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PREFACE
Credit for the concept of a celebration and symposium to mark the 20th anniversary of the first flights
of the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) and Supercritical Wing (SCW) research aircraft belongs to Dry-
den Flight Research Center (DFRC) Director Kenneth J. Szalai. Under the watchful eye of Chief Engineer
Milton O. Thompson, the two aircraft had been brought out of storage by Dryden Public Affairs Officer
Nancy D. Lovato and were being refurbished for display as part of the Dryden heritage, joining the
presently-displayed X-1E rocket-powered research aircraft and HL-10 lifting body research vehicle. Col-
laborating with Milt, Nancy had planned a modest F-8 display ceremony for on-site staff once the aircraft
were in place on their respective concrete pads.
A ceremony on a much broader scale was requested by Director Szalai in recognition of the 20th
anniversaries and the significant role of flight research in adoption of the landmark DFBW and SCW tech-
nologies by the aeronautical community. Accordingly, the celebration was expanded to include a technical
symposium with a keynote speaker from NASA Headquarters, the display aircraft dedication, a pilots'
panel discussion, and a 20th anniversary social event with after-dinner talk by noted aerospace historian
Dr. Richard P. Hallion. Participants and invited guests were to include former members of the DFBW and
SCW teams, pilots who had flown both aircraft, and the younger members of the Dryden staff.
A small organizing committee was formed and later expanded under Nancy Lovato's leadership to
carry out the planning and myriad other tasks necessary to assure an outstanding event. At the risk of over-
sight, several individuals must be recognized for their service on the organizing committee:
Milt Thompson
DFRC Chief Engineer
Elder Statesman, Advisor
Joe D'Agostino
DFRC Administration and Technical
Services Division - Facility Support
Ed Saltzman
PRC Inc.
SCW Technical Program Chair
Don Bacon
DFRC Research Engineering Division
Financial Manager
Dwain Deets
DFRC Research Engineering Division
DFBW Technical Program Chair
Louis Steers
DFRC Director's Technical Assistant
Aircraft Displays Chair
Jim Phelps
DFRC - Flight Operations Division
Dinner Program Chair
Don Nolan
DFRC Public Affairs
Publicity, Invitations, Badges
Dan Viney
Woodside Summit
Commemorative Medallion Supplier
Malty Curry
DFRC Imaging Technology Branch
Audio/Visual Services Support
Stephanie Rudy
DFRC Program Assistant
Luncheon Chair
Monique Sullivan
DFRC Contracts Management Branch
Procurements
vii
Cal Jarvis
DFRC Aerospace Projects Office
Commemorative Medallion Design Coordination
Laurel Mann
DFRC Aerospace Projects Office
Registration, Logistics
Cheryl Heathcock
Woodside Summit - Public Affairs
Committee Minutes
Karen Richards
PRC Inc.
Historical Exhibits Chair
As an aid to readers, a nomenclature and bibliographies for further reading are provided as appendices.
It has been my pleasure to serve as Program Chair of the Digital Fly-By-Wire and Supercritical Wing
20th Anniversary Celebration and to prepare these proceedings.
Kenneth E. Hodge
Dryden Associate Director
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WELCOME AND OPENING REMARKS
Kenneth E. Hodge
Welcome to the F-8 Conference and Dedication. My name is Ken
Hodge; I am the general chairman of this event and my challenge today
is to keep us on schedule and be sure everything works smoothly.
According to the agenda, there will be a short break after the third
speaker. After the wrap up of the Digital Fly-by-Wire session, we'll
proceed to the display area where we will dedicate the two F-8's.
Please note that the white chairs are reserved for the original F-8 team
members.
Following the dedication we will walk to the Integrated Test Facility
which is less than 1/8th of a mile from here for our luncheon and pilots'
panel. There are two vans parked in the parking lot behind you for those who might have some difficulty
in walking or getting down to the ITF, so please take advantage of that. The vans will also be available to
bring you back from the ITF to the afternoon session.
After the luncheon and pilots' panel we will return to this auditorium for the windup of our meeting.
Those are the administrative details.
It is now my pleasure to introduce Dr. Dale Compton, Director of the Ames Research Center.
INTRODUCTION OF THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ASSOCIATE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE OFFICE OF AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
TECHNOLOGY
Dr. Dale Compton
Thank you very much Ken. It is always a pleasure to be at Dryden and
particularly on this occasion. For those of us who started our careers in
research, we believed at the time that research was good in its own right,
and discovered that we had to justify the research. These two programs
we are celebrating today epitomize the justification. I have attended
many meetings and advisory groups. Members of advisory groups who
are here know what they are all about, and the questions we are always
asked are, "Where is the value in this research?" and "How can we show
the value?" These two programs show the value in a way that is so evi-
dent there can be no question about them.
I don't want to get ahead of the story here. The folks who have been involved understand the technol-
ogy and applications far better than I, and can tell the story far better than I. I'd like to let them do that. It
is my privilege today to introduce the keynote speaker, Richard, better known as "Dick" Kline, who is the
Special Assistant to the Associate Administrator for NASA' s Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
(OAST) in Washington.
Dick is a newcomer to NASA management, but he'll forgive me for saying so. He's an old timer to
aerospace with a 35-year career in the field, most of it with the Grumman Corporation where he served as
a senior executive, manager, and technical expert. Immediately prior to coming to NASA he was vice pres-
ident for their Space Station Program Support Division and before that he was program vice president for
Grumman Shuttle Space Systems Technology and Development.
He's a natural for his current position at NASA because of his experience on the aeronautics and the
space side of technology development. That is particularly important for the role he is playing in OAST at
this time. On the aeronautics side, he was involved in the design of Grumman's A-6 Intruder, F-14 Tomcat,
Gulfstream executive jet, and E-2A Hawkeye. On the space side, he was program manager for the Lunar
Module Thermal Heat Shield Program for the Apollo era and was technical manager of the Lunar Module
Manned Systems Test Program. As you can see, his experience encompasses all aspects of what NASA
does.
Dick has served on a number of advisory panels and boards. He has served on the President's Space
Commission Utilization Task Force, US Scientific Advisory Board, the Committee on Space Debris, the
National Research Council, ASEB Panel on NASA Space Research and Technology Program, and on the
NASA Advisory Committee Task Force on the Role of Man in Space. He has been the chairperson of the
Aerospace Industries Association (AIA) Space Committee for the past couple of years. Dick has not only
played the role of technology manager but also played the role of advisor. Attesting to that are the awards.
He's been elected to the International Academy of Astronautics, he's a fellow of the AIAA and several
other professional societies, he has authored and coauthored 46 papers of a technical nature and he is a
licensed New York State Professional Engineer. It's with great pleasure this morning that I welcome Dick
Kline to this podium.
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F-8 FLIGHT RESEARCH OF THE PAST - A GUIDE FOR AERONAUTICS OF
THE FUTURE
Richard Kline
Thank you Dale. It's a real pleasure to be here at Dryden to join you
on this happy occasion of celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Su-
percritical Airfoil and Digital Fly-By-Wire Programs. I bring you
greetings from Associate Administrator Pete Peterson from the Office
of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST), who I daresay would
much rather be here than wading through the torrents of FY-94 budget
plans and the various pressures of red and blue teams. Nevertheless, it
is my pleasure to be here in his place. I want to talk to you about three
things. First, the environment that we are in from the aviation side; sec-
ond, some opinions which I have relative to the F-8 programs; and
third, what OAST is doing in its strategy for building and strengthening
even more of the technology in aeronautics.
Let me turn first to the aeronautics environment. In 1991, just within the United States, the aeronautics
business had sales of more than $90 billion, employing almost a million highly skilled personnel in the
process. Of that amount, at least $28 billion was in exports, and so more than any other industry it helped
contribute to a positive balance in payments for our country. The outlook between now and the year 2005
is a doubling in just the air travel side of that business, creating a market for an estimated $600 billion in
new jet transport aircraft. It's exciting and important to us as a country (but many others recognize that
same critical importance) and so we see other companies and countries positioning themselves for large
participation in that activity. Looking back, American industry sees European and Japanese companies po-
sition themselves to do a lot of business, business that we might say is our business. At the same time, we
see a decrease in military expenditures which reduces the base from which this activity can go on. Third,
we see in the European and Japanese communities increased strengthening of the R & D activity so vital
to participation at a later time. It is vital that the United States, both from the private industry and from the
govemment side, do the right things to position ourselves for leadership in the next 13 years.
Within that environment let's look back now at the F-8 programs. We'll hear from many of you who
are much more expert than I about those two programs. I want to highlight four things which I think are
significant. The first is the selection of the F-8 Crusader Jet from a field of military fighter aircraft, an area
where, with stringent requirements, you have a robust airframe with large structural margins with ample
propulsive capability to meet those requirements. Then there are the wide flight envelopes. When you cou-
ple those flight features with the added benefit of a structural design for the wing which allowed for easy
modification, add the fact that the aircraft came at no cost to NASA - the price was right - and even a Grum-
manite like myself has got to turn back and say that an excellent decision was made for that vehicle.
There are several other important features relative to the program. One is the involvement, right from
the very beginning, with the analysts, wind tunnel experimentalists, and then the flight researchers in close
communication. Then, the approach of not waiting for the ultimate aircraft (which might never have come;
who knows?), but to get on with the job and get early flight research results so that one could build from
that for what needed to be done at a later time. Dryden fostered development of dual use technologies, with
NASA providing an essential link between military and civil aircraft technology application. Although the
F-8 wasamilitary aircraft,thetechnologiesthatwerevalidated-supercriticalairfoils anddigital flight con-
trois-arebroadlyapplicableto civil aircraft.Finally, therewasthefeatureof gettingwidedissemination
of thedataearly.Thesethingscoupledtogetherformedtheimportantbasisof thephilosophyunderwhich
this programwasdirected.Theproductcertainlyshowsit, becausetheairfoil activity found its way into
commercialvehiclessuchasthe757,767(in whichI flewonmy wayouthere),andtheMD-11.With the
Digital Fly-By-Wire Program,theF-18quicklypickedit upbut it will bealmost15yearsbeforeit appears
in the777.We've got to acceleratetransferof technologyandits incorporationinto practiceto maintain
ourcompetitiveedge.
I selectedsomeexamplesto makeapoint abouttheF-8Program.TheF-8Programwasfaster,smarter,
cheaperwhile maintainingflight safetythroughoutheprogram.Thisshouldbeveryfamiliar to thoseof
youwhohavebeenworkingwith thepoliciesNASA intendsto implementagency-wide.I wouldsaythat
theF-8Programis oneof theharbingersof thatkind of activityaswe look into it. You havea wonderful
heritagehereatDrydenin developingandtransitioningcutting-edgeaeronauticaltechnology.
WhereisOASTgoing?TheOASThasdraftedastatementof positionwhichI will readtoyou.Briefly
stated,we intendto
"Maintain/achieveworld leadershipin pioneeringhighpay-off,critical technologieswith theeffective
transferof productsto industry,DOD, andFAA for applicationto superiorUScivil andmilitary aircraft
andfor theenhancedsafetyandcapacityof ourNationalAviation System."
As manyof you know from beingpartof it, wehaveestablisheda programto bringthat into reality.
In 1989,NASA's AeronauticsAdvisoryCommitteeTaskForceonFlight Researchrecognizedtheimpor-
tanceof flight researchactivity andI quote:
"The US aviationcommunitybelievesthatthe foreignchallengeis, in part,theresult of insufficient
attentionin theUSto technologyvalidation- themidphaseof theR & D processbetweenbasicresearch
andproductapplicationandproduction.In thisregard,flight researchhasbeenandwill continueto bea
majorcontributorto thesuccessfulcompletionof thiscritical phaseof theR & D chain."
I say- well said!Now whatgoeson from herein OAST?
We arenowtrying to gofrom thatvisionto thetechnicalprogramwhich is going to attainthatresult.
Evenin theseausteretimes,wemustcraftthebestprogramto bringourselvesforward.To meetourcom-
mitment to supportthenationalaeronauticsgoals,we look first to thehighestflight regime,to thetrans-
atmosphericNationalAeroSpacePlaneactivity.Leadershipmustbeprovidedto alargeextentherein the
developmentandin thedemonstrationof criticaltechnologies.At thesametime,weneedto turnbackand
recognizetheveryhigh costthatwewill facein attemptingto do thosevalidationandresearchactivities.
That sayswemustchallengeDrydento comeupwith creativeandinnovativewaysto keepcostsdown
andto close-couplethetechnology-aswedid with theF-8-backto theNASPprogram.
The secondof the threeareasthatwe arelooking at in theOAST Programis high-speedresearchin
the high-speedcivil transportregime.Herewe focuson two key concerns.First is commercialaircraft
communitynoise;secondis atmosphericpollution.Greatimprovementsandprogresshavebeenmadein
theseareas,andif wecontinuein thedirectionwe're going,I think thoseenvironmentalimpedimentscan
beeliminated.Weneedto focusfurtheronthepropulsionandtheairframetechnologyanddo thosethings
necessaryto give ourselvesabettereconomicadvantagein thedesignsdevelopedin theUnitedStates.
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Thethirdareais in subsonicaircrafttechnology.We mustrecognizethatsubsonictransportsaregoing
to bedominantwell into theearly2000's,andwemustpositionourselvesfor theproperparticipationin
that activity.
This meansgoingbackinto flight safety-thegroundoperations,flight operationsactivities-andthen
working in theairframe,propulsion,andflight controlareasto provideadvancedtechnologyasthebasis
for designandsystemenhancements.Ournewadministrator,DanielGoldin,haschallengedusto become
partof a newteam,sharingits visionandstrategywith all of its stakeholders.Its objectiveis straightfor-
ward-find new waysto do thingssafer,faster,better,cheaper,andmakecontinuousimprovementa part
of everythingwedo.All of usneedto bepartof this team.It's theright objectiveat this time for NASA
within theenvironmentwithin whichweall work-bothnationallyandinternationally.I askyour help.
I alsoaskyourhelp in seekingandimplementinginnovativewaysto transitionour technologyto our
customers.That is thebottomline, andtheultimatevindicationof thework whichwe do is theextentto
which it actuallyis committedinto practice.We mustextendourpartnershipwith industry,government,
andotherpartiesto bemoreeffectivethanwehavebeenin thepast,althoughI think we've hadextremely
goodmarkssofar.
What elsecanyou do?I submitonemorepieceof advice.Be anactiveandvocalparticipantin your
program. Talk up the program with your friends and your neighbors.Communicate with your
congresspeople,your senators,explainingto themthe advantagesandvalueto the Americanpeopleof
havingtheright aeronauticsprogramfor ournation.Don't beafraidto showthisoff; you're doingsome-
thing very, very right. You areon theright sideof theneed.A healthyandcompetitiveU.S.aeronautics
industryis vital to oureconomy.
Programslike theF-8SupercriticalWingandDigitalFly-By-Wirehaveshownusthewayto bringthat
technologyinto practice.We needa strongflight researchprogramto developthetechnologybaseand
encourageits transferinto theusercommunity.Let's profit from theoutstandingexamplesshownby these
F-8 Programs;usethemasmodelsfor technologydevelopment.ContinuetheDrydentradition through
sounddemonstrationsthatinvestmentin aeronauticsreturnsrealvaluefor ourcountry.
Congratulationsto youagain,andthankyou.
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INTRODUCTION OF KEN SZALAI
Ken Hodge
Thank you Dick for that pat on the back and those words of wisdom. I'd like to now introduce Ken
Szalai, Director of the Dryden Flight Research Center, who will introduce our next speaker.
INTRODUCTION OF DUANE McRUER
Kenneth J. Szalai
It's a pleasure for me to introduce Duane McRuer, who will focus
on flight research, especially its role in discovery. The name McRuer
has become synonymous with manual and automatic flight controls,
human operator-vehicle systems interactions, flying qualities, and
flight dynamics. Some will argue all of these things are really one and
the same. I think that more than any other individual, "Mac" has unified
flight dynamics, flight controls, and flying qualities.
He is Cal Tech educated, and I guess that I should correct that and
say that one of Mac's characteristics is his lifelong education and learn-
ing, which is a good lesson for all of us. He was with Northrop between
the years of 1948 and 1954 and worked on the Flying Wing during that time. Since 1957 he's been the
president and technical director of Systems Technology, Incorporated. He's worked on more than 50 ve-
hicles: spacecraft, bombers, fighters, transports, RPVs, missiles, research aircraft, and ground vehicles.
He is the author of more than 100 papers and reports, and 7 books. He's been a major contributor to un-
derstanding the design and application of manual and automatic flight control systems.
Perhaps more notable is that he has given a tremendous amount back to the aeronautics and space com-
munity. When a program needs a real review, not just somebody just to check a square off, that's when
Duane McRuer is called upon by this country, whether it's space shuttles, spacecraft, aircraft, or other
complex programs. Mac has been willing to give of himself, sacrifice a great deal, and contribute to this
country and these programs. He is on the NASA Advisory Council which reports directly to the NASA
Administrator. He was the intellectual force behind really understanding the role of flight research in dis-
covery.
He is a fellow in five professional societies. He was the recipient of the NASA Distinguished Public
Service Award and the Mechanics and Control of Flight Award, the prestigious award of the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA). He is also a member of the National Academy of
Engineering. He' s a mountaineer, a student of history, and has mentored many young scientists and engi-
neers, including the one speaking to you now. It's an honor and pleasure to introduce Duane McRuer as a
scientist, engineer, mentor, and friend.

THE CENTRAL ROLE OF FLIGHT RESEARCH IN AERONAUTICS:
DISCOVERY AND MATURATION
Duane McRuer
Flight Research as a Central Activity in Aeronautics
A thesis in this paper is that flight research has two quite different
facets-discovery and maturation. Technology maturation is the more
common function, involving flight validation or flight demonstration.
These important aspects of flight research are needed to confirm and
fine tune expectations, and to help solve known problems. Such flight
programs are undertaken knowing what is sought, at least in principle,
and they tend to be terminal phases of an open-loop development pro-
cess. In the history of aeronautics, by far the most important result of
flight research has been discovery-revealing what exists but is not yet
perceived (fig. l). The pioneering flight research programs conducted
on the digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) and supercritical wing (SCW) air-
craft which we celebrate today have been remarkable examples of technical maturation and discovery
categories. Much of this heritage will be recapitulated by other speakers so I am going to focus on flight
research in general-but the F-8 DFBW will make a momentary appearance as an exemplary entry.
Validation = to confirm expectations
Know what you're looking for, at least in principle
Discovery = to reveal what exists, but is not yet perceived
Hopes, dreams, and faith-great expectations for novelties
Figure 1. Validation versus discovery.
As shown in figure 2 (adapted from ref. 1), aeronautical research can be depicted as an interconnected
aeronautical triad with many feedbacks and crossfeeds among the elements. In combining maturation and
discovery roles, flight research becomes a central discipline in aeronautics which is intrinsically interac-
tive and synergistic with the other design disciplines. When the discovery role is involved, the flight
research element can become the initial rather than a terminal phase. In either a maturation or discovery
role, flight research is indispensable for aeronautical, scientific, and technological advance.
Even a brief consideration of the advantages and limitations of each of the elements in the triad makes
clear their complementary, noncompetitive roles in aeronautical developments.
Theory and computation, including numerical simulation, allow the isolated study of known phenom-
ena of interest. Harnessing the power of the computer, many variations can be examined relatively
inexpensively by these means. Designs which are optimum in one or more ways can be achieved.
Theoretically-based, mathematical representations provide a general framework for understanding, but
they are likely to be incomplete in one or more aspects. Thus testing is essential.
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Ground Test
Theory
and
Computation
Figure 2. Relationships in aeronautics research.
Ground testing, like mathematical simulations, has the virtue of eliminating some unwanted phenom-
ena from consideration while, it is hoped, adding realism and more complete representations. Frequently,
however, some extraneous factors are introduced whose effects are unneeded and, to some degree,
uncertain.
Flight research, on the other hand, can provide complete representation and realism, albeit at some
sacrifice in the ability to isolate phenomena. Most importantly, it intrinsically includes all the system in-
teractions, foreseen and unforeseen.
Those involved in the design of aircraft always hope that the early flight phases of new aircraft devel-
opment (which amount to flight research, but is seldom referred to as such) represent only validations, that
only fine tuning will be required, and that the designs have sufficient margin and robustness to accommo-
date all the uncertainties and possibly overlooked phenomena. But, most know that this is not the likely
result-something will indeed be discovered in flight as the envelope is expanded. It is hoped that the
discovery will be something good, but this is not necessarily the result.
After the inevitable discoveries, theories are revised, foci for future ground tests are changed, etc., as
the result of feedback from flight research to the other elements of the aeronautical research triad. Most
importantly, the new phenomena discovered become entries in the fundamental database on which aero-
nautical leadership is based-new insights which offer or can lead to enhanced performance of one sort or
another, new problems which must be resolved and accommodated, etc. In short-the bases for understand-
ing and unveiling the future!
Validation versus Discovery
Flight research is a sort of conundrum because its two roles-maturation and discovery-and their mo-
tivations, are quite unlike. It is essential to understand and keep the distinctions in perspective (fig. 3).
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• Flight research Is Incorrectly often equated to:
- Flight validation
- Flight demonstration
- A terminal result of an open-loop development process
• Flight research is Instead a central discipline which
- Is interactive and synergistic with other design disciplines
- Includes validation, demonstration, and discovery
Figure 3. Flight research.
Technology maturation via flight validation-demonstration involves tasks which are usually fairly
easy to comprehend. By the very definition of validation--demonstration, the tasks are usually the final
stage in largely open-loop development processes. And, while some risk is always present when new
things are being explored, concrete expectations and estimates are such that outfight failure is defmitely
not expected. Such flight operations can, accordingly, be considered in concrete programmatic and cost
terms. Flight is not inexpensive, and this kind of flight research can become very dear indeed. It is therefore
inevitable that technological policy makers are tempted to adjust priorities according to financial realities,
sometimes to the detriment of the ultimate flight validation--demonstration needed to achieve subsequent
commercial viability.
In the evolution of aeronautics, discoveries stemming from flight research activities have been histor-
ically dominant (fig. 4). There are good reasons to suggest that this historical trend will continue, even in-
crease. Inherent in discovery is the need to take risks and to accept the fact that there will be failures.
Unfortunately, there is no easy way to subject discovery to cost accounting procedures and attitudes.
NASA, in its space sciences efforts has shown unprecedented vision and leadership in sowing the seeds
for future discoveries in the space arena. Similar vision is needed in aeronautics.
• In the evolution of aeronautics, flight research for discovery has always been
defined by the leading edges of knowledge In the other disciplines
• In early aeronautics, flight-based discovery was almost everything
- Hydrodynamic analysis-mainly theory:
Newton, Bernoulli, D'Alembert, Euler, Navler,
Stokes, Poisson, Helmholtz, Rayleigh, Klrchhoff
• Experiment-mainly fluid resistance:
- D'Alembert (ship drag); Robins (whirling arm, 1743)
- Reynolds; Philips (wind tunnel, 1885); Lillenthal (whirling arm)
- Langley; Wright brothers (wind tunnel)
• Integrated effects:
- Models (Penaud, Cayley)
- Flight (Lillenthal, Wright brothers)
• Because integrated effects were everything, theory and basic experiments played
only a minor role (except models and wind tunnel)
Figure 4. Flight research as a discovery process.
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Examples of Flight Research Discoveries
Concrete examples of past flight research discoveries include almost all dynamic phenomena of air-
craft stability and control (fig. 5). Indeed, weather-cock stability and the longitudinal phugoid are perhaps
the only stability and control features which were well-understood theoretically before first flight-and the
Wright brothers paid little attention to the first and completely ignored the second! The flight-derived dis-
coveries include pilot-vehicle interactions such as longitudinal and lateral-directional pilot-induced oscil-
lations (PIO), most aircraft-alone modal instabilities such as tuck, directional divergence, nose slice,
engine-enhanced phugoid instabilities, inertial coupling, rolling velocity reversals, and a host of other phe-
nomena that have given stability and control aerodynamicists and flight control engineers a steady diet of
fascinating occupation and test pilots some interesting moments! The detailed nature of transonic shifts in
the center of pressure, shock interactions, buffet, and wing-rock are other examples. Dynamic interactions
combining structural, aerodynamic, and control effects, starting with flutter, and propulsion-aerodynamic
phenomena can also be cited. Although I have focused here on dynamics, stability, and control because of
my background, it is fair to say that in the history of aeronautics, many dynamic phenomena in all the fun-
damental aeronautical disciplines have been discovered in flight.
These examples suggest that flight testing functions not solely in a validation mode or even in a risk
reduction or demonstration mode, but as a means of discovering what is. In this sense, flight research is an
indispensable part of the creative process in aeronautics. Modem aircraft are increasingly dependent on
the interactions of complex systems to function (ref. 2) and realistic interactions are often revealed only in
the flight environment, so flight testing in the discovery mode becomes increasingly important.
Figure 5.
• Vehicle dynamic phenomena
- Tuck-under (Moaqulto?)
- PIOs (Wright's, XB-19, F-86, YF-16, YF-22)
- Deep stall (Curtla XP-55)
- Lightly-clamped quadretic dipoles
• O)(p/03 d effect
- rigid/flexible/controls coupling (Snark)
- Rolling velocity reversals
- Lateral phugoids (X-13)
- Inertial coupling
- Departure
- Engine-enhanced phugoid instabilities
• Fundamental engineering problems
- Propulsion-induced flow interectlons
- Wing-warp
- Aeroelastic distortion/trim hinge moments
• Major ubiquitous integration problems
- Pilot-vehicle dynamics/flying qualities
- Aerodynamice/propulsion/structuree
Some typical discoveries in flight research.
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A Concrete Example-Pilot-Induced Oscillations
To provide some concrete examples I will present a short series of videos that show so-called pilot-
induced oscillations. This topic has been selected for a variety of reasons. First, it is one aspect of flight
research which can readily be illustrated to a general audience. Second, although there are outward simi-
larities between the examples, the actual technical details and contributing causes are often quite different.
That is, PIOs are, in general, a complex class of diverse phenomena which cannot be simply explained and
understood. Third, as the examples chosen will attest, such phenomena permeate aviation's history, and
are with us today. Indeed, a comprehensive understanding of PIOs remains a major problem in flying qual-
ities research. While much is known and understood for specific examples (see e.g., refs. 3-6), further
understanding is needed if PIOs are to reliably be estimated and alleviated.
As noted in figure 5, pilot involvement in oscillatory behavior was first demonstrated by the Wright
brothers. There is a famous on-board movie sequence from a 1908 flight of the Wright Model A of a
steady-state pitching oscillation. Because the airplane was longitudinally unstable, the pilot had to exert a
stabilizing influence, and the resulting oscillation was normal and routine rather than a big problem.
Skipping a few decades to the immediate pre-World War 2 era, we have the XB-19, a giant experimen-
tal bomber. This is shown in the first video sequence, but this time the operation was distinctly abnormal.
The next example is much more dramatic and deadly. These remarkable movies show the second pass
of an attempted low-altitude 3-kilometer record run by an F-4 conducted at White Sands on May 18, 1961.
The airplane's envelope had not been pushed to the dynamic pressures involved in this very low altitude
pass, and the pilot was understandably apprehensive. The night before the record try he indicated that he
would trim the airplane nose up, so that if anything happened he could just let go, but he didn't!
The next sequence shows a somewhat premature first flight of the first operational fly-by-wire fighter,
the F- 16. The operations of this pilot-aircraft system seemed quite ambivalent-was this to be a taxi test or
what? Remarkably, the great skill of the pilot (Phil Oestricher) saved the day, but just barely !
On October 26, 1977, another fly-by-wire craft, this time of the digital variety, had its day on the news
hour. The approach and landing tests using the shuttle Enterprise culminated in this famous sequence
which, in detail, exhibited several PIO modes, a,4
These dramatic events, and other less-well photographed PIOs, have received a great deal of attention
from the community comprising test pilots and flying qualities, stability and control, and flight control en-
gineers. As it turns out, while the general nature of the aircraft's oscillatory behavior can be readily appre-
ciated from the visual evidence, sometimes supplemented by detailed quantitative data, the underlying
pilot and aircraft behaviors which can combine to create such devastating results are remarkably diverse
and difficult to understand.
Figure 6 gives a breakdown of some of the known major factors associated with PIOs. Some of these
are complicated or even arcane in themselves, and still more complex in their interactions. One of the sim-
pler causes among the major airplane factors is the net high-frequency lag of the effective aircraft-
stability-and-control augmentation system (SCAS). Excessive values can guarantee that a PIO will occur
sometime, somewhere. One of the flight research discoveries that can be attributed to the Digital Fly-by-
Wire F-8 is the definitive data point in this regard. The actual flight sequence is shown in the next video.
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• Aircraft dynamic characteristics
- Undesirable effective vehicle dynamics
- Controller rate and position limits
"PiO syndrome"
Unfavorable quadratic dipoles
- Manipulator force and displacement characteristics
- Vehicle dynamics transitions
Stick-fixed/atic k-frae
Vehicle dynamics form changes
Moding transients
Triggering disturbances
• Pilot behavioral characteristics
- Excessive pilot gain
- Inappropriate pilot adaptation
- Improper pilot behavioral organization
- Transitions in pilot behavioral organization
Pursuit to compensatory
Precognitive to compensatory
- Locked-in resonance/precognitive lock-in
Figure 6. Pilot-induced oscillation fundamental factors.
In sporadic experimental work attempting to elicit quantitative understanding of those PIO phenomena
associated with time delay, a fairly large database has been gathered using simulators of all sorts, fixed and
moving ground-based, and airborne using variable stability aircraft. Ground-based simulators have usually
been poor quantitative predictors of PIO tendencies. As shown in figure 7, the pilot ratings for simulators
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and even for relatively benign airborne tasks are only moderately sensitive to effective time delay. But, for
crux moves with high attentional demands and focused purpose, the time delay can be of paramount
importance. As previously noted, the DFBW F-8 results are definitive here. Indeed, the allowable effective
time delay (not to exceed 0.10 sec for Level 1 flying qualities) in military specifications reflects these data.
Many of the entries in figure 6 are still highly qualitative and obscure, so complete understanding still
eludes us and these interactions are still important issues yearning for flight research discoveries! That our
advanced appreciation is still insufficient is probably best illustrated by the last video sequence, showing
the recent unscheduled YF-22 landing which is current indeed (April 25, 1992).
Has the Age of Discovery in Aeronautics Passed?
At the outset the answer to this rhetorical question is a resounding "NO!" Some of the reasons are listed
in figures 8 and 9. Discovery possibilities are always present when understanding is inadequate and when
flight regimes are extended. The probability of discovery is also very high at performance margins-
boundaries and when underappreciated interactions are present. Discovery in flight research is most com-
monly associated with integrated and overall systems effects. Although models, computation, and theories
are all enormously advanced, the leading edge for the ultimate integration which occurs only in flight is
correspondingly extended. The interactions between technical disciplines are much closer, the frequency
ranges of interacting phenomena are enormously extended, scalings for model experiments cannot dupli-
cate flight, etc. The effective vehicle is no longer an airframe fitted with an engine, but is an integrated
aero/structural/propulsion/control system, with each of the disciplines introducing their own dynamic
effects and coupling with one another. Further, for manned aircraft, the interactions with the pilot within
the system not only remain with us but are augmented by new considerations. Flying qualities continue as
a predominant theme, extended and complicated with issues involving living with automation, flight man-
agement, and divided attention workloads, all providing new interactive phenomena.
One of the most notable conclusions of reference 2 is the ubiquitous presence of interactive disciplines
cooperating dynamically to create aircraft of the future. The physical manifestations of these dynamic in-
teractions are efficient and highly advanced designs-and, implicitly, many new discoveries. Discoveries
found in the course of flight research will, in many cases, have to lead the way to these new horizons.
I
D
D
Figure 8.
Flight discovery today is still heavily associated with integrated effects but at a
much higher level. Models, computation, theory all enormously advanced but
Frequency ranges of phenomena enormously extended
Interactions between technical disciplines closer
incompatible scalings for model experiments
Interference effects in experiments
Theory often ahead of experiment
Flight environment extended
Reasons why the age of discovery in aeronautics has not passed.
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• Most important involve closed-loop system phenomena introduced by the Wrights,
with their appreciation of pilot-vehicle closed-loop operations
- Continue to this day in the guise of "flying qualities" as a major purpose for flight
research
- Generalized now to include automatic systems, broader frequency ranges,
involvement with more systems, etc.
- Notable on VTOL, rotorcreft, and propelled hypersonic craft
• Vehicle-alone dynamic interactions
- Edge of envelope
- Flow-field interactions
- Transition
Figure 9. Dynamic interactions, a hot bed for discovery.
Planning for Discovery and Future Advances
Full-scale aircraft and special models are the bases for empirical discoveries and developments in aero-
nautics. As previously described, full-scale flight research activities are essential for leading-edge and
highly integrated effective vehicles. In the past, research aircraft have played prominent roles, and to some
extent they will continue to do so. But for reasons of cost we have to take advantage of other, already
existing aircraft modified for experimental purposes.
In its flight research study, 7 the National Research Council's Aeronautics and Space Engineering
Board (ASEB) concluded that a national focus on flight research is needed. The ASEB recommended that
a National Research Aircraft Enterprise be set up to assess requirements for flight research for validation
and discovery and to promote and advocate experimental and proof-of-concept aircraft. This enterprise
should be national in scope, with DoD and NASA as governmental partners appropriately assisted and ad-
vised by industry and academe.
In conclusion, I've emphasized discovery as a major theme in this talk. An obvious question is, "How
does one configure a flight research program to guarantee discoveries?" This impossibly simplistic
question has no simple answers. But we can search technological history for insights and parallels. James
Burke's "Connections," as shown on public television a few years ago, showed again and again how
apparently unconnected devices, ideas, and concepts can often interact, via the medium of a prepared
mind, to create new visions and understanding. Daniel Boorstin's "The Discoverers ''8 is also full of inspi-
rational analogies. Some of the more obvious generalities gleaned from experience are summarized in
figure 10.
• Discovery is most likely to occur to the curious and prepared mind, searching
for understanding
• Discovery possibilities are almost always present
- At the margins/frontiers
- When understanding is inadequate
- When flight regimes are extended
- With underappreciatsd interactions
Figure 10. Prescription for discovery.
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Aeronautical history makes clear that where advanced flight research is involved, the unexpected is
just around the comer and we must be prepared to make the most of it. After all,
"There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;"
And, if we're not prepared, Shakespeare finishes with,
"Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries."
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Some of the material contained herein initially appeared in the ASEB White Paper on flight research,
reference 7.
REFERENCES
.
.
.
.
5.
.
.
.
"Assessment of NASA's Flight Research and Technology Program and Capability with Respect to
Current and Furore National Needs," Report of the Aeronautics Advisory Committee Ad Hoc Team
for Flight Research and Technology, Apr. 16, 1989.
"Aeronautics Technology Possibilities for 2000," Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, Nation-
al Research Council, 1984.
Ashkenas, Irving L., Roger H. Hoh, and Gary L. Teper, "Analyses of Shuttle Orbiter Approach and
Landing," AIAA J. of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics, Vol. 6, No. 6, Nov/Dec 1983, pp. 448--455.
"Advances in Flying Qualities," AGARD LS-157, 1988.
Ashkenas, Irving L., H.R. Jex, and Duane T. McRuer, Pilot-Induced Oscillations: Their Cause and
Analysis, STI TR 239-2, June 20, 1964. Also published as Norair Div., Report NOR 64-143.
Smith, Ralph H., "A Theory for Longitudinal Short-Period Pilot-Induced Oscillations," AFFDL-TR-
77-57, June 1957.
"Flight Research: An Important Component of Aerospace Research," Aeronautics and Space Engi-
n_ring Board White Paper, National Research Council, Nov. 1990.
Boorstin, Daniel J., "The Discoverers: An Illustrated History of Man's Search to Know His World
and Himself," Harry N. Abrams, Inc., New York, 1991. Text identical to "The Discoverers," pub-
lished by Random House, Inc., 1983.
17
Ken Hodge
At this point, Ken Szalai will take the podium again to make retrospective remarks about the F-8 Dig-
ital Fly-By-Wire Program, the harbinger of today's systems-dominated airplanes, and he will also intro-
duce our third speaker.
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THE F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE AIRCRAFT; HARBINGER OF TODAY'S
SYSTEMS-DOMINATED AIRPLANES
Kenneth J. Szalai
We are focusing on the original F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW)
aircraft, and as I looked at it in the last few days, this program and aircraft
served in the following ways. First, it was not a one-shot demonstration
or validation. The F-8 DFBW program was a link between the Space Pro-
gram of the 1960's and the Aeronautics Program of the 1970's. Digital
computers were very rare in airplanes before 1970; in fact, at Dryden we
only had a digital computer in one airplane (a Honeywell Alert computer
installed in an F-104 for a guidance experiment). In the Apollo Program,
however, the Lunar Module and the Command and Service Module had
full-authority, digital fly-by-wire control for the lunar landing and entry.
There were many things transferred from the Apollo Program to the F-8 Program. The guidance, nav-
igation, and control system from the Lunar Module was used as the core hardware system in the F-8. This
reduced the cost and schedule significantly. It also ensured a high level of safety because of the integrity
of the hardware. We also used much Apollo software, which included the operating system and a large
amount of utility software. This also contributed to reducing the cost and schedule of the F-8 Program.
In addition, there was the transfer of expertise and experience. I think of two organizations specifical-
ly-the Draper Lab, and AC Spark Plug, now Delco Electronics. I remember the Phase I Program people-
A1 Engle and Bob Bairnsfather. We also have in the audience today Phil Felleman, Vince Megna, Bob
O'Donnell, and George Silver. Their expertise is an enormous national asset. The Draper Lab is one of the
success stories of this country's advanced technology work. On the AC Spark Plug side, I remember Ken
Adamek and Ben Beh. Ken is here today. I remember when the AC Spark Plug people came in and refused
to open their boxes of hardware because the area was too dirty. They insisted on vacuuming all the sand
before opening the boxes and powering up the precious Apollo hardware. The sand blew in again after they
left, of course, but it never affected the operation.
The Draper Lab and AC Spark Plug experience transferred from the space program to aeronautics was
significant. The enormous infrastructure of these two organizations also transferred, which included sys-
tems and software design processes, software management, configuration control, and verification and
validation processes. This was a major reason for the quick advance we made in this technology.
The second contribution of the F-8 DFBW aircraft flight program was that it was certainly a milestone
in flight. It was the first true fly-by-wire and the first true digital fly-by-wire aircraft without any mechan-
ical back up. It unshackled designers and allowed them to select configurations and stability levels that
were previously forbidden. It was a significant force in changing the course of aircraft design. At this point
I would like to note the pioneering work done by the US Air Force on the F-4 Survivable Flight Control
System and later on the Advanced Fighter Technology Integration (AFTI)/F- 16 DFBW flight control sys-
tem. These advances enabled the transition of digital fly-by-wire technology into military aircraft.
The third role of the F-8 DFBW program was as a prolific and productive flight research facility. After
the first flight of the F-8 on May 25, 1972, the program engineers developed a Fault-Tolerant Triplex
DFBW System in 1976, which pioneered techniques in sensor, computer, and actuator redundancy man-
agement. Research was done in analytic redundancy management with Langley, the Draper Lab, and with
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MIT. We alsoconductedexperimentsusingreal-timeparameteridentification.This involvedanadaptive
control experimentdonewith LangleyandHoneywell.GaryHartmann,who is heretoday,designedthe
advancedcontrol lawsfor theF-8 andalsodevelopedtheadaptivecontrol system.We did work onside
stickforcecontrolandaresidentback-upsoftwaresystem.Thiswasaback-upsoftwaresystemapproach
which hasfound its way intousein severalaircraft.We alsodid a greatdealof work in channelsynchro-
nization.I estimatedthattherewereaboutaquarterof abillion synccyclesonflight softwarewithoutthe
single loss of sync.We exploredvery low sampleratesin anexperimentrun by Dick Larson.Kevin
PetersendevelopedtheF-8 remotelyaugmentedvehicleapproachwhichclosedthe aircraftcontrol loop
with acontrol law computerontheground.This led to thenewuplink controlanddisplaytechniqueswe
useonmostairplanesatDryden.Differentdesignphilosophieswereusedandall havebeenmadeto work,
includingsynchronousandasynchronousystems.I mentionatthis point thepioneeringadvancedasyn-
chronoussystemswork doneon the AFTI/F-16.ColonelHarry Heimpleis in the audience;he ran the
AFTI/F-16 CTF here.It wasaverysuccessfulprogram,andevolvedintoaveryproductiveandimportant
researchanddevelopmentfacility.
Thefourthcontributionwasthetrainingof many people. Cal Jarvis is not here today; he's working an
important NASA activity. He is an outstanding project manager who made this program succeed. The F-8
Program also trained our operations engineers like Jim Phelps. He had the responsibility of finally quali-
fying and certifying the aircraft for first flight. In addition, the program provided training for simulation
engineers, flight control engineers, software managers, PI's, safety personnel, operations engineers, pilots,
ground crews, instrumentation crews, procurement staff, ground testers, contractors, and our own manage-
ment. Spouses learned that getting a software program to run right meant long hours at work.
I would also like to call attention to our aircraft crews. They have the ability to deal with airplanes that
have new wings installed in place of the ones that were removed, and new electronic flight controls replac-
ing mechanical systems which were torn out. This causes havoc with the TO manuals, processes, and pro-
cedures, when one starts yanking out the mechanical controls and pulleys and things that you've greased
and loved all those years. Jim Hankins, who has since passed away, was the crew chief on the F-8 DFBW
and he asked the question that is still the principal question in digital flight controls today. At first, when
everything was working fine, there were no questions. We all marvelled at the new technology. But then
we had our first anomaly, the very first anomaly, and all of a sudden Jim Hankins got very, very suspicious.
He looked at the computer and he came over to me and said, "How do I know what's in that box? ..." and
I guess that's still the unanswered question. People have made careers and billions of dollars trying to an-
swer that question.
Finally, the F-8 was a link back to the Space Program. It was really a pathfinder for the AP-101 flight
computer. We found some problems with the computer, but it led to a better computer that ultimately went
into the Space Shuttle. The F-8 also tested shuttle software modules and control time delay effects, as Mr.
McRuer mentioned. The F-8 went on to support the development of the pilot-induced oscillation suppres-
sion filter.
These activities were part of the discovery process and were much more than mere "validation"
activities.
One thing this program made clear was that we had to let people do their jobs. It's a popular thing now
to use the word "empowerment," but that's been the byword here for many years. The line supervisor dur-
ing these years, and the first PI on the program, was Dwain Deets. As a line supervisor during this time,
he advised and empowered people to do their jobs. I'd like to introduce the line supervisor that guided me
and others through these years. Dwain Deets is acting chief of the Research Engineering Division.
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THE STATE OF TECHNOLOGY BEFORE DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE
Dwain Deets
Thank you Ken, I'm not sure there's anything more to be said about
the program after that, but I'll see what I can do. I'm going to start by
taking a look at the state of the technology going into the program; the
things we thought were the important things that the program would
contribute to. The first slide (fig. 1) is my outline.
Figure 1.
• The promises
• The technical issues
• The arguments for flight
• Changes in thinking
The state of technology before F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire.
First of all, we thought-and the advocates pushed as the promises that the program offered-how could
it affect airplane design and the payoff, and then we'll go through the various technical issues as we un-
derstood them. A little about why we need to do this in flight to actually make sure that you understood
the answers and that you had the credibility with these people. How this affected the change in thinking of
people, the culture that was here and used to the ways of doing it in the past.
Starting with figure 2, the easiest thing to explain was that you can save airplane weight if you can rely
on digital fly-by-wire. "Control configured vehicle" was the term that we used; it featured a smaller tail
and various other things. That really needed to be the argument because it resulted in the largest improve-
ment in performance and weight savings so people could understand. A lot of what we had to do in saying
"Why do this?" was to show this could actually change the configuration later on. We did studies showing
how you might put a canard on the plane; we weren't so sure that anyone would have to believe that you
might do that, but we did it anyway.
• Weight savings (control configured vehicles)
• Improved reliability and maintenance
• Greater adaptability
Figure 2. The promises.
Then, the idea of improving reliability and maintainability by having a lot of soft checking that goes
on once you got the digital computer there. It not only does the control laws but it does a lot of the other
things to monitor the health of the airplane and the health of the systems. This is something that was hap-
pening in the space world and their applications; so we said, if it works there we certainly can apply that
to aeronautics and get those kind of benefits as well.
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The third thing is that the software part has greater adaptability to make changes and the gee-whiz kind
of thinking is "Well, you can have whatever hardware you have and if you have any problem right at the
end, before you need to fly, then you just change the software." Zap it in there and you've corrected your
problem! That was the promise-but we found it's really not that easy-it took a lot of effort to correct.
Going through the technical issues (fig. 3), digital fly-by-wire has several aspects. One was that it was
a digital flight control system, whether it was a fly-by-wire system or not, the part that says how a digital
computer affects your ability to design a good flight control system, or how might it interfere with stability
and pilot-airplane interfaces. That was a whole area of technology that opened up its own possibilities for
research.
Diaital
Sinqle-channel Issues
Sample-Rate Effects
Computational Delay
Failure Mechanisms
Fl__ -Wire
Authority Level
Power Systems Redundancy
Single-point Failure
Independent Backup
Redundant-channel Issues
Interchannel Communication
Synchronization
Generic Software Errors Verification & Validation
Figure 3. The technical issues.
Given that it was a digital system, it could either be a single-string system, or single-channel single
computer, and have those kinds of problems. If it were a multi-channel system, a redundant cross channel
comparison, then there was a lot of communication that had to go on between the different channels, and
how you synchronized the channels. That was a whole different set of technical issues that needed to be
addressed.
Under the term "redundant-channel issues" I also had a generic software issue. You could have all the
same software running in each of the computers, then it would really be a single-string failure even though
you had a redundant set of channels.
On the other side is digital-fly-by-wire where you have removed all the digital back-ups and all the
mechanical back-up systems. That was a whole different set of challenges and technical issues that needed
to be addressed. By coupling these two in one program, a lot has been addressed across the board.
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Last is thewholesubjectof how doyouverify andvalidatethis total systemto convinceyourself it's
all working right. Thatendsup in beinga technologyin itself. Kind of a technologyin theprocessesthat
youusethatendupbeingconvincingto yourselvesandto othersthatyouhavedoneyour job right.
Backwith thepuredigital flight controlsingle-stringkind of issues,samplerate(fig. 4) wasonethat
anawful lot of time wasspentdiscussing"What sampleratedid youhaveto have?"Whenwe beganthis
program,computerswerenot fastlike theyarenow; theysortof pluggedalong.You imaginethatyou're
alwaysgoing to be facedwith samplingslowly relativeto whatyou're trying to control, themodesthat
you interactwith. Thequestionis, "What analysistoolsdoyou haveto use?"I'm showingtwo different
analysistoolsthataretypically used.There'sawholeset;S-planeanalysisis anexampleof acontinuous
system,ananalogsystemanalysistechnique.This is whatall of thecontrol law designersthat you had
faith in usebecausethey've seenthekind of problemsyougetinto; youaskthemwhichoneyou needto
useandtheywouldalsosay,"Well thekind I've alwayshad,thecontinuoussystem."This is anexample
whereyougotrootsandpolesto indicatedynamiccharacteristicsof theairplaneon theSplane;wherethe
arrowgoesacrosstheverticalaxisto theright, yougounstable.
• Are unfamiliar design/analysis approaches necessary?
S-Plane j(D
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0
Familiar
Z-Plane
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Unfamiliar
• How high a sample rate is necessary?
Figure 4. Sample-rate issues.
The Z plane is what was used for digital systems, sampled data systems, and that was a common anal-
ysis technique for people that were number one in universities, who had done a lot of paper studies, but
hadn't reached the point where it actually was applied to real airplanes that had to fly. So you have the
group of people that feel very comfortable with Z-plane analysis that included the sample rate effects, but
they weren't the people that had been through programs. So part of the problem is: do you really have to
go to this Z-plane analysis or is there a way of approximating the effect of the sample rate and still be able
to use the tools that you're used to? There are other things such as Bode plots-a whole cadre of tools that
help you to better understand the system.
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Thebottombullethere:howhigh asamplerateis necessary?We endedup looking ata lot of different
samplerates.We hadto freezeadesignonaparticularsamplerateoncetheschedulesaidyouhadto freeze
adesignin orderto beableto fly whenwesaidwewould.We did a lot of studiesthatsaid,"Do I needto
sampletwice thatfast?" andsimplify thedesignsothecomputercoulddo it?We hadthis uneasyfeeling
that maybewehadn't selectedahigh enoughsamplerateandwe'd haveproblemslateron.
Figure5 addressesthequestionof computationaldelay.Thehorizontalbarhereis atimeslice,acom-
puteframewhereat the left-handsideis thestartof thecomputecycleandtheright sideis theendof that
computecycleor thebeginningof thenextcomputecycle.Youneedto doall of your sequentialcompu-
tationsbefore you get to the far right side.You want to getyour answerout-which is control surface
command-asquickly aspossible.
Sample Period
(30 milliseconds)Sensor
Reads
I  a'n"n°O°m u*L I
Control
Surface
Commands
Computational
Delay
PROBLEMS:
Large phase lags
Pilot Induced Oscillations
Figure 5. Computational delay issues.
By breaking up the software into a set we'll call mainline computations, only those things you need to
do to get to the next command, you then save the things you have to do later for the wrap-up. It's a way of
minimizing the length of time from this computational delay that's within the digital computer. There's
concern as how much delay can you stand and not cause a phase lag that would cause a pilot-induced
oscillation or stability problem just in the closed loop around the airplane.
This figure shows an ideal computational delay. It assumes that when you sampled there at the sensor
read point (the information that pertains to the sensor), it was probably sensed somewhere in the earlier
frame, so there was a lot of average delay before you even got to that point. At the control surface
command, when it goes out it may go to a buffer that holds that information until another sample comes
along and sends it on to the control surface. So, there were a number of different sources of delay; this is
just the one that we tend to focus on to show the difference between a digital system, fundamentally, and
an analog system. You really have this delay; on an analog system you don't have it. So, how are we going
to be impacted by these additional delays?
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Here are the problems that we worried about: the phase lags, whether or not we had pilot-induced
oscillations, the way of breaking up the software into packages of the mainline computations, and the
wrap-up. That was something that was being done in the Apollo Program so we inherited that approach.
It looked like a sensible way of doing it so we passed it on to others as we gained experience.
The whole question of handling failures (fig. 6) - the failure mechanisms (how do you detect them,
what do you do about them) is another subject. First, the unfamiliar failure points; unfamiliar to people
who deal with, for example, black boxes. Ken mentioned the question, "What is it doing?" that shows
there's a real fear here that since you have a digital computer where if one bit changes, you could have a
dramatic change in the level of command at the surface. You never know when that is going to occur on
the output-on an unexplored path in the logic ... a whole set of mysterious new failures.
How do you detect these kinds of failures which are application independent? We inherited the soft-
ware and the hardware from the Apollo Program and we used a lot of the detection equipment, built-in
tests and things that were valid no matter what you had. The fact that we were applying it to an airplane
with flight control laws, that would be the application and it was independent of these other kinds of tests.
There would be systems software checks to make sure the operating system was doing what it was sup-
posed to do. So a lot of self-checking was inherited with the system. For our application we added another
set of checks to our flight control laws; checks to make sure that a control surface command didn't seem
unreasonable between one compute cycle and another.
Unfamiliar failure forms
Bit failure could have dramatic repercussions
Failure detection
Application independent
• Hardware self-check
• System software self-check
Application dependent
• Reasonability checks
Failure accommodation
• Restart
• Restructure (downmode)
Figure 6. Failure mechanisms.
Once you detected a failure, the next question was, "Well, what do you do about it?" The Apollo Guid-
ance Computer had a restart capability which allowed the program to start over with a known set of infor-
mation at any point. Then the question was, "What information should you save so that if you ever have
to start over within a compute cycle, you have a safe situation and can press ahead." A lot of thought was
given to this question. It was well understood on the space side, but for us in aeronautics without a lot of
experience, it was quite a learning process for us to figure out the sensible thing to do.
These are the issues and questions that we had to think through and make sure we understood well so
we could explain them to other people who were not familiar with it.
And if you don't want to just restart and continue in the primary mode, then you would go to some
downgraded mode that might be a different mode within the digital system, or you don't have one of the
primary sensors, or you go to a back-up system avoiding use of the digital system altogether.
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With the redundant channel issues (fig. 7) there was a different set of problems. How much information
needs to be communicated between the different redundant channels? That was a big question then, be-
cause the more information you transferred back and forth to convince yourself that all channels were
working correctly, the more time it took to do that and the more processing time to figure out whether the
information was what you expected it to be before you could proceed. The opposite approach was to have
an absolute minimum of information transferred between channels, and if that minimum information isn't
right then we shut the channel down and not take as much time. So we did trade studies to see what was
right.
• Interchannel communication
• Synchronization
• Generic software errors
Figure 7. Redundant-channel issues.
The synchronization question continues today even after the F-8 Program-there are still differing
views on what is the way to synchronize between redundant channels. The tightest connection would be a
bit-for-bit synchronization. Every bit of information that went into one channel you assure yourself it went
into the other channels exactly the same way. Also, the computations started exactly the same so there
would always be a one-for-one comparison. We chose a looser form of synchronization, a frame synchro-
nization, where the computer was started on a computational cycle. Each channel was slightly different,
but if they were a little bit off we would make them closer as time went on. It gave you some flexibility
but was still a good solid system.
The other extreme is asynchronous, where there is no attempt to match the computer cycles. In fact,
you would not want the channels lined up with one another; they would run independently and then you
would sort out the information as you transfer back and forth. There was a tremendous amount of time
spent on this question.
The generic software error is really the question "What happens if something you haven't thought of
is programmed wrong in the software and it's in all of the computers and it just wipes you out and shuts
all channels down?" A tremendous amount of time has been spent trying to figure out how to be systematic
in approaching this question, but there's never a final answer because there's always one more problem
that you hadn't thought about.
Moving to the fly-by-wire issues that are not dependent on whether you have a digital system or an
analog system (fig. 8) - the first one is that it's full authority by definition if you have no mechanical back-
up so that a failure can overstress the airplane, so that becomes a question of how much, what do you have
to do if it's full authority and the airplane integrity is at stake versus the experience that was then available
from past systems with limited authority, where a problem wouldn't endanger the airplane.
• Authority level
• Power-system redundancy
• Single-point failure
• Independent backup
Figure 8. Fly-by-wire issues.
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The power system redundancy relates to the electrical power and hydraulic power. How do you make
sure that those have the same level of reliability that your digital system has in doing its electronic com-
parisons - so that had to be thought through very carefully.
The single-point failure, other than a software failure, we worried about. If you have a single-point fail-
ure that can cause one of your control surfaces to go hard over, how do you protect yourself and convince
people you've found all the possibilities? We believed an independent back up was needed, and therefore
we had an analog back-up system that was FBW and was independent from the hardware channels.
Verification and validation (fig. 9). How do you qualify (man-rate) the software when a life is at stake?
Putting this process together and bringing it to an aeronautical application was as much a part of the
experiment as the hardware and software. How we did it, what processes we followed, the configuration
control set-up, and whether or not it was successful and to convince people-that it was something to be
investigated, reported, suggestions made to other design teams in the future and how they might set up
their processes to have the same degree of confidence.
• Man rating flight software
• Configuration control processes
• Model fidelity requirements
Figure 9. Verification and validation.
The final item on this list is how much fidelity was needed in the simulations. We ended up with a
decommissioned F-8, an iron-bird simulation, where we had a complete set of hardware, the actuators, the
hydraulics, the electrical system, and the flight computers. We found it was important and helpful to have
the ultimate in fidelity in our modeling before you go to flight.
The arguments on why you really needed to fly the DFBW system (fig. 10) were that by flying it, it
forced you to go through all the steps to convince yourself; just going through analysis alone would not be
convincing to us or to others. You really had to live it and interact with all the various disciplines-the safe-
ty office, the pilots-you've got to go through it, interact, and learn as you go. Out of that comes the under-
standing of the real operational issues that are important.
• Only flight forces all problems to be worked
- Operational Issues
- Real environmental effects
- Pilot-vehicle effects
• Identify the unknowns
Figure 10. The arguments for flight.
The real environmental effects were more the questions: did you model things right, did you get all the
important aerodynamics correct, are there other factors, vibrations, electromagnetic interference (EMI),
things that might be out there but did not get into your laboratory model and that you could only get
through flying?
The pilot-vehicle effects: of all the PIOs that Mac showed, we didn't know whether we had answered
our questions until we went out and flew it and looked at some of the system delays. Again, we had to
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identify thoseunknownsbecausewehadnootherwayof evenguessingthattheywerethereuntil we flew
it.
Thechangesin thinking (fig. 11) - how do cultures change - we saw it change as we went through the
F-8 Program. The attitude that control systems and electronics are like black boxes, in that you expect a
certain output from a certain input-that really had to change as we thought about a digital system because
it's all dependent upon what that software was doing, and to help people who are not that familiar with
digital computers through the process of understanding and gaining confidence that "yes, this is something
that I can depend on as well."
• The black box approach to flight control electronics
• Design and analysis tools
• Pilot interface becomes more of a design option
Figure 11. Changes in thinking.
The design and analysis tools go back to whether it was a Z plane or an S plane. The control law
designers had confidence that they had done it right. In some cases they needed new analysis techniques
and became comfortable with them; in other cases they decided they didn't need those new techniques.
The pilot interface: what do we display to the pilot? Do we make it as simple as possible? Do we make
it simple, but similar to the previous analog control systems interface that the pilots knew or do we do
things differently? We discussed those questions with the pilots at length and then entered these concerns
into the design. They became important issues as well.
In summary, to hit the main points (fig. 12): The digital fly-by-wire technologies can be broken into
two kinds of problems: digital flight control problems and that whole set of learning that came out of the
program, and those that are the pure fly-by-wire issues that concerned technology application, and the
merger of these two.
• Digital fly-by-wire technologies opened opportunities and raised issues in two
distinct areas:
(1) Digital flight control
(2) Fly-by-wire
• Redundant digital fly-by-wire promised fault tolerance, but raised generic
software error possibility.
• Flight offered the possibility to answer these questions, and to provide
credibility if actual experience warranted it.
Figure 12. Summary.
In Phase II, the redundant digital fly-by-wire system had the promise of full fault tolerance, which
meant if something fails in the overall system, it could still be counted on to work correctly. Still there was
the lingering question of generic software failure and did we need to do anything to insure ourselves that's
not in the implementation. Flight offered the opportunity to answer these kinds of questions and we were
hopeful that was the right thing to do and was the basis of going on with the program.
Thank you.
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CALL TO ORDER
Kenneth J. Szalai
Dwain Deets described the state-of-the-art as it existed at the beginning of the Digital Fly-By-Wire
Program and the questions, concerns, and issues which were unanswered, and unknown in some cases. Cal
Jarvis was originally scheduled to present the story on what actually happened. Cal is not here today
because he is on a NASA Aeronautics "Blue Team" to reexamine the entire NASA Aeronautics Program.
Cal was the project manager for the entire F-8 Program until the last couple of years. It turns out there was
a conjunction of coincidences that brought Cal to the DFBW Program. He had just completed work on the
Lunar Landing Research Vehicle, which was a fly-by-wire vehicle. It was used to prepare the Apollo as-
tronauts for lunar landings.
Before I ask Dwain Deets to return and present Cal's story, I want to point out a couple of things. The
electrical and electronic systems of these fly-by-wire aircraft are life critical. I saw Bill Petersen here. Bill
is Honeywell trained and also did some flight controls work in Sweden. He brought to this project the skills
that were, again, just at the right place and the right time. When we talk about fly-by-wire, we have to ask,
"How about the wires?" and Bill brought us that expertise. During this time, there was simultaneous
activity going on at NASA Langley to develop some very advanced analytic tools that could model these
advanced fly-by-wire systems for use in the design process. Bill Dove was one of the leaders of that activ-
ity at Langley for several years. He is also here and we're very happy to see him.
I should also mention that advanced control law work was carried out at Langley under the lead of Jerry
Elliott. Ray Montgomery was a key contributor there. They worked for Jay Bird, who has since passed
away. One of their bright engineers was Joe Gera, who also worked for Dr. Whitcomb. He transferred to
Dryden where he worked on advanced flight controls.
I now reintroduce Dwain Deets, to recount the results of the program.
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THE DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE PROGRAM
Dwain Deets (for Cal Jarvis)
There were two phases of the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW)
flight research program and toward the end, we broke Phase II into two
parts: Phase IIA and liB (fig. 1).
I'll go over the three phases with the main focus on the first two.
Phase I was making use of the Apollo Guidance Computer in a single-
string manner; Phase IIA covered the redundant system. Last was Phase
IIB, the research test bed.
• Phase I
• Phase IIA
• Phase liB
• Summary
Apollo Guidance Computer
Redundant digital system
Research test bed
Figure 1. Outline.
Figure 2 shows the generic-sounding program objectives for which we were not sure what to do, given
a statement at this level:
• Establish practicality of digital fly-by-wire for conventional aircraft. It's strange that the word
"practicality" was used because the system we used was so sophisticated that it really was not a
practical system for use in aeronautics. However, we really wanted to use a digital system.
• Assess the applicability of current design tools.
• Find out what level of confidence we could obtain.
Program objectives:
• Establish practicality of DFBW for conventional aircraft.
• Assess applicability of current design tools.
• Establish level of confidence.
Approach:
• Apollo Guidance Computer
Time period:
• 1970-1972
Figure 2. Phase I.
The Apollo Guidance Computer and the other components that went with it such as the inertial mea-
surement unit - using that whole package was the approach.
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We did Phase I from 1970 to 1972. Earlier, in 1969, the process of selling this program was amazing
because the person who made it happen was Neil Armstrong. He was the associate administrator to the
equivalent of what is now the Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology (OAST), which was called
OART at the time. What Neil saw was the opportunity to make this technology transfer from space, which
he was so much a part of, to aeronautics which was then his responsibility as AA. He thought that it was
the right thing to do. Prior to talking to him, as we talked with the various people at the lower levels, there
was a universal "NO" response. At least they all said, "Well, why don't you go ahead and talk to the next
level?" That contribution was important because they could have said, "No, absolutely not." The people
below allowed us to advance the idea and Neil approved it.
As figure 3 shows, there were technical advantages in selecting the Apollo Guidance Computer for this
conceptual demonstration. The computer was reliable; in all of the testing that had been done to get ready
for Apollo and during all its missions to the Moon there were no failures. We said that the reliability was
proven to be greater than 90,000 hours mean time between failures (MTBF) and we are still looking for
the first failure to find out what it should be. The existing contracts were the contracts that the Apollo Pro-
gram had set up, so Draper Lab and AC Spark Plug, organizations that were under contract, could imme-
diately go to work on the F-8 program. The industry teams were very excited about working with us on
the F-8.
• Advantages
- Reliability (> 90,000 hr MTBF)
- Surplus equipment available
- Existing contracts could be utilized
- Software development facilities in place
- Could build on Apollo experience
• Disadvantages
- System optimized for different application
- Some limitation on aircraft maneuverability
- Special cooling requirements
Figure 3. Selection of Apollo Guidance and Navigation System for Phase I.
The software development facilities were in place and I don't think we appreciated the importance of
this. We could now see what the code was doing. There were some very sophisticated tools, for that matter,
in Draper Lab that allowed us to really understand the inner workings of these computers. We had the
Cadillac approach capability, and we found out later how much that capability was needed. After we ex-
perienced the knowledge of the people, we found out how important it was.
There were also disadvantages; for example, the system was optimized for a different application using
an inertial measurement unit to provide vehicle rates. This was an inertial measurement unit that was
designed to measure angular position very accurately in certain regimes-very small changes. The rate
measurement accuracy was really quite poor. This imposed limits on aircraft maneuverability because the
inertial measurement unit (IMU) could not keep up with the airplane in roll, for example, if the roll rate
was greater than 80 deg/sec. The hardware also had special cooling requirements which had to be met. We
spent a lot of time making that system work for us.
Under Phase I ground rules (fig. 4), the decision to go with no mechanical reversion was a decision to
force us to do everything right. We saw that the long-term possibility was a control-configured vehicle
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wherewewouldn't haveamechanicalcontrol system.We couldhavepretendedthatwedidn't haveone
but still haveit, in caseweneededit. Theenvironmentwouldbe,"Well, we're alwaysgoingto havethat
asour fall-backpositionandwe're notgoingto forceourselvestogo throughtheringerandtheconvincing
argumentsthat youknow thatyoucouldreprogram."Thatdecisionwasmadeandwebrokethemechan-
ical link sotherewasnocapabilityto revertto aconnectionbetweenthepilot stickandthecontrolgroup.
• No mechanical reversion capability
• Simplify pilot's interface with computer
• No hardware changes to Apollo GN&C system
Figure 4. Ground rules for Phase I.
We knew that we needed to simplify the pilot's interface with the computer. The Apollo display turned
out to be a nice interface device for engineers, but for a pilot to need to think of these kinds of things flying
around in the atmosphere really was not the thing to do.
We needed to figure out what made sense for the pilot interface with the system that was not much
different from what the pilot was familiar with, but still had the flexibility to do what we configured it to
do. We decided to not allow any hardware changes to the Apollo guidance, navigation, and control system
because the integrity and reliability were dependent on the existing hardware. Therefore, we didn't want
to make changes because then we had to figure out whether we had compromised the hardware and soft-
ware reliability and performance.
Why did we select the F-8? As shown in figure 5, it had adequate electrical and hydraulic power. The
volume was adequate for installing the Apollo system hardware, and it was easy to disconnect the mechan-
ical system, although we found that when we disconnected it, it left an unusual handling characteristic in
the stick-a lack of damping. The flight envelope was quite broad, and it was flyable without controls aug-
mentation. We thought that it was an advantage because it turned out that the feedback sensors were not
working. The availability of an iron bird, a separate airplane, a decommissioned F-8, we thought was also
important - we did have one - so that seemed to be the right thing.
• Adequate electrical and hydraulic power
• Volume for system components
• Mechanical flight controls easily removable
• Broad flight envelope capability
• Flyable without control augmentation
• Availability of decommissioned F-8 to serve as "iron bird"
Figure 5. Reasons for F-8 aircraft selection as test bed.
When Cal was running through these figures with me, I thought an important consideration, not on this
list, was that the F-8 had an ejection seat. Had it not had an ejection seat, we probably would not have pro-
ceeded with this airplane selection.
This is the system architecture diagram (fig. 6). The primary system is in the upper two-thirds or three-
quarters of the figure and then the back-up system is on the bottom. The first half of the primary system
32
wassinglechannel,asI've mentioned.FromtheApollo computeronward,wehadadual channel system
from there on. One channel was an active channel, and one was a monitor. We didn't worry about
reliability problems with the hardware that we added to get the signal to the control surfaces. We had this
secondary actuator that Hydraulic Research and Manufacturing built for us. They connected to the power
actuator at the point that the cables would have connected.
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Figure 6. F-8 system architecture, Phase I.
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Part of the problem was synchronizing the primary system with the back up so any time we had to re-
vert to it, we would have a known status of the back up and would be tracking reasonably well with the
primaries. We worried over that sync and how it got into the back-up computers. It's a jump now to the
summary of Phase I.
Figure 7 summarizes Phase I flight results. From the first flight in May 1972 through November 1973
we made 42 research flights with six pilots. The key finding that I would tell other people was that the
existing control design tools were adequate for that job. We didn't have to develop or invent anything.
• Flight program May '72-Nov. '73
• Total flight hr 58
• Total flights 42
• Number of pilots 6
Key findings
• Existing control law design tools adequate
• Software development tools critical to establishing confidence in system
• No software programming errors found in operational system
• Functional changes late in decision cycle possible without impacting
hardware schedule
• Verification of flight critical software requires extensive effort
Figure 7. Phase I - flight test summary.
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Thesoftwaredevelopmentoolsparticularlyandtheenvironmentat DraperLabwerecritical to under-
standing what was going on within the digital system. We found no programming errors in the operational
systems software. We had done an excellent job of reviewing the verification and validation (V & V) lead-
ing up to the flight. We did make some functional changes late in the design cycle without really impacting
any hardware schedules. Those are all important pieces of information to come out of the experience. It
was not so much a system, but the whole approach-the people, how you went about doing the program.
Figure 8 outlines Phase IIA. The first program objective was to establish a design base for a practical
DFBW system. Next was to assess application of advanced control laws which we-the thought of having
powerful digital computers-control law designers had all kinds of ideas of what we might do with that
computer power in the airplane to make your control laws do things that never would've been possible in
the past.
Program objectives:
• Establish a design base for practical DFBW
• Assess application of advanced control laws
• Support shuttle system development
Approach:
• Redundant (triplex) general-purpose flight computers
Time period:
• 1973-1978
Figure 8. Phase HA.
Our work in the F-8 Program gave us the ability to help the Space Shuttle Program as they were de-
veloping their system. Both programs were using the same flight computers and we were able to exchange
information from our respective programs.
We ended up with triplex general purpose flight computers from IBM-the AB 101.
Figure 9 shows how we thought we were going to do it, where we had done the Phase I single channel
system. There was also the cost, $7.6 million and that was the delta cost because so much was already
available from the Apollo infrastructure. We had the actual dollars to make the application to the F-8.
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Figure 9. F-8 system architecture - Phase II.
Then the question was, "Well, what should we do next?" The debate was whether we could lick all the
problems just with two digital computers, and we had to assume that we had gotten down to our last two.
Whatever the number of channels we initially had, when there were two left, we would say, "Well, now
what do we do?" That was one approach. If we did that, then when we to got down to the last two, the
trade-offs are we got two more powerful digital computers and work some of the more advanced control
law schemes, instead of working with redundancy aspects and communication between channels. When
the Shuttle Program needed answers in this area, it was clear that we also needed to be working these
redundancy management questions. The Shuttle Program had to have confidence they were doing it right,
so it was obvious that we had to go to a triplex system with multiple communication channels.
The system architecture for Phase II-as you can see, there was three of everything. The interface unit
was a sophisticated piece of hardware. Often we focused on the computer itself and what it could do. The
interface and the ability to be highly tailored is important, too.
The back-up system was the same as before, no change was made. We were able to go into the second-
ary actuator servos - I'm not sure if it was a $1 million switch or a $15 million switch. That device allowed
us to switch between the primary and back-up system under any kind of condition that you can imagine,
confidently, with high integrity, and that's much more challenging than a diagram on a chart would
suggest.
Figure 10 provides some meaningful numbers. For example, the Apollo LEM Computer was compared
with a current date computer. Those were the kinds of dramatic improvements that we dealt with, so you
can imagine the kinds of problems that we faced.
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• Memory cycle time (microsec)
• Fixed point multiply (microsec)
• Main memory size (K words)
• Word size (bits)
• Fixed or floating point arithmetic
• Memory types
Figure 10.
Phase I Phase II Current SOA
Apollo LEM IBM
AP-101 1750A
11.7 0.9 0.05
46.8 4.8 0.75
37 32 96
16 32 16
Fixed Floating Floating
& fixed & fixed
ROM RAM, RAM,
ROM ROM
EPROM
Comparison of flight computer characteristics.
Figure 11 is a time history of F-8 system software discrepancies. We didn't just measure performance
of this system, we had to be introspective when we did the system development. We looked for those
parameters, and some of them were already known within the industry, which shows how things were go-
ing. These were documented accumulated software anomalies, because every time there was a software
anomaly you wrote up a discrepancy report, so at least you had something that you could measure and
show the build up. The report was broken down into serious anomalies and all anomalies - I've seen other
reports that showed software anomalies and hardware anomalies to show how things were going before
you had your first flight. As time went on, you stopped having this increasing rate of anomalies, and the
numbers came at a more regular pace because every day you'd find another anomaly. A leveling off of the
discrepancy curve was an indicator of system maturity. This kind of information ended up being important
to designers as well.
-- Anomalies
--- Operating time
 _1,0ri'*P
4000 r m 80 _-" )/' Serious anomalies
:<-I olJ__ls i I I
June Jan July Jan July Jan July
1975 1976 1977 1978
Figure 11. F-8 DFBW system anomaly experience.
Figure 12 summarizes results from Phase IIA. There were approximately the same number of flights
as in Phase I, plus a few more pilots. Toward the end we had a number of guest pilots that were brought
into the program. With these findings, we document a high-integrity DFBW system without nuisance trips,
where you had redundant systems, a frame-synchronized system as this was. It turned out the computer
failure rates were higher than predicted, and we ended up having 4 failures in flight during that 55 hours.
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Thesystem,however,respondedexactlyasit wassupposedto whenthese failures occurred, reconfiguring
itself, voting out channels, for example with no control transients. The integrity of the total system was
demonstrated.
• Number of flights 54
• Total flight time 55 hr
• Envelope (12 M, 40 K ft, 6 g)
• Number of pilots 11
Key findings
• Frame-synchronization between redundant channels provides high Integrity
without nuisance miscompares
• Computer failure rates higher than predicted, but redundant system
reconflgured with no transients
• Hardware and software configuration control is facilitated by establishing
similar processes
• Shuttle flight hardware and software validated through flight test experience
Figure 12. Phase IIA - flight test summary.
Hardware and software configuration control was facilitated by establishing similar processes. We had
hardware configuration control that had been used for years at Dryden, and everyone understood what
worked and how we did it. The Space Shuttle flight hardware had essentially the same computers. In some
cases, the modular software that would fly in the Shuttle, we flew in the F-8 in the same environment.
Figure 13 is an overview of the DFBW test bed operations. There was a lot of control law work, quite
a range of experiments. Langley was heavily involved in some of those concepts and the F-8 allowed them
to get into flight. Several universities had grants and ended up with concepts that could be evaluated. We
developed a remote control system augmentation facility with which we could uplink commands and
receive downlinked F-8 responses while investigating experimental control system and software designs
in the laboratory environment.
Objective:
Research test bed for advanced control concepts
Example experiments:
• Advanced control law concepts
- NASA (Langley and Dryden)
- Unlvereltlee
- Contractors
• Time delay effects on flying qualities
• Reeident back up software (REBUS) concept
• Cooperative (NASA and RAE) advanced digital research
experiment (CADRE)
Time period:
1978 - 1985
Figure 13. Phase lIB.
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Theinvestigationof time delayeffectson flying qualitiesandtheresultantPIO wasnot to showthat
thepilot couldn't handleit; wewereinvestigatingwhatthemaximumtimedelaywasthatapilot couldfly
with. We weresystematicallyaddingevenadditionaldelays(morethanthesystemitself normallyhad)to
find thelimit.
Theresidentback-upsoftwareallowedyou to transferto different softwareif you had a failure, such
as a detected failure in the primary system. The software would be in separate memory but still within the
primary system.
In a cooperative program with the Royal Aircraft Establishment (U.K.), the F-8 test bed was used to
facilitate some of their advanced digital control systems research.
Figure 14 is a short summary. The Phase I used the Apollo system which was a reliable system that
allowed us to get going and learn. Phase II used the commercial-grade computers (off the shelf), and al-
lowed us to find out what kind of redundancy our DFBW system had. Finally, much of our outputs were
the processes and procedures and how they led to a system with which we had high confidence in its
integrity and qualification as "man-rated."
• Phase I utilized Apollo GN&C team and equipment to gain a running start on
fly-by-wire for aeronautics
• Phase II emphasized commercial-grade computers and redundancy concepts
• Much of the output was in processes and procedures that led to high confidence
in integrity of the system
Figure 14. Summary.
Thank you.
38
INTRODUCTION OF GARY KRIER
Ken Hodge
Having heard all of the preceding we now turn to one of our research pilots to give you the pilot's im-
pression of the fly-by-wire.
The speaker will be Gary Krier, who started his flying career in the Air Force and joined NASA Dryden
as a research pilot almost 25 years ago to the day. He made the first flight of the digital fly-by-wire air-
plane; he was the project pilot. He also served as the co-project pilot on the Supercritical Wing Program
of which we'll hear more this afternoon. In the mid-1980's he obtained a law degree and went to work in
the Ames Chief Counsel's office at Moffett Field. He left Ames to go to NASA headquarters, where he
worked in the Aircraft Management Office and in the Space Shuttle Office. He is currently in the Office
of Space Systems Development helping NASA develop an advanced launch system. At this point, I want
to introduce Gary Krier.
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A PILOT'S VIEW OF FLY-BY-WIRE
Gary Krier
Well, I'm Gary Krier, but you can call me Geraldo because I've got
a couple of really great war stories to tell you. Now it can be told!
Let me start out by saying that I was sitting in the pilots' office one
day in the other building and Bruce Peterson came in and said to me, "I
just got a phone call from Phil Oestricher, who is down in Fort Worth
and they're building this new airplane, the YF-16, and they would like
you to come down and fly the simulator, a couple of NASA guys." So
Bruce and I jumped in a T-33 and flew down to Ft. Worth to fly this
simulator. On the way down we're talking back and forth and said,
"Why do they want us to do it?" It turned out that Jerry Gentry, when
he was in the Air Force and was here, went down to fly the simulator
and they wouldn't tell us the results. Phil was absolutely pristine about saying, "Well, just come down and
fly, you know, we just want some other opinions." So, Bruce gets in the simulator first, they knew him
very well and besides that he was a Marine (he goes first, the Point Man!), he flies the airplane and I'm
sitting outside (keep in mind that this is just a simulator - this is the first time that they' ve done their control
laws and phasing). Bruce gets real red in the face, then the blood begins to drain from his face, it turns
really white, and he completes his evaluation and says "thanks."
I get into the simulator and fly it and I'm having a terrible time with it. The thing that I remember, it's
funny how these things stick in your mind, I remember what Fitz Fulton said when he was quoting Joe
Cotton about one of the airplanes, I don't remember if it was the first flight of the B-70 or whether it was
one of the first flights of the B-58. But Joe Cotton said on the powered approach configuration, "Well, it's
all right I guess, if your task is to land somewhere in California." So, we go back and Neil Anderson and
Phil take us back to Carswell AFB-they're both on the ladder after we're in the airplane and they're saying,
"Thanks guys, for coming down here and flying this thing. We really appreciate it and wanted to get your
opinion." We just didn't know how to convey the message of what we're trying to tell them. So we said,
"Ok, what we'll do is Bruce and I will give individual ratings, write a report and send it back to you." So
again, flying back I'm saying to Bruce over the intercom, "Bruce, how are we going to handle this thing?
I don't know what to say. These people are contractors, we don't want to alienate them, we don't want to
over play the thing, but I can't land it!" 1 mean the gains and the phasing are such that - and they had at the
time-it was not a mobile stick, it was a hard force stick with no displacement. So, we talked to Phil after-
ward, over the telephone, who recognized that we've got a pretty severe problem with the airplane and
that's the message we conveyed.
Now I'm going to tell a tale out of school and that is, that what happened was: that's exactly what Phil
said; that's exactly what Neil said; that's what Jerry Gentry said. The problem was their previous success,
and that was on the F-111 they did an outstanding job on it and the same flight control system engineers
said, "All right you guys; look, we' ve done the job, we did the job on the F-111. Look how this thing flies,
it flies beautifully" (which it did). "We don't want to hear this stuff about cut the gains, change the phase
and do this and that." So, you saw the results in the film, you saw the PIO, that's what happened to Phil.
But my question was, "Why does the film always stop when the airplane is in an attitude like that?" They
never showed the pilot putting himself into the loop, becoming part of the system, smoothing it out like
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Phil did, andtaking theairplaneoff, comingaroundandgettingintegratedwith it andmakinga terrific
landing.Becauseif hehadn'tdonethat,if therewerea lesserpersonin thecockpit eitherasa pilot or an
engineerthatknewthesystems,thatairplanewouldbein thetrashheaptoday.Phil, I wantto congratulate
youonwhatyoudid andexpressourappreciation.
Thesecondwarstoryhasto dowith thefamousF-8 PIOandI'll savethatfor themovieclip.
Twentyyearsagoplustwo days,I andabout200otherguysmadethefirst flight on theF-8 Fly-By-
Wire. That occasionwasvery importantto me, andI knewit wasanoccasionthat I'd alwaysremember,
soI madesomepreparedremarks.I still havethemtodayandI'm goingto readto youwhatI said20years
ago.
"The pilot more thananybodyelserealizeshowhardothershaveworked.Somepersonsdestroyand
othersbuild. I think thatall of uswhocontributedto thisprojectof advancedtechnology,yearsfrom now
whenfly-by-wire iscommonandtheshuttlemakesits returnfrom orbit,wecanall reflectonour first dig-
ital fly-by-wire airplane.Weknewwhereweweregoing,weknewwhatwewantedto do,wecouldforesee
thefutureandtheapplications.Theprideof ownershiphasbeenunparalleled.Oneexamplethat I canre-
memberis seeinganelectriciansandingdowntheairplaneprior to paintingit. I don't believeI haveseen
a bettergroup."
When I first readthoseremarks,I didn't needglasses,andthanksto Maccomputers,largefonts,and
largetype,I still don't needglasses!(Speakershowedthe audiencean8 1/2X 11sheetof paperwith a
largeletterA on it).
Now we're goingto seeafilm clip of whichyouhaveseenpartsalready.Letmegooverit beforehand,
andthenafterI've donethat,we'll run thefilm clip andyou'll getachanceto enjoy it - there'ssomemusic
on this thing,but I'll try to dominimal voiceoverssoyoucanenjoythefilm. Thefilm clip showsapre-
flight andit showssomecloseformationflying which is agoodclosed-looptaskto determinehow anair-
planeisgoing to behave.In my opinionit is averygoodtestto seeif theairplanePIOs.There'sonly one
problem-you'vegot to getairborneandupandawaybeforeyoucandothat.If youcan't getoff theground
safely,you can't testit in formationflight! Sothatandgunsighttrackingareexcellentsothere'sabrief
clip to showit-it showsa little pilot porpoising-butnot very much.You'll seea little moreon the first
flight landingwhich is alsoin there.
Shuttletransportime - you'll seethatagain- there'ssomethingadditionalthatI wantto sayaboutthat,
to geteverybodyto relateto whatPhil hadto doandwhatsomeof theotherpeoplehadto do whenyou
getoneof thoseflight controlsystemsthathasafew interestingquirks.Imaginegoingout to Rosamond,
to that racetrackout there,andsomebodygivesyoua newracecar to drive aroundthat track with two
things:one,you're catapultedontothetrack,andtwo, somebody'scuttwo teethoff thesteeringgear,and
theywon't tell you whichteeth!That'swhatit's like to getinto anairplanethathasthosecharacteristics.
Sounderstandthatandlook for it in simulation.
Here's thesecondwarstory.Whenwedid thisworkon theshuttle,I flew theairplaneoneday-and I
think it wassomethinglike a200-msectimedelay-andI tookthetaskthatDwainDeetsmentionedbefore
andthatis, "How muchcanapilot tolerateandstill landthevehicle?"I haveto admit thatI modified it
just a little bit. I tried to put it downaround2,500ft downtherunwaywhich waswherethe shuttlewas
supposedto land.On final approachI absolutelycouldnotcontrolthevehicle.I couldcontrolgrosspitch
attitude,but it wasjust passingthroughattitudes.SoI didn't evencomecloseto the ground,I recognize
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that,but to meit wasuncontrollable so I rated it a "ten." Einar Enevoldson and John Manke took the task
and they looked for ways to make sure that they could land the airplane and to find the point where they
couldn't. So what Einar did, and I'm speaking for him now and I'm sure that this is what John Manke did
because that's what John said, was to get an attitude set up where they were pleased with what the airplane
was doing and then just letting the airplane fly on to the ground. If you look at the film clip carefully and
you look at the elevator you'll see minimal elevator motion on final approach and touchdown. Where John
got in real trouble was when he got back in the loop on the ground and started to make the wave-off. We're
ready for the film, please. (Film was shown).
Comments during "Digital Fly-by-Wire-the F-8 Experience:"
- This is a great airplane. Originally one of the proposals was to use an F-104 since we had a lot of
them. Through what really was a total quality management (TQM) process (although we didn't
know it at the time) the choice evolved to selection of the F-8, an excellent choice.
- Up and away! We'll soon have a close-in shot of some formation flying.
- This is the first landing, on lakebed runway 18. You talk about slower, better, and less expensive:
there's the Aero Commander chase! We had TQM even then.
- A little quantization there-you could have seen it pitching if you were looking for it.
- A great airplane. You could take a full bag of fuel and if you had a problem you could dump fuel
and come back for a landing at relatively light weight.
- This is really close-in formation flying, Phase III think-and Wilt Lock I think you picked out the
film-because this is much, much smoother than we could have done otherwise.
- This ground test sequence is self-test on the analog back-up system. I really appreciated the work
done on it by Sperry and Wilt Lock and all the other people who helped out. It gave me a great deal
of confidence that whatever happened on the digital system we had an excellent analog system to
rely upon.
- There's an enormous speed brake on this airplane-here it's coming up for landing. As any F-8 pilot
will tell you, when you get the gear down the speed brake goes to "trail," but you can override that
feature if you want to and grind off about 8 in. of speed brake when you land!
- Here's a shot of the shuttle Enterprise on landing, showing the PIO-the pilot is Fred Haise. He's
caught in a real trap-he's the guy who's catapulted off the SCA just like the guy on Rosamond
racetrack with a couple of teeth missing in the steering.
- There goes the famous PIO on wave-off with John Manke. If you'd looked for elevator motion
you'd have seen very little. Who remembers how John got out of this?
What did we learn? Always, I say again, always simulate software changes before you fly them. If you
can't simulate takeoff or landing as well as possible, you're in for trouble if you're doing a flight control
program or if the flight controls are untested.
A good research tool can take you anywhere-even places you don't want to go! Approach things care-
fully. Tasks rated 8 or greater by any pilot should have severe scrutiny by the responsible manager before
being reflown; involve the entire team!
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We can(andshould)runourown programs.Contractors houldsupportus,notdoourwork. TheF-8
DFBW trained many of our best personnel-and we still have them with us today! They enjoyed every
minute of their workday. That's TQM, that's continuous improvement and that was the F-8 Program!
Now we are in the final phase of the F-8 Program. Honoring the machines, the personnel, and the mem-
ories. This is in sharp contrast, by the way, with some of today's programs where the phases seem to be:
1. Wild enthusiasm
2. Mild concern
3. Deep despair
4. Search for the guilty
5. Punish the innocent
6. Awards to the non-participants
Now, after having said all that, will you still give me my medallion?
Thank you.
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INTRODUCTION OF GARY HARTMANN
Ken Hodge
Our next subject is the effect of digital fly-by-wire on today's aircraft. Presentation will be by Gary
Hartmann, who is a Principal Research Fellow at the Honeywell Systems and Research Center in Minne-
apolis. He has over 25 years experience with Honeywell in a variety of flight navigation and control
pursuits. Although most of his applications have been with aircraft, he has also had experience with oil
drilling vessels and undersea vehicles. He has participated in control law development for the F-15 and
B-2 Bomber which have been tested here at Edwards. Without further ado, Gary Hartmann.
44
THE F-8 DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE INFLUENCE ON TODAY'S AIRCRAFT
Gary Hartmann
It's my pleasure to come out today and talk about the influences of
the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW),on today's aircraft. What I'd like
to do is to give you a perspective from someone in the industry. We're
going to talk about how some of the F-8 technology has been applied
in other systems, and I'm going to discuss areas where I think it's in-
fluenced some of the fly-by-wire activity in the commercial sector.
This cartoon (fig. 1) goes back before the F-8 Program. Some peo-
ple thought that if you put digital computers in airplanes it would be
quite a burden. What the F-8 did was to change that thinking.
Remember me in 1965?
I am digital, I am optimal, I am adaptive, get me off the ground and I will show you.
Figure 1. Progress.
The F-8 was a pioneer in a number of areas; hardware, control laws, redundancy management, and so
forth, as shown in figure 2. There were some major contributions made in all of these areas and I'll touch
upon them. I think in all of these areas we learned something, and many of these lessons were applied to
future aircraft. I also want to emphasize that one of the major benefits of the F-8 was that since the
mechanical system was removed, all the fly-by-wire (FBW) problems had to be addressed, we couldn't
leave some details off to the side because they were a little messy, or we didn't want to work on them. This
perspective had much to do with establishing the credibility of the program and the legacy that's available
to future applications.
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° Hardware
- Computer
- Architecture
• Control laws
- Active
- Adapt!ve
• Redundancy management
• V&V testing
Figure 2. F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire-the pioneer.
The hardware for the Space Shuttle was very important (fig. 3). The digital computer hardware
matured to a large extent with the F-8 experience. Since the F-8 remained a one-of-a-kind system, there
was not a hardware legacy in the sense that the system went into production and was widely used. How-
ever, the redundancy management and test approaches are relevant in spite of continuing advances in elec-
tronics and computer and language standards. We've moved from HAL and assembly coding to JOVIAL,
Pascal, Ada, and other higher order languages. On the computer side we've moved into different kinds of
microprocessors. We learned many lessons in redundancy management and testing that are still relevant
and, I think, have been successfully applied in other programs.
• Flight hardware
- Important to Space Shuttle
- Not major legacy to other aircraft
• Computers, languages, and standards are dramatically different today
• F-8 redundancy management and test approaches still relevant
Figure 3. Hardware.
One of these involves the lessons learned in synchronizing redundant computers (fig. 4). There is a
continuum of approaches. I believe people have made all of the different options work. You can have
either clock or instruction synchronization, frame synchronization, or asynchronous applications. As it
was pointed out earlier, there's still discussion among designers regarding the pros and cons of different
approaches. Certainly the frame synchronous approach that was demonstrated with the F-8 has been used
on many other airplanes like the F-18, X-29, X-31, and various helicopter applications. Even though the
frame synchronous approach was very successful, there are also operational asynchronous systems such
as the F-16, as well as the Swedish Grippen. As I'll discuss later, in the commercial transport arena, we're
starting to see increased interest in asynchronous designs as well as issues of generic faults if you have
identical channels.
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• Three broad approaches Clock
Frame
Asynchronous
• F-8 DFBW - synch of each 20 msec frame
• Similar approaches used on Jaguar DFBW, F-18, )(-29, C-130
hlgh-technology test bed (HTTB), X-31, C-17, B-2 ...
• However, there are proponents of asynchronous channels
- MllItsry (F-16 C/D, JAS-39 ... )
- Commerclal transports
Figure 4. Synchronization of redundant computers.
One thing that hasn't been mentioned was the F-8 lightning and susceptibility testing (fig. 5). There
was much work done with the F-8 looking at the effects of lightning-induced voltages. This work benefit-
ted the Space Shuttle as well as the F-16 and F-18. Today this area is of interest to all fly-by-wire applica-
tions and in fact, the whole arena of electromagnetic interference (EMI) and high-intensity radio
frequencies (HIRF) is continuing to receive a lot of attention. Today as people continue to get better at
modeling, they try to reduce the need for testing, but testing is still critical to system verification. In this
area the F-8 was certainly one of the pioneers as well.
• F-8 DFBW demonstrated a non-destructlve method for determining the level of
llghtnlng-induced voltages In electrlcal clrculta.
• Thls methodology has been used for susceptlblllty testlng of Space Shuttle, F-16,
and F-18 fly-by-wlre systems.
Figure 5. Lightning susceptibility tests.
The advanced control work in the second phase involved a number of contractors and universities
looking at various control law designs (fig. 6). As Ken Szalai mentioned, one of the legacies we see here
is that the F-8 involved a number of young engineers in their formative years when they were in graduate
school. They were able to learn modeling and control from these design activities. I'd like to make a few
comments regarding three of the concepts that were flight tested as part of Phase IIB.
• Various studies supported advanced concepts
• Contractors/universities Included:
- MIT
- RPI
- College Univ. of NY
- William and Mary
- Virginia Polytechnic
- Honeywell*
- Draper Lab*
*Concepts flight tested
Figure 6. Advanced control law concepts.
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Theactivecontrollawsexperiments(fig. 7) lookedatperformanceandintegrationof anumberof dif-
ferentcontrol functions.It hadamulti-modestructureandusedacommandaugmentationsystem,which
meanscommandingparticularresponsevariablesof interestasopposedtojust dampingsomeof thesur-
faces.It alsohada modethatcommandedthesymmetricflapswhichgeneratedamodestamountof direct
lift. Thedesignswereaccomplishedwith linearquadraticcontroltheoryandwe usedexplicit modelsto
enforcedesiredhandlingqualities.Thegainschedulinguseddynamicpressureandangleof attack.This
wasa successfulapplicationof linearquadratictheory.Onelessonlearnedwasthebenefitof looking at
optimalcontrol designsin thefrequencydomain.This ledto renewedinterestin frequencydomainanal-
ysis.Eventhoughthedetailsmayvary from airplaneto airplane,thiscontrolstructurehasbeenappliedto
manydifferentmilitary andcommercialflight controlsystems.
Investigate performance and Integration of projected active control functions
• Multi-mode structure
• Command augmentation system
• Boundary controller (angle-of-attack limiter)
• Autopilot functions
• Ride smoothing system/maneuver flaps
• Gain schedule with airdata
- Industry standard used in large number of military and commercial designs.
Figure 7. "Active" control laws.
The adaptive control laws (fig. 8) experiments were conducted using Dryden's ground computer
facility. This was an interesting experiment. The maximum likelihood theory had been used extensively
in off-line parameter identification.The idea that Dr. Stein had was to use a number of Kalman filter chan-
nels to cover the F-8's operating envelope. I believe we had five of them; four for subsonic parameter
tracking and one for supersonic. We estimated surface effectiveness and the pitching moment caused by
angle of attack. One thing we learned was that there's a fundamental need for excitation. We quickly dis-
covered, when the test signals were large enough to get accurate identification, the pilot tended to notice
it and thought he was flying in continuous turbulence. This work also pointed out some of the theoretical
limitations of adaptive control concerning how many parameters to extract and what to do about model
mismatches. This led to a renewed interest in robust adaptive control theory. We have seen some applica-
tions to missiles where an airdata system isn't on board, and there aren't any pilot concerns about test sig-
nals. It is also interesting to note that we haven't put adaptive control in a production airplane since the
F- 111. Gain scheduling has become the standard.
• Use modern Identification theory to estimate aircraft parameters for adaptive
gain scheduling
- Maximum likelihood estimation
- Estimate dynamic pressure and angle of attack
- Identification algorithm on ground computer
• Fundamental need for excitation
• Theoretical limitations (uncertainties)
- New robust adaptive theory
- Missile applications
Figure 8. "Adaptive" control laws.
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The final F-8 flight experiment looked at analytical redundancy, which uses the dynamic relations to
estimate sensor outputs from dissimilar sensors (fig. 9). There were similar flight experiments done on the
A-7 Digitac about the same time. Some performance factors were established, particularly the need for
both high-fidelity models and a need for excitation. In spite of these limitations, various forms of analytical
redundancy have been used in a number of airplanes, an example is the digital upgrade of the SR-71. A
Kalman filter format has also found application in a variety of health monitoring applications for flight and
propulsion systems.
• Estimate sensor output from dissimilar unfailed sensors
• Use kinematic and dynamic relations
• AR algorithms implemented in parallel with baseline FDIR
• Performance factors
- Model fidelity
- Excitation levels
• Various forms of AR used in RM and health monitoring algorithms
Figure 9. Analytical redundancy (AR).
One area that is particularly relevant to some of today's aircraft programs involves fault testing. Figure
10 shows data I took from one of Cal Jarvis' papers that illustrates how heavily the F-8 Program used the
Iron Bird Facility - and the rigorous set of test cases used. Today's aircraft systems follow a similar
approach. If we look at what happened, there was more automation in terms of being able to run through
test cases more quickly, and with the computer power we have now there are larger databases.
• F-8 DFBW relied on Iron Bird facility
- 98% of software verification
- 90% of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) demonstration
• A rigorous matrix of test cases used
• Today's testing of DFBW aircraft follow a similar approach
- More automation
- Larger databases
Figure 10. Flight qualification testing process.
Consider one of the recent examples, the X-31, shown in figure 11. I selected this example because the
hardware was built by our division in Albuquerque and I have some familiarity with it. The X-31 uses sim-
ulation integrated test environment (SITE) which supports automatic fault insertion and logging of results.
This process is automated to where it can run over 30,000 tests in less than a day. Today's systems need a
methodical test approach as did the F-8. What has happened is technology has allowed us to be more
automated, but the essentials had their origin in the F-8 Program.
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Figure 11.
• Flight hardware-in-the-loop simulation
- Interconnects flight hardware to nonlinear simulation
- Piloted evaluation of system
- Data extraction
- Fault insertion
- Closed-loop piloted evaluation from actual aircraft cockpit
- System Interface checkout
• Fully automated system level testing
- 30,000 tests rerun within 20 hr
- Failure Isolation and verification
Recent example, X-31 SITE (simulation integrated test environment).
The next topic concerns back-up systems and dissimilar redundancy (fig. 12). Mr. Deets mentioned
some of the work on the F-8 analog system. This approach was actually used in other vehicles such as the
X-29. The resident software back-up scheme was also mentioned, which has a separate, dedicated portion
of memory (fig. 13). This concept of having a resident software back up has been implemented on several
different designs, particularly in the F-16 digital system. Military applications have been willing to depend
on identical channels. However, in looking at a transition to commercial systems and commercial fly-by-
wire, there's a growing interest in dissimilar software and diverse design approaches. In fact, what I see is
that the F-8 just scratched the surface of the kinds of things that we're interested in now. Looking through
some of the commercial applications of digital fly-by-wire, there is a strong interest in dissimilarity. These
systems have channels that have multiple lanes and the lanes have dissimilar processors and dissimilar
software.
• F-8 DFBW used triplex analog bypass (protection against common-mode
software failure)
This approach used in other designs such as AFTI/F-16 and X-29
• F-8 DFBW conducted experiments using back-up software
- REBUS (resident back-up software)
- Dissimilar software
- Isolated memory
- Transfer criteria
(2 of 3 digital channels generate self fail)
Figure 12. Back-up systems/dissimilar redundancy.
• Fixed-gain three axis stability augmentation system (SAS)
• Asynchronous operation between channels
• No interchannel communication
• Dedicated sensor inputs for each channel
• Mid-value select for actuator command
• Minimal pilot/vehicle interface
This concept implemented in several designs including F-16 C/D.
Figure 13. REBUS characteristics.
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If you reflect on some of these applications to commercial transports, the first two items in figure 14
illustrate a conflict. First, you have to get certification, and that involves the FAA as well as the European
counterpart, the Joint Airworthiness Authority (JAA). What they're looking for involves significant hard-
ware and software dissimilarity, which is in conflict with the cost of developing the system and the eco-
nomics of using it. The other trend I see emerging in commercial applications is the ability to dispatch with
failed elements. This is not yet standard practice in fly-by-wire systems. In addition to commercial trans-
ports, the other area in which we're seeing interest is the potential application of FBW to the business jet.
Here, interestingly enough, you don't have the same pay-off as you have in some of the larger airplanes
but it gives you a high-tech image which is important in selling the airplanes. I think that in the years ahead
we'll see more commercial applications of FBW technology in the large airplanes as well as in the small.
• B-777 (in development)
• MD-12
Commercial transport applications
- Economics
- Certification (JAA and FAA)
Dispatch wlth falled elements
A-320 (in service) 3 spoiler & elevator computers (SEC)
2 elevator & aileron computers (ELAC)
Each SEC or ELAC has a control channel and a
monitor channel with dissimilar m proc and software
3 channels/3 dissimilar lanes per channel
Figure 14. Future challenges - DFBW dissimilarity.
Let me go to my last slide (fig. 15) and reflect on the process. The F-8 Program was a well run R&D
activity. It successfully demonstrated the technology you see flying in other airplanes today. There was
involvement with contractors and universities in the R&D phase. It also enhanced the training of people
in the government and in industry. Last but not least, I think the people that did most of the work on the
F-8, particularly the people here at Dryden, did an excellent job in disseminating results in papers and
conferences.
• Well runR&D
• Successful flight demonstrations
• Involvement of contractors and universities in the R & D
• Dissemlnatlon of work through conferences and workshops
Figure 15. Reflections on the F-8 DFBW "process."
Thank you very much.
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INTRODUCTION OF DWAIN DEETS
Ken Hodge
Thank you Gary for that insightful view from the customer's perspective. Dwain would you like to
wrap the session up and then we'll proceed across the street? You can lead the procession for the dedica-
tion.
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DIGITAL FLY-BY-WIRE WRAP UP
Dwain Deets
I'll make the wrap up brief because more will be said as the dedication proceeds. As I look back at all
that's been said, I can either focus on the technologies the program developed and how that happened, or
on the people that made it happen. I think it's the latter that is more important. If you look at that group of
people - various names come to mind - Ken Szalai's name is the one that stands out because he was a driv-
ing force with a strong technical understanding. I also think about the other people working together to
make DFBW happen. There was an openness to new ideas; the willingness of the Apollo people to better
understand what the aircraft problem was and the Dryden people wanting to understand where the Apollo
people were coming from. In addition, there was the crew chief and the people on the floor who wanted to
understand these other people's ideas, and finally, the pilots.
Every way you look at it, it was that willingness to develop understanding, and not just taking it at face
value, really examining the concepts and technical objectives and thinking it through and letting that be
part of their own motivation. Then they explained it to others as well. That really characterizes what
happened.
With that I invite you all to head across the street for the F-8 dedication.
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F-8 Aircraft
Display Dedication
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F-8 Aircraft Dedication
A brief outdoor ceremony was held the morning of May 27, 1992, to formally dedicate the F-8 DFBW
and SCW research aircraft now on permanent display at the Dryden Flight Research Center. Dryden
Director Kenneth J. Szalai greeted attendees and welcomed special guests. Brief welcoming remarks were
also provided by Col. Robert Cherry, representing the Air Force Flight Test Center, and by Mr. Richard
Kline representing the NASA Headquarters Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology.
Following a summary of program accomplishments, lessons learned, and guidelines for application to
future pioneering flight research endeavors, Mr. Szalai cited for special recognition the aircraft ground
maintenance teams which supported the two F-8 research aircraft/flight facilities. Present at the ceremony
were:
F-8 DFBW Aircraft
Frank Fedor - Assistant Crew Chief
George Nichols
Darrel Sperry
Dave Stoddard
A1 White
F-8 SCW Aircraft
Herin Dorr - Crew Chief
Jim Duffield
Danny Garrabrant
Darrel Sperry
Jim Wilson
Crew members gathered at the respective bronze plaques as the aircraft on display were dedicated:
DFBW
"This research aircraft was the first airplane to fly using a digital fly-by-wire electronic flight control
system, with no mechanical back-up system. The initial system utilized components from the Apollo
spacecraft guidance and control system.
"Digital fly-by-wire flight control systems are now being incorporated into the designs of the most
modern commercial transport airplanes, and are routinely used on nearly all new military aircraft."
"First flight: May 25, 1972. Pilot: Gary E. Krier."
SCW
"This research aircraft was the first airplane to demonstrate the transonic performance capabilities of
a supercritical wing. This airplane demonstrated a drag-rise Mach number of 0.96 at cruise lifting condi-
tions. The resulting technology base permitted an increase in cruise Mach number for transport aircraft
from approximately 0.8 to above 0.9. Wings of this type are now routinely utilized on all new military and
commercial transport aircraft.
"First Flight: November 20, 1971. Pilot: Tom C. McMurtry."
While preparing these proceedings, I discovered that Gremlins in the foundry which cast the SCW plaque had changed the first flight
date from March 9, 1971, to November 20, 1971 ! This clearly shows in the photograph which follows. This latter date was determined to be
of no special significance. It is expected that the plaque will have been corrected by the time this CP is in readers' hands. - K.E.H.
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EC92 05275-5
The ground maintenance crew for the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (from left) Dave Stoddard, George Nichols,
Frank Fedor, A1 White, and Dan Garrabrant, help dedicate the F-8 DFBW display May 27.
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EC92 05275-33
The ground maintenance crew for the F-8 Supercritical Wing (from left) Darrel Sperry, Jim Duffield,
and Dan Garrabrant help dedicate the F-8 Supercritical Wing display.
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Digital Fly-by-Wire displayplaque.
SupercriticalWingdisplayplaque.
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International Space Year
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NOTE TO EDITORS 92-12: NASA AIRCRAFT DISPLAY DEDICATION
A dedication ceremony to pLace two of NASA's most historic
a_craft on display to the public will be held at the Dryden Flight
Research Facility, Edwards, Calif., at 11:45 a.m. on May 27.
Both airplanes arc F-8 Crusaders. One was the first aircraft to
be flown with a digital fly-by-wire system, now in use on most
military aircraft and some civil transports. The other featured the
first demonstration of the SUl_rcritical wing concept, which is used
now by many civil and military aircraft. A symposium with papers
on both programs is also being held on May 27 from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00
p,m,
Pilots who flew both aircraft will be at the event, as will local
NASA officials.
Media planning to cover the dedication and/or the symposium
should notify the Dryden Public Affairs Office, (805) 258-3449, by
I0:00 a.m. the morning of the event and should plan to be at Dryden
by 11:30 a.m. Fact sheets on both aircraft are available, as are
photographs.
-end-
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Facts
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Re=earth Facility
P.O. Box 273
Edwards, California 93523
AC 805-258-3449
Background
N _ murr F_r eEcaua_ OF _m_wr, pilots controlled aircraft
through direct force -- moving control slicks and rudder
pedals linked to cables and pushrods that pivoted contro]
surfaces on the wings and mils.
As engine power and speeds increased, more force was
needed and hydraulically boosted controls emerged. Soon,
all high performance and large aircmh had hydriullc-
mechanical flight control systems. These conventional flight
control systems restricted de_gnen in the comqg, uratlon and
design of aircraft because of the need for flight stability.
As the electronic era grew in the 1960s, so did the idea
of aircraft with electronic flight conc_l systems. Wires replac-
ing cables and pushrods would give designers _ter
flexibility in configuration and in rim size and placement of
components such as tail surfaces and wings. A flyby-wire
system would be smaller, more reliable, and in military
aircraft the systems would be much less vulnet_le to battle
damage. A fly-by-wire aircraft would also be much more
responsive to pilot control inputs. The resuh would be
more efficient, safer aircraft with improved pelfOrlltali_
and design.
International Space Year
b
ISY
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The Aircraft Research Benefits
ol_lm-
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PIONEERING RESEARCH -- NASA's F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire (DFBW) research aircraft cruises over
California's Mojave Desert on one of its pioneering flights in the 1970s that developed the electronic fly-
by-wire flight control systems. The concept is now used in many aircraft today, including the space shuttle
orbiters. The F-8's conventional flight control system was replaced with a digital electronic system utiliz-
ing a computer from an Apollo spacecraft. First flight of the DFBW aircraft was May 25, 1972, by Gary
Krier, of NASA's Dryden Flight Research Center, Edwards, California. After initial flight tests were com-
pleted, the DFBW F-8 was used to test the prototype fly-by-wire sidestick system used now in F- 16 fight-
ers and later tested the computer software for the space shuttle's digital flight control system. The aircraft
was also used to test simulated lightning strikes on digital flight control systems. The aircraft was retired
from flight status in 1985.
(NASA Photo)
October 1991
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Facts
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Ames Research Center
Dryden Flight Research Facility
P.O. Box 273
Edwards, California 93523
AC 805-258-3449
Background
's aim _T 1960s, Dr. RichardT Whitcomb, Chief of theTransonic Aerodynamics Branch, Langley Research
,Center, Virginia, conducted exploratory research which
led to the invention and patent of the NASA Supercritical
Airfoil. Compared to a conventional wing, the Supercritical
wing is flatter on the top and more round on the bottom
with a downward curve at the trailing edge (see illustra-
tion). The concept was first studied in the wind tunnel at
Langley, before actual research with an aircraft began.
An F-8 Crusader, available from the U.S. Navy, was
selected as the SCW testbed. With its easily removable
wing, landing gear which retracted into the fuselage and
Mach 1.7 capability, it was the perfect choice as a testbed.
The announcement that the SCW concept would be flight
tested at the Dryden Flight Research Facility, then the
Dryden Flight Research Center, was made in February
1%9.
Rockwell International's North American Aircraft
Division was awarded the $1.8 million contract to fabri-
cate the supercritical wing. It was delivered to NASA in
December 1969.
Intemational Space Year b
ISY
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Flight Research
mmmq maamam.k,m Md'r_ was the first SCW
program manager, with "Ibm McMum'y as the lead
roject pilot. At Langley, WhRcomb took a personal
interest in test results while Thomas Kelly acted as that
center's project engineer.
The first $CW flight took place on March 9, 1971, with
McMurtry at the controls. On this first flight McMurtry
reached an altitude of 3000 meters (9200 fvv0 and a
maximum speed of 300 knots (260 miles per hour).
WRh the new wing the F-8 landed at a high speed of 230
knots (200 miles per hour). Without antiskid brakes or
wing flap,, it was necessary to land the craft directly On
Rogers Dry Lake. The 15,000-foot concrete runway at
Edwards was used for takeoffs but was too short to
accommodate landings. First fll_.ght of the supcrcritieal
wing at supersonic speeds was on May 26,1971.
Studies of actual wing performance began In August
1971, Pressure sensors on the w/rig's upper surface
measured shock wave formation. Performance sub-
stantiated data from the original wind tunnel tests
performed at langley, in May of 1972, NASA added new
instrumentation and installed new fuselage fairtnss
which reduced drag, thereby tncreastn 8 speed.
Research results showed the SCW had increased the
transonic efficiency of the V-8 by as much as 15 percent
and proved that passenger trampoas with supercritical
wings could increase profits by 2.5 percent over aircraft
with conventional wings. This equated to $78 million
per year (in 1974 dollars) for a 280-plane fleet of
200-1maaenger airliners.
The last flight of the NASA SCW F-8 was on May 23,1975,
with Ron Go.des as pilot.
May 1902
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SHAPEOF THE FUTURE-- The first supercriticalwing to be flight testedon an aircraft appears as a
graceful extension to the upper fuselage of a modified F-8 flown by NASA' s Dryden Flight Research Cen-
ter, Edwards, California, from 1971 to 1973. The wing, developed at NASA's Langley Research Center
by Richard Whitcomb, features an airfoil flatter on top and more rounded on the bottom than conventional
airfoils. Research flights with the wing showed that the supercritical airfoil delayed the formation of the
shock wave over the wing at high subsonic speeds, resulting in less drag. This allows the aircraft to cruise
farther0rfaster, with increased payloads, with greater fuel efficiency. Many military and civilian aircraft
are now flying with supercritical airfoils.
(NASA Photo)
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THE F-8 SUPERCRITICAL WING; HARBINGER OF TODAY'S AIRFOIL SHAPES
- AND -
INTRODUCTION OF DR. RICHARD WHITCOMB
Ted Ayers
Good afternoon, and welcome to the second half of today's sympo-
sium. This afternoon we'll focus on the F-8 Supercritical Wing.
As you can see from the title in your agenda, The F-8 Supercritical
Wing; Harbinger of Today's Airfoil Shapes is intended to focus on the pi-
oneering aspects of transonic airfoil development. I didn't know what
harbinger was until yesterday - I did look it up in the dictionary. For those
of you who don't know it, it means pioneering, or apostle, or preceding,
or one who changes things.
Up until the mid-1960's the transonic, mixed, or supercritical flow re-
gime was either avoided or viewed with disdain as an environment to
be transitioned rapidly or slowly, depending upon thrust minus drag. It was not a very friendly environ-
ment to fly into. The first generation of jet transports had gone about as far as they could go aerodynam-
ically in pushing the speed and efficiency of commercial travel.
Dr. Richard Whitcomb, of NASA's Langley Research Center, (characterized by Dick Hallion as say-
ing, "We've done all the easy things, lets do the hard ones") was well aware of this fact and was seeking
new challenges. The challenge was great because at this time the state of the art in theory and in ground
base testing at near-sonic velocities was very poor. The real tools were intuitive thinking - and I believe
here that Dick Whitcomb was world class, perhaps even unmatched-a wind tunnel, and an unlimited sup-
ply of auto body putty better known as white lightning or black magic. Just as all good whiskeys, beers,
and coffees have their own unique characteristics, so too, does body putty. Taste, smell, texture, and rapid
set-up time were critical.
It was this backdrop that set the stage for what was to become several years of intense, and I do mean
intense, supercritical aerodynamic research in the Langley Research Center's 8-ft Transonic Pressure
Tunnel.
Figure 1 is an artist's concept of the tunnel and I only show it to set the stage of where things took
place. The test section is located here; it was a slotted transonic tunnel, capable of speeds from Mach .2
to 1.2 with an additional capability to 1.41. I will leave it to Dr. Whitcomb to lead you through the real
story of supercritical aerodynamic research. That research, as we all know today, was important to the
future of US competitiveness and was successful as evidenced by its culmination in three flight activities:
the T-2C, the F-8 Supercritical Wing, and the F-111 Transonic Aircraft Technology Program (TACT).
There were some aspects of the Supercritical Wing Research Program that are worth mentioning and
I believe these are outside of what Dr. Whitcomb will talk about. Whereas the objective was the achieve-
ment of efficient near-sonic cruise flight, many other firsts were achieved during the course of this re-
search. It's these other things that I would like to focus on.
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Figure 1. Langley's 8-ft Transonic Pressure Tunnel'
Figure 2. Supercritical wing flow field.
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It was the first time a large, two-dimensional airfoil designed to take advantage of the shock waves had
been tested. There was an interesting thing here that nobody picked up on for years. We used this sche-
matic (fig. 2) to explain supercritical flow and if you'll note, the conventional airfoil has a large area of
supersonic flow terminating in a shock wave which results in separated flow and very high drag. I show
this here only to make a point; while we thought we were doing everything right in the tunnel, the real
supercritical airflow shown down here was what we were after. In fact, this airfoil was going to generate
so much lift that it was mounted upside down in the tunnel to prevent the test section from lifting off its
mounts. This test section (fig. 3) weighs nearly 30 tons.
Figure 3. 2-D supercritical wing model.
The other thing that was unique about this supercritical airfoil was that when we tested beyond the
design Mach number, the shock wave would "pop" off its design location and the whole building would
rumble because of the separated flow. While many changes could be made to this large, heavy model in
the tunnel using the previously mentioned body putty technique, some major design changes required the
model to go back to the machine shop six miles away. On one such occasion the model was being returned
from the shop for the next series of tests - I need to tell you that when Dick Whitcomb was on to something
he was really focused, it was like-here we go, don't bring any side shows. Now the road from the shop to
the tunnel ran through the Langley Air Force Base NCO housing area which had two 90°-turns. This road
represented a significant delay to the research because the wing, this large, two-dimensional wing, neglect-
ed to follow the truck through the 90°-turn and ended up skidding down the main street in the NCO
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housingarea.Obviouslythis didn't set very well with Dick. So people kind of stayed away from him for
a few days while he cooled down and we got the model repaired.
Having overcome this setback, the research continued and another first occurred. Because of the airfoil
design and the need for a critical positioning of the shock wave, understanding the boundary layer was
very important. Dick may have more to say on this subject, but I did want to show here the sophisticated
techniques that we used to control boundary-layer transition. There were two ways of doing this. One was
to feed carborundum grains to a fly and make him walk along here to deposit them; the second one was to
find one of the technicians that could blow real well and put it on there with a piece of paper.
The research continued as the airfoil became refined. It transitioned from the 2-dimensional slotted air-
foil to a 2-dimensional unslotted airfoil with a thick trailing edge. It seemed that thickening the trailing
edge improved the flow characteristics. So much emphasis was placed on squeezing the last bit of perfor-
mance out of this area with the final shape looking like this latter one in figure 4. You may wonder, "How
did this shape get to be this way, why this?" Well, supercritical flows and weather have something in com-
mon. Shown by figure 5 here, this is a snow cornice theory published in the literature and thus the reason
for the cusp and the trailing edge for the supercritical wing. That was the reason that the trailing edge on
the F-8 ended up this way (fig. 6).
Figure 4. Supercritical wing design optimization.
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Figure 5. Snow cornice theory.
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Figure6. TrailingedgeonF-8SCW.
RememberthatI startedoutby sayingthatgoodtheoreticalpredictivetoolswere essentially nonexist-
ent during this time period. Somewhere along the way, and I don't remember exactly when, the folks at
Lockheed came up with a 2-dimensional attached flow code that could compute pressure distributions. Up
until this time everything was done on a piece of paper. This code was eventually modified for use as a
design code that allowed one to specify the desired pressure distribution and compute the airfoil geometry.
However there was still a problem, we still needed to know what the boundary layer was to get the viscous
effects on it.
What's the point of mentioning this? The point is that the experimental research in supercritical aero-
dynamics spawned a renewed interest in computational fluid dynamics (CFD) that led to the development
of very sophisticated transonic computational design and analysis methods.
In fact, here's an example of an early design approach, this being the solution to potential tip flow prob-
lems on the F-8 Supercritical Wing. Figure 7 is a picture of an original hand-sketched drawing, so this was
CFD without a computer.
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Having completed the airfoil development, or at least carrying it far enough to prove its feasibility and
being well aware of all the problems associated with practical transonic flight, it was decided that an actual
flight research program was in order to dispel any myths about this new airfoil. Believe me there were
myths; like anything new, people were skeptical. Many believed that any benefits derived from this airfoil
would be offset by trim drag, flutter, buffet, and the practicalities of fabrication. At the time of the super-
critical wing research, Larry Loftin was director of aeronautics at the Langley Research Center, and he
gave the flight research idea a thumbs up. Larry was such a key part of this activity and such an admirable
speaker we had hoped to get his views on airplane design. Unfortunately, Larry is unable to be with us
today. The decision was made to conduct the flight research at Dryden.
The F-8 Supercritical Wing flight project was thus born. The Langley Research Center Wind Tunnel
testing continued to define the flight configuration. More firsts were in store. We had long known that our
atmospheric open-circuit wind tunnels contained moisture and that its effects were not well understood.
When we went from atmospheric wind tunnels, where outside air was used to replenish inside air without
conditioning it, to the pressurized closed-circuit tunnels where we could control temperature, pressure, and
other parameters, we more or less assumed that the moisture content was low enough so as not to be a prob-
lem. However, we began to see differences in test data, at near sonic velocities, that led us to suspect that
this might not be the case.
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These suspicions led to yet another spinoff of supercritical aerodynamic research. This was an
increased insight into the effects of moisture on the location of shock waves or shock condensation effects.
Our research into shock condensation phenomenon was carried out in a very sophisticated manner. We
would throw a cup of water in the tunnel, run it, then throw a bucket of water in the tunnel and run it, then
throw more buckets of water in the tunnel and run it. We did this until we were able to define the critical
temperature and humidity levels at which shock condensation effects appeared in the data.
Another spinoff from the F-8 Supercritical Wing research was that of wind tunnel blockage_dt near son-
ic velocities. The development of a slotted transonic wind tunnel was intended to somewhat alleviate the
effects of blockage. However, concern for the potential disastrous effects that blockage could have on
wind tunnel drag results at the approximately Mach 1 design cruise conditions led to another research
effort focused on understanding this blockage and its consequences. A series of equivalent bodies of rev-
olution; i.e., a body of revolution having the same longitudinal area distribution as the F-8 Supercritical
Wing airplane, were constructed and tested in the Langley 8-fl and 16-ft wind tunnels and the Ames 11-ft
wind tunnel. It was this research that provided an understanding of blockage Ol'fects and allowed for its
consideration in assuring the accuracy of the F-8 Supercritical Wing drag predictions.
One other area I would like to touch on has to do with testing philosophies. Early on, it was believed
that the design conditions, that is Mach 1 cruise, dictated that all testing be done with the wind tunnel mod-
el wing fabricated to the 1-g design load shape. Generally wind tunnel models are built to the design jig
shape which is an unloaded condition, and then the wind tunnel tends to load it up to some extent and you
try to make corrections for the difference between that and the airplane. In the case of the F-8 we believed
that the shock location was so critical to the boundary-layer stability that the wing on the wind tunnel mod-
el had to be exactly the same as the wing on the airplanes. Therefore, the airplane design specification re-
quired the full-scale wing be designed to match the wind tunnel shape at that 1-g loaded condition. So,
another first was achieved; aeroelastic tailoring. We generally think of aeroelastic tailoring as the result of
control using composite materials overlaid in a strategic manner to control the shape of a wing as it under-
goes aerodynamic loading. In the case of the F-8 it was the reverse, i.e., we designed the airplane to be like
the wind tunnel model.
Figure 8 is a comparison of the wing box deflection versus the semi span for the predicted ability of
deflection. The difference between these two i_e jig shape.
O
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Figure 8. F-8 SCW wing geometry.
Finally, in keeping with Dryden's low-cost and simple approach to flight testing, the F-8, so I'm told,
represented the first and last attempt to conduct a load calibration using lead shot. The lead shot was pur-
chased from shotgun reloading stores, used to load the wing, and then sold back to the reloading store. As
shot was added to increase the wing loading, the actual wing mass was increased causing the wing to res-
onate. This approach, while low cost, did require very careful placement of the load to insure that the wing
did not fail during the loads calibration. This actually saved money, but did create other problems. Test
results are shown in Figure 9 compared with predictions.
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Figure 9. Design requirement verified.
And now, as Paul Harvey says, "you know the rest of the story." Well not quite. During the F-8 Pro-
gram, it was discovered that while the airplane generally performed as anticipated and did cruise at
approximately Mach 0.97, differences still existed. The discovery was that the airplane actually had some
laminar flow on the wing, resulting in a thinner boundary layer and therefore, an increase in the effective
camber of the wing. This was not predicted. "And now you know the rest of the story."
My point is that while we con_tinue to develop new methods, new techniques, and continue to learn
more, we continue to find out that there are still many unknowns. Only through actual flight research do
we discover these phenomena. The other point I want to make here is that for those who believe that flight
projects are only there to support ground-based research, the F-8 Supercritical Wing stands as an example
of where flight activity provided a focus to enhance our overall knowledge of transonic flows.
At this point, it is my pleasure to introduce to you one of the true icons in the world of aeronautical
research. This is the man I have had the privilege and the pleasure of working for and with, I've known
him for over 30 years, He was my first boss, and my first real professor in transonic aerodynamics.
Richard Travis Whitcomb was born in Evanston, Illinois; he attended Worcester Polytechnic Institute
graduating with high distinction in 1943 with a Bachelor of Science degree in mechanical engineering. He
went to work at Langley and was associated with the Transonic Aerodynamics Branch at the Langley Re-
search Center from 1943 to 1980, when he retired. He was appointed head of the branch in 1958 and
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throughouthis careersupervisedthedevelopmentof means for improving aerodynamic performance of
aircraft. Dick always had an eye toward practicality, improvements to aircraft at transonic speeds, and the
practical application to specific airplanes. He's the author of over 30 technical papers on transonic aero-
dynamics and he's an instructor in the graduate program at Langley. Since his retirement from NASA he
has continued to be active, although now he tells me he's in a voluntary role to teach high school kids how
to build 30-ft flying paper airplanes.
In 1952, Whitcomb discovered and experimentally verified a revolutionary aircraft design concept
called the area rule. This is a method of designing aircraft to reduce drag and increase speed without
additional power. It has been incorporated into almost every American supersonic aircraft. He was also the
inventor of the supercritical wing that we're talking about today. In addition, he invented and developed
the application of winglets to transport airplanes and other vehicles to increase their lift-to-drag ratio. He's
an internationally known aerodynamicist, he's received awards too numerous to cover in totality; he was
awarded the Collier Trophy in 1954 for the year's greatest achievement in aviation in America, the Excep-
tional Service Medal of the Air Force in 1955, the first Distinguished Service Medal to be presented by
NACA in 1956; he received the NASA Scientific Achievement Medal in 1959, in 1974 he received a cash
award of $25,000 for the invention of the supercritical wing, he was selected to receive the Aircraft Design
Award from the AIAA, and on and on.
Chuck Yeager may have broken the sonic barrier, but Dr. Richard T. Whitcomb made routine transonic
or supersonic flight a reality. Please welcome Dr. Richard Whitcomb.
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THE STATE OF TECHNOLOGY BEFORE THE F-8 SUPERCRITICAL WING
Richard T. Whitcomb
I should explain what supercritical means. Critical Mach number is
the speed at which local supersonic flow develops on the wing or any
other part of the configuration, and super obviously means "beyond"
just like supersonic means beyond the speed of sound. The first airfoils
designed to operate efficiently at supercritical Mach numbers were the
Pearcy Airfoils, which were used on the second generation of trans-
ports. The Pearcy Airfoil, which delayed the drag-rise Mach number
about .02 or .03, had a limited region of supercritical flow on the upper
surface, about 5 to 10 percent of the chord near the leading edge. Pearcy
didn't take the next step which was to design an airfoil with a large re-
gion of supercritical flow above the airfoil. With such an airfoil, one
should achieve large delays in the drag rise Mach number. A schematic of the airfoil resulting from our
work is shown in figure 1.
The well-known flow problem for conventional airfoils at high subsonic speeds is illustrated at the top
of figure 1. A local region of supersonic or supercritical flow develops above the upper surface of a lifting
airfoil which terminates in a strong shock wave. The wave itself causes some increase in drag, but usually
the principal effect is separation of the boundary layer with a significant increase in drag, stability prob-
lems, and buffet. For the NASA supercritical airfoil shown at the bottom of figure l, the curvature of the
middle region of the upper surface is substantially reduced with a resulting decrease in the strength and
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Figure 1. The supercritical phenomena.
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extent of the shock wave. The drag associated with the wave is reduced and, more importantly, the onset
of separation is substantially delayed. The lift lost by reducing the curvature of the upper surface is
regained by substantial camber of the rear portion of the airfoil.
The airfoil also incorporated other features which were important to the total effectiveness of the new
shape. The middle region of the lower surface was designed to maintain subcritical flow for all operating
conditions of the airfoil, because the pressure rise associated with a shock wave superimposed on the pres-
sure rise caused by the cusp would cause separation of the lower surface boundary layer. To minimize the
surface curvatures and thus the induced velocities on the middle regions of the upper and lower surfaces,
the leading edge was made substantially larger than for the previous airfoils. It is approximately 2.5 times
that for a 6-series airfoil of the same thickness ratio. The pressure distribution on the aft portion of the low-
er surface was designed by the Stratford criteria to obtain the largest increase in lift by the cusp without
incurring boundary-layer separation in the cusp. This involves a rapid initial increase in pressure followed
by a more gradual increase. Finally, at the trailing edge the slope of the lower surface was made approxi-
mately equal to that of the upper surface to reduce to a minimum the required pressure recovery at the
upper surfacetrailingedge.
The development leading to the shape shown in figure 1 is shown in figure 2. For years people had
been trying to control the boundary-layer separation under the shock wave. The devices used, blowing and
sucking, for example were far too complicated. If you just put a slot in the airfoil as shown in figure 2, then
the flow through the slot stabilized the boundary just like for a slotted flap at low speed. The action of this
slot is essentially the same as for low speeds but the slot was designed with much more care because the
flow though it is near sonic and it has to be exactly right. The industry thought the slotted airfoil was too
complicated, so we developed the integral airfoil shown.
SUPERCRITICAL AIRFOILS
SLOTTED 1964
C._
INTEGRAL 1966
THICKENED T. E. INTEGRAL 1968
Figure 2. Supercritical airfoils.
Another thing that the industry didn't like was the thin trailing edge, so we thickened it. Here we got
into a disagreement with almost every aerodynamicist in the whole industry, they said, "You can't do that,
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it will cost you drag !" But if you kept the thickness small enough, there was no drag penalty. Any airfoil
that has ever flown had separation near the trailing edge. What we did was move the separation around to
the base.
Figure 3 presents variations of drag with Mach number for an airfoil similar to that used on the out-
board part of the F-8 wing for a normal force (lift) coefficient of 0.7. This value is substantially higher than
the lift coefficient at which the F-8 would fly. The sweep of a wing reduces the lift produced by an airfoil
by the cosine of the sweep angle squared. Thus, the airfoil must be optimized for a higher coefficient. For
comparison, the variation for a NACA 64 series with the same thickness ratio and normal force coefficient
is also shown.
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The drag rise Mach number is about 0.11 higher for the supercritical airfoil. This comparison was crit-
icized by people in industry since we didn't compare the new airfoil with the most recent Pearcy airfoil
already mentioned. The problem is that Pearcy never published any airfoil data which could be used. He
presented coordinates, selected pressure distribution, and some drag data, but not enough to make a valid
drag rise comparison. Using drag rise data for complete wings with the Pearcy airfoil and the 64 series
airfoil, we estimated that the drag rise values for the former were about .02 to .03 higher than for the latter.
A comparison of the variation of the drag rise Mach number with normal force coefficient, presented in
figure 4, shows that not only is the Mach number for drag rise increased but also the normal force coeffi-
cient for stall improved. Thus, the new airfoil should improve the maneuver characteristics of fighter-type
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airplanesat high subsonicspeeds.Onthebasisof resultssuchastheseshown,thenewsupercriticalwing
panelsfor theGeneralDynamicsF-111wereflight testedhereatDryden.Theysubstantiallyimprovedthe
maneuvercharacteristics.
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Figure 4. The onset of drag rise.
Ted noted that we had to develop the new airfoil experimentally because no theory for supercritical
flow was available. Larry Loftin said, "We've got to have a theory!" Clint Brown, who used to work at
Langley, recommended Garabidian at the Applied Math Department at NYU, since nonlinear mathematics
would be required and Garabidian had written a book on the subject. We gave Garabidian a large grant to
support a group to work on the problem. He proposed a method for computing supercritical flow which he
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presentedto us.I wassupposedto managethegrant,but I wasnomathematician.Loftin hadEd Garrick,
oneof Langley'sbestmathematicians,lookattheproposal.Garrick,whohadgrownupwith lineartheory,
said,"It's brilliant but I don't understandaword of it." Now therearemanynonlineartheoriesfor super-
critical flow.
As Tedpointedout, Yoshaharadevelopedatheorybut it wouldn't converge.Hespentall nighton the
fastestLangleycomputerandit hadn't evenstartedto converge.
Any methodfor computingtherealaerodynamicsfor supercriticalairfoils musthavetheeffectof the
boundarylayer in the computations.A schematicof theboundarylayeron theaft part of a supercritical
airfoil is shownin figure 5. Becauseof steeppressuregradienton the aft part of the uppersurface,the
boundarylayer in this regiongreatlythickensat shown.Also, the steepgradienton themid part of the
lower surfacealsothickenstheboundarylayerin thecuspof this surface.Bothof theseeffectsgreatlyre-
ducetheeffectivecamberfor theairfoil.
Figure5.
BOUNDARY LAYER
(SCHEMATIC)
........... _-__---_
Influence of boundary-layer displacement on effective camber of supercritical airfoil.
As Ted mentioned, the other thing Larry said was, "We're going to have a flight demonstration. This
thing is so different from anything that we've ever done before that nobody's going to touch it with a ten
foot pole without somebody going out and flying it." So he said, "We'll fly it!" We decided the Navy F-8
would be the best test bed. Loftin talked with a man high up in the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics, who pro-
vided us with an airplane. We finally got some money from Washington headquarters and the wing was
built by North American in California.
Let's talk about the configuration.The F-8 with the new supercritical wing on it is shown in figure 6. I
decided somewhere along the way to try to get a cruise Mach number as close to M = 1.0 as possible. I
wanted to have a "sonic" transport. I had worked on a supersonic transport configuration for about four
years and had decided that supersonic transports were totally impractical from the standpoint of operating
cost. Ask the British and French about that. Every year they fly the Concord they lose their shirts and yet
it's a matter of national prestige that they fly those airplanes. They built about ten of them but only use
seven because so few people wanted to pay the ticket price required. It's very high! The high cost results
primarily from the high drag at supersonic speeds which greatly increases fuel consumption.
To get the drag rise for the wing up to near M = 1.0, we increased the sweep to 42 °. In addition, we
wanted ultimately to design a total airplane on the basis of the area rule. To obtain a reasonable indented
fuselage, the increase in cross-section area for the wing should be relatively gradual. We achieved this by
extending the leading edge of the inboard section of the wing forward as shown in figure 6.
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Figure 6. Three-view of F-8 Supercritical Wing airplane.
The shapes of the airfoil sections are shown in figure 7. Most of the airfoils for the outboard region are
the same as we had developed two dimensionally. However, the root section did not look like those air-
foils, since there was a strong three-dimensional effect near the root. It still has a lot of aft camber in this
region, but it doesn't have that severe curvature near the trailing edge of the upper surface. As for this re-
gion of previous transports, it has very little curvature in this region. The spanwise variations of section
thickness ratios and incidence are shown in figure 8.
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Figure 7. Supercritical wing on the F-8 research airplane.
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Spanwise variation of thickness and twist.
The available subcritical theory indicated that because of the high sweep and Mach number, the wing
should have a large amount of twist. With supercritical flow present, it should have even more. We arbi-
trarily moved 2 ° for this effect. Now let's look at the thickness ratios, t over c. As you can see, there is a
large spanwise variation in thickness ratio, again this is similar to previous transport airplanes.
Now let's discuss one of the problems we encountered. We had increased the sweep and aspect ratio
so that we were guaranteed to get pitch up. I made a presentation at Langley on some of our data. Jack
Reeder, the chief test pilot at Langley, who was in the audience, said, "You can't have that." So I said,
"We'll fix it." We added a little surface which extended below the leading edge of the wing as shown in
figure 9. Oil flow studies with and without this addition are shown in figure 10. You can see that on the
original wing without the addition, the boundary-layer flow zipped spanwise across the wing indicating
that the boundary layer was separated. When we put the addition on, an opposing vortex on the upper sur-
face stopped the spanwise flow on the wing. It's an aerodynamic barrier, not a physical one, like a fence.
The effect of the addition on pitch up is shown in figure 9.
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Figure 10. Oil flow, vortex generator effect (M = 0.95, C L = 0.93).
That's all I'm going to say about things that happened up to the F-8 Supercritical Wing Program. I'd
now like to say something about what happened immediately after that program. At that point we had a
new administration at headquarters. George Low had moved back there. He was gung-ho for convincing
the industry to apply the new wing on a real transport. At Langley, we tested the same wing used on the
F-8 on an indented transport fuselage. Figure 11 shows a General Dynamics version of an actual transport.
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ARTIST'S CONCEPT OFA NEAR-SONIC TRANSPORT
INCORPORATING A SUPERCRITICAL WING
Figure 11. Artist's concept of a near-sonic transport incorporating a supercritical wing.
To account for the expansion of the stream tubes above the upper surface associated with the super-
sonic flow in that region, we altered the ideal area distribution for a supercritical body of revolution to the
modified shape shown in figure 12. This resulted in a deep indentation of the fuselage. This configuration
provided a cruise Mach number of 0.98. We provided the industry with the coordinates and aerodynamic
data for this configuration. Three companies; Boeing, Douglas, and General Dynamics studied real trans-
ports based on this design. Boeing was so impressed with the results of their study that they started design-
ing a production airplane based on the design.
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Figure 12. Second-order area-rule considerations.
Now I have a sad story to tell. About two months after that systems study was completed, the Arabs
quadrupled the price of fuel and the airlines weren't the least bit interested in buying faster airplanes. They
said, "Give us something that would reduce the fuel consumption." So we did two things. We used super-
critical technology to obtain higher lift-to-drag ratios at the same speed as for existing airplanes rather than
to increase the speed. This was accomplished by using thicker airfoil sections and a reduction in wing
sweepback, both of which allowed an increase in aspect ratio without an increase in wing weight (a thicker
supercritical wing had been demonstrated in flight using a Navy T2C trainer as a test bed). Most new trans-
port airplanes today have high-aspect ratio-supercritical wings. We also started working on winglets.
Well, that is about my story, so if you have any questions, I'll be happy to answer them.
Audlienee: How about the Harrier AV-8B, is that supercritical?
Dr. Whiteomb: Oh, yes. The aerodynamics on the original British Harrier weren't too good. So Douglas
Aircraft, which had a cooperative agreement with the British, put a supercritical wing on the Harrier. Now
there are many airplanes with supercritical wings, but they're designed for M = 0.8 to 0.85, not for
M = 0.98 as was the wing for the F-8. The Douglas company for example has the supercritical wing on
their new MD-11. I didn't want to say that the supercritical wing died; just this particular configuration on
the F-8.
Audience: Do you remember back in 1970, Swearingen tried to build a supersonic jet? He spent $35 mil-
lion and went bankrupt.
Dr. Whitcomb: Of course he had to go bankrupt. He was wrong ! I never talked to Swearingen, but I did
talk to the aerodynamicist designing the airplanes who called me. I told him they were wrong. For an
airplane the size of a business jet, with the long and narrow fuselage required for supersonic flight, every-
body would have to lie down.
9O
Audience: The General Dynamics people came to see you about an anti-shock body. I haven't heard that
mentioned at all, can you say a few words about that?
Dr. Whiteomb: The anti-shock bodies did work. However, they basically accomplished the same aerody-
namic effect as the supercritical airfoil, so they're not needed on a wing with these airfoils.
Audience: Do you know anything about supercritical wing development being done in the Soviet Union?
Dr. Whiteomb: No, I know nothing at all about that. I know that it has been used on the European Airbus.
Phillipe Poisson-Quinton, a Frenchman called P.Q., came to see me during his regular visits to this coun-
try. Also Pearcy of Britain visited me. I told them, in general terms, what we were doing on the supercrit-
ical airfoils. However, I could not show them any wind-tunnel data since they were classified. The French
and British then conducted wind-tunnel tests of their versions of the airfoil. P.Q. came back to show me
some of their data. Later, several European papers on various aspects of supercritical wings were presented
at an international conference in Haifa, Israel.
One of the things that we have in this industry is that, and it really drives you up the wall, there is a
very strong anti-age factor. Ultimately they'll use the technology, but they drag their feet for years.
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INTRODUCTION OF TOM McMURTRY
Ken Hodge
At the Pilot' s Panel this noon we were making excuses for Tom McMurtry' s absence. Tom is here now
and we'll have his views on the supercritical wing in just one moment.
Tom is currently the chief of the Dryden Flight Operations Division. He's been a research pilot here
for the last 25 years. His 10,000+ flight hours include service as the F-8 Supercritical Wing Project Pilot;
he was also a co-project pilot on the Digital Fly-By-Wire airplane.
He's a former Navy pilot, Naval Test Pilot School graduate; his experience here at Dryden ranges from
small-scale aircraft like the AD-1 up to being one of the project pilots on the 747 Shuttle Carrier aircraft.
He's the recipient of the NASA Exceptional Service Medal for his work on the F-8 Supercritical Wing.
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A PILOT'S VIEW OF SUPERCRITICAL WING
Thomas McMurtry
Twenty years, my how time flies when you're having fun!
I'm going to begin by showing you a short film that's been put to-
gether from some footage from the early flights of the F-8 Supercritical
Wing airplane. Before the film begins, I want to suggest that you care-
fully note how the pilot pulls and tugs on the engine inlets and the
wheel well doors during his walk around pre-flight. I suppose that those
things could fall off some time! Also note how the pilot describes the
flight after getting out of the airplane. Pilots have to use their hands for
something! I'll make a few comments as the film is shown.
The first take-off was made on the dry lake bed at Edwards. One of the great features of the Dryden
Flight Operations area is the availability of the lake bed for unique take-offs and landings. During the flight
program we did a lot of maneuvers such as pull-ups, push-overs, etc., to determine the stability of the
airplane. Most of the footage in the film was shot during the first few flights of the airplane. We used
F- 104s as chase airplanes. Later in the program, there were times when the F-8 Supercritical Wing and the
F-8 Fly-By-Wire airplanes flew at the same time. I think the F-8 Supercritical Wing airplane is a beautiful
airplane when in flight. The first landing was made on the lake bed. The airplane was very stable during
the approach and landing.
In the interest of accomplishing the first flight on the airplane as soon as possible, the airplane was not
painted in the blue and white scheme as it is today. There was no time or money to do that! The SCW sym-
bol was actually taped on the tail of the airplane for the first flight. Would you believe it? A picture of the
airplane in this configuration made the cover of Aviation Week. There were some interesting features on
the F-8 Supercritical Wing airplane, and I'll describe them to you today.
To fair the fuselage glove into the forward fuselage, an extension over the rear part of the canopy was
added. This extension was called the "cape" and it had to be installed after the pilot was in the airplane,
and after the canopy was closed. Also it had to be removed before the pilot opened the canopy after flight.
It extended over the canopy about 18 in. and was designed to tear away with canopy separation during ejec-
tion. We never did test for separation, but we did the analysis to determine that it would not degrade the
capability of the ejection seat in the airplane.
Since the wing was designed to carry no fuel, there was 4,700 lb of fuel in the airplane at engine start.
This resulted in flights of approximately 1 hr when afterburner was not used. No aerial refueling capability
existed in the airplane. For higher lift, the ailerons were drooped 20°; this was to provide higher lift for
take-offs and landings. The speedbrake was on the lower fuselage. It could be extended 15 ° for landings
to increase the drag of the airplane to allow better engine response if a go around was required.
Now 1'11 talk about the handling qualities of the airplane. Remember that the intent of the F-8 Super-
critical Wing Program was to demonstrate the applicability of the concept to a transport-type airplane.
Even though the F-8 didn't look like a transport airplane, it was thought that maneuvers could be per-
formed to simulate a transport airplane. The handling qualities were thus looked at as to their acceptability
for a transport airplane.
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A concernabouttake-offsandlandingswasthefuselageincidenceangle.ThebasicF-8 airplanehad
a two-position wing; oneposition for take-offsand landingsandthe other for cruise.Only the cruise
positionwasretainedon theF-8 SupercriticalWing airplane.Over-rotationcouldeasilycausethetail to
striketheground.To preventthis from happening,areferencepitchattitudewasproposedfor thepilot. To
determinethis, wejackedtheplaneupbeforethe first flight, with thepilot in thecockpit.We measured
theclearancebetweenthefuselagetailpipeandthegroundandwhenit equalled1ft weplacedamarkwith
greasepencil on the forwardwind screenthatwasusedasa referenceby thepilot sothathedidn't over-
rotatetheairplaneduringtake-offor landingandthusstrikethetail on theground.Youmight considerthis
crude,but rememberthis wasa low-costprogramandtheideaworkedbecauseweneverscrapedthetail.
During take-off theairplanehandledquite well. Nosewheelsteeringwasuseduntil about75 kts, at
whichtimedirectionalcontroleffectivenessbecamequitegood.Pitchcontrolwasresponsivewith no ten-
dencyto over-control.As mentionedearlier,thefirst take-offwasmadefromthedry lakebed.Latertake-
offs weremadefrom thehardsurfacerunwaytowardthelakebed.Duringclimb-out,theairplanehandled
quitewell. Testmaneuveringwasperformedtorepresentatransportairplane.Dick Whitcombcommented
abouta concernaboutthe pitch-up characteristics.During my experienceflying the airplane,I never
experiencedanypitchup.Wedid fly theairplaneup to about20°-angleof attackandtheproblemthatwe
encounteredtherewasthatwestartedto getroll-off thatwecouldn'tcontrolwith theairplanelateralcon-
trois.We didn't go intoa stallbut wewentto theangleof attackwherewe lost lateralcontrol.
At thecruiseconditions,theairplanewasquitestable.Theairplanecouldbequickly establishedat a
testconditionandeasilyheldthere.Oneof theconcernswasthatwith thetransportairplane,if youhadan
upset,andtheairplaneattainedaveryhighspeed,wastheregoingtobeaproblemrecoveringtheairplane?
We investigatedthat anddeterminedthatanyupsetsof theairplanewouldbeeasyto control.
No high-g maneuverswereperformed.Theairplanewaslimited to +4 gs. Approaches were flown at
approximately 170 to 175 kts. Control on all axes was very good; engine response was good. The landings
were not made with standard Navy F-8-qualified tires, because the original F-8 tires were rated up to only
178 kts. The F-104 tires were used on the F-8 Supercritical Wing wheels and were qualified for speeds up
to 239 kts. Landings were made on the dry lake bed because there was no anti-skid brake system on the
airplane.
There were 11 pilots who flew the F-8 Supercritical Wing airplane for a total of 86 flights. The results
of the flight program compared very favorably with the results from the wind tunnel.
Looking back, I believe that the testing team was highly motivated because everyone knew that a suc-
cessful flight-test demonstration would result in applicability of the concept to the benefit of future trans-
port airplanes. With the best test team at work on the project, it was fun, exciting, and successful.
Thank you very much.
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INTRODUCTION OF JAMES A. BLACKWELL i
Ken Hodge
We turn once again to the Aerospace Industry to find out the influence the Supercritical Wing airplane
has on today's aircraft. Our speaker will be James Blackwell, better known professionally as "Micky"
Blackwell.
During the past 18 months, he has been the F-22 Program Vice President and General Manager at the
Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Company in Marietta, Georgia. Previous to that, he was vice president
and general manager for the Lockheed portion of the Advanced Tactical Fighter Program. He joined the
company in 1969 as a research engineer after working at NASA Langley for Dick Whitcomb. He's held a
number of management positions at the Georgia company including engineering program manager for
special projects for staff aeronautics, and vice president of engineering.
In 1987 when one of the Georgia companies merged with the California company, he became vice
president and general manager of Research Technology and Engineering. More than an adequate back-
ground to comment on the supercritical wing.
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INFLUENCE ON TODAY'S AIRCRAFT
James Blackwell
The greatest heritage that NASA has is its people, facilities, and re-
sources. It's people like NASA's Dick Whitcomb that make this coun-
try great. His life has been focused. Working first as an aerodynamics
research engineer and later as the branch head of the Eight-Foot Tunnel
Transonic Aerodynamics at Langley, he has dedicated his life to im-
proving aircraft aerodynamics, improving that science that he loves so
well. All that I have learned about the practical application of aerody-
namics I learned from Dick Whitcomb. I hope that each of you have the
good fortune in your career to be able to work with someone as out-
standing as Dick Whitcomb.
Figure 1. The Supercritical Wing Legacy: influence on today's design.
As indicated in figure 1, I would like to talk about the influence on the design of today's aircraft that
supercritical technology has had. Today, we see a lot of different kinds of applications. Even before I left
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NASA in 1969,supercriticaltechnologyanditsprincipleswerebeingusedin numerousapplications(e.g.,
fighterwings,transportwings,helicopterrotors,engineblades).
As shownin figure 2, I'm goingto talk aboutthe influenceof supercriticaltechnologyon oneof the
mostcomplexairplanesthatwe're buildingtoday-theF-22,theUSAir Force'snewair superiorityfighter.
I'll alsotaketheliberty to talk aboutothertechnologiesthatNASA hasdevelopedandtheinfluencethat
theyhaveleft on theF-22Program.Finally, I'll showyou wheretheF-22Programstandstoday.
Figure2. Outline.
The heritageof supercriticaltechnologyshownin figure 3 startedin the 1960's.Supercriticalflow
technologydevelopmentgavethe whole industrythe possibility that major improvementsin transonic
aerodynamicperformancecouldbemade.Keyonthatword"possibility," becauseunlessyoubelievethat
it's possibleto discover,youwon't beableto discoveratall. Dick Whitcombgraspedthat possibilityand
the major achievementhat hegaveto us wasthe understandingof transonic-supercriticalflow-what
madeit tick, how it worked,whatyouhadto dophysicallyandlogically to comeoutwith asuperior-per-
forming airfoil.
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Figure3. Theheritage:aeronauticaltechnologyadvances.
In anearlierpresentation,Dick Whitcombdiscussedhowweusedtheprimitive airfoil designandanal-
ysis toolsthat existedin thelate 1960'sto work in thetransonicflow regime.It wasnot until the 1970's,
afterweunderstoodthatpossibilityof tremendousimprovementin transonicaerodynamicsthat thecom-
putationaltoolsbeganto catchup.By theearly 1980's,wehadthetechnicalunderstandingof supercritical
flow conceptspluswehadthecomputationaltools to optimizethataerodynamicperformanceof all kinds
of airplanes,including fighters,transports,helicopters,andevenengines.
Onesmallhumoroustidbit aboutapplicationof supercriticalflow technologyto fighters.Dick Whit-
combwasaskedin the mid-1960'sto apply thesupercriticalairfoil to theF-14. SubsequentlytheNavy
cameoutwith a writtenproclamationthat thecontractorcould notusesupercriticalairfoils on the F-14
becausetheywere"supercritical"and,therefore,theymustbe"supersensitive!"
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Fightershavecomea longwaysincetheF-14;theNASA technologyadvancesthat haveinfluenced
theF-22areshownin figure4 andaremorethanjust theaerodynamicadvances.NASA hasspentmillions
of dollarsoncompositematerialshelpingindustryin understandinghowto designcomposites.All of this
technologyhasgoneinto theF-22.Thesamething goesfor thefly-by-wire flight control systemlessons-
learnedin thedesignof theF-22.NASA hasalsobeenin theforefrontof stealthtechnology.A consider-
ableamountof theF-22's stealthdesignhasbenefittedfrom NASA's researchwork.
Figure4. Theheritage:additionaltechnologicaladvances.
Soasyoucansee,thereweremanyNASA technologiesin additionto supercriticalflow technology
thathaveinfluencedthedesignof theF-22.
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Figure5. F-22majorevents.
Theinfluenceof supercriticalflow technologyon the F-22 started during the Advanced Tactical Fight-
er (ATF) demonstration and validation program which began on October 31, 1986 (fig. 5). Northrop and
Lockheed were engaged in a fight to the death that began in October of 1986 and ended in April of 1991.
Lockheed won the opportunity to begin the engineering and manufacturing development (EMD) program
for the F-22.
100
Figure6. F-22teamsystemdesignobjectives.
It wasduring thedem/valprogramthatwedevelopedour strategyof howto designtheF-22usingall
of the conceptsandthe technologythat wehavejust discussed.TheF-22 hadto be a balancedsystem
design.Thecharacteristicsof thebalanceddesignareshownin figure6.Therehasneverbeenanairplane
moreintegratedthantheF-22.Everytechnologytouchedanothertechnology.
TheF-22hadto be lethal,carrysufficientweapons,andcarry theminternally.Theweaponshadto be
carriedinternallybecauseyoucouldnotsupercruiseif youdidn't. This airplaneis roughly thesamesize
asthe F-15.However,theF-22hadto absorbinsidethefuselageall themissilesandall the fuel carried
externallyby theF-15.Additionally, it hadto beroughly thesameweightasanF-15,andit hadto have
betterperformance.It alsohadto behighlymaneuverable.Thisairplanewasdesignedto haveanunlimited
angleof attacksothatit couldfly at 90° to thewind.It hadto be reliable,maintainable,andsupportable.
Everycapabilityputon theairplanehadto bebalancedagainstcostandjudgedto beagoodtrade-off.
Lastly,our strategyrequiredahighdegreeof aerodynamicfidelity betweentheYF-22airplaneproto-
type,built andtestedduringdem/val,andtheF-22wewantedto build in EMD. We wantedthehugedem/
val programdatabasedevelopedover four yearsto becarriedforwardandusedto reduceEMD program
risk.
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Onereasonfor flight testingin adem/valprogramisrisk reduction.Thisrequirementcameasaresult
of the PackardCommission.ThePackardCommissionrecommendationsare reflectedin how the F-22
dern/valprogramwasstructured.Thedem/valprogramconsistedof thefive partsshownin figure 7: (1)
systemsspecificationdevelopment- wehadto workwith theAir Forceto developabalanceddesignthat
mettheAir Force'ssystemsrequirementsandcouldbeproducedwith low technologyrisk; (2) wehadto
prototypetheF-22avionicsanddemonstratetheir performancein flight; (3) wehadto validatethestealth
characteristicsof theaircraft;(4) wehadto prototypetheengine;and(5) wehadto prototypethe aircraft
itself for flight testto demonstratetheflying prototypeperformedasadvertised.
Figure7. TheF-22dem/valprogram.
All of thepreviouslymentioneditemsaddedup to four yearsof inventionanddiscoveryandbringing
technologyto low risk. We startedtheengineering/manufacturingdevelopmentphasein Augustof 1991.
Our focus in this phaseis on the implementationof existing technologyand not discoveryof new
technology.
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Figure 8. Single-piece thermoplastic wing skins.
One of the dem/val technology activities is illustrated in figure 8 and happens to be the largest com-
posite thermoplastic wing that has ever been built. It uses a lot of composite technology that was developed
at NASA. This work is typical of the kinds of technology development we have done to implement
advanced technologies and bring the technologies to low risk.
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Figure 9. Prototype avionics development.
Figure 9 is another example of applying advanced technology to the F-22. Many of the technology risk
reductions were demonstrated in flight test. We took the avionics sensors developed in dem/val and inte-
grated them in our avionics test facility located at Boeing. It took over 100 VAXs in this facility to
integrate all the sensors. We took the results of the ground tests and installed the avionics in the 757 avi-
onics flying test bed. We successfully demonstrated sensor fusion in flight.
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Figure 10. Radar cross-section pole model.
In figure 10, a full-scale radar cross-section pole model is shown out in the desert, not too far from
Edwards where we successfully demonstrated the blending of stealth technology and aerodynamics. Most
of you have seen the F-117 in flight-remember, the F-22 also has to be stealthy and, in addition, has to
have maneuverability that far exceeds the F-I 5.
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Figure 11. Aerodynamic design guidelines.
Let's look at the YF-22 prototype configuration development and how supercritical technology was
applied. First there were some aerodynamic design guidelines (fig. 11) that we wanted to apply. We want-
ed a configuration that had an unlimited angle of attack and good control power. The aircraft had to be
area-ruled so we could achieve supercruise. We also had to have good subsonic cruise and maneuverabil-
ity. The aerodynamic shaping had to be consistent with low observability. Finally, the design had to have
redundant control surfaces for survivability.
106
Figure 12. Continuousimprovementhroughdesignevolution.
Thedevelopmentof theF-22airplaneconfigurationstartedwith agreatdealof designdiversity.The
airplaneteamwasmadeupof Lockheed,Boeing,andGeneralDynamics.Thedem/valproposalconfigu-
rationsfrom eachof thethreecompaniesareshownon thefar left of figure 12.After Lockheedhadwon,
andthe othertwo becamepartners,we thenshareddataandoutof thatcamethestartingpoint which is
referredto as092.
We madetwo majorconfigurationchangesasweproceededfrom 092to our EMD proposalconfigu-
ration638.The first changewasmadein early 1987.Wechangedtheinlet locationsfrom underthefuse-
lagechineto side of body.The secondsignificantchangeoccurredin mid-1987.We changedfrom a
trapezoidalwingplanformto adiamondwingplanform.At thispoint,wehadtocarrytwo paralleldesigns:
adesignfor theprototypeto fly anda seconddesignfor ourEMD proposalthatwould evolve later.The
wing designtoolswehadatourdisposalin 1984werereallyquiterobust.We had3-dimensionalanalysis
codes,inversedesigncodes,andconstraintoptimizationdesigncodesthatcamefrom NASA Ames.For
the F-22 wing designwe rana "camber-off."All threeF-22partnercompanies,usingdifferentdesign
tools,designedcandidatewingconfigurationswhichweretestedandthebestwasselected.
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Figure 13. Wing design approach.
Figure 13 shows the constraints used in the wing design. The influence of supercritical technology is
obvious in these constraints. A starting premise was that the lowest weight possible would be obtained
with a common structural box design that used variable surfaces on the leading and trailing edges to opti-
mize the aerodynamic characteristics for transonic cruise, subsonic/supersonic cruise, and transonic
maneuvers.
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Figure 14. Wind-tunnel test program.
Good aerodynamic performance did not come cheaply. Getting ready for our dem/val proposal in 1984
and 1985, we used 7,000 hr of wind-tunnel test time as shown in figure 14. In the dem/val program, we
used approximately 18,000 hr of wind-tunnel time covering low-speed stability, propulsion integration,
high-speed drag, weapons release, etc. Northrop spent about the same amount. A great deal of our testing
was done in NASA facilities. In the current EMD program, we're now scheduled for 13,000 hr of wind-
tunnel testing.
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Figure 15. YF-22 external features.
The airplane shown in figure 15 is the result of the prototype (YF-22) design effort. The airplane has
an angular appearance. It employs the same stealth principles as the F-117. We had to make sure that we
matched the shaping from the stealth constraints and the shaping of the aerodynamics. The horizontal and
vertical tail configuration on the airplane gave us the maneuverability we desired. We also have leading-
and trailing-edge flaps and thrust vectoring nozzles on the airplane. The blended wing body is used for
internal fuel and weapons carriage. The excellent inlets with very low distortion provide for thrust recov-
ery even at very high angles of attack.
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Figure 16. YF-22 demonstration program.
Figure 16 provides a snapshot of our YF-22 flight test program. We took three years and nine months
to design, build, and get the YF-22 ready to start flying. The only requirement that we had in the dern/val
contract for the prototype was to take off. Contractually, we didn't have to land the aircraft! Also, it was
strictly up to the contractor as to how much flight test data he wanted to produce. We had from the 29th of
September 1990 to the 29th of December 1990 to gather the flight data to put in our EMD proposal. It was
a magnificent effort. The amount of data collected in this short time period was historic.
IIi
Figure 17. Transition to the future: the F-22 EMD Program.
The transition to the F-22 EMD (fig. 17) is based on our successes in dem/val.
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Figure18. F-22similarity to YF-22reducesEMD risk.
Now I wantto showyou thecomparisonbetweentheYF-22 andthecurrentF-22configuration.Re-
memberthatoneof our strategieswasto makesurethattherewasa highdegreeof fidelity betweenthe
prototypeairplaneandtheairplanewewantedto build in EMD. You canseein figure 18thatthe YF-22
andF-22configurationsareindeedsimilar.
In conclusion,youhaveseentheinfluenceof NASA's supercriticalflow technology,aswell asother
NASA technologies,on theF-22program.All of thetechnology,in onewayor theother,hascontributed
to an outstanding,balancedfighter aircraft design(fig. 19). Every Air Forcepilot that has flown the
airplanethinks thatit's anoutstandingairplane.It hasachievedthroughdemonstratedperformanceall of
therequirementsthattheAir Forcehadsetforth. Today,tenmonthsafter EMD go-ahead,the F-22pro-gramcontinueson track.
ll3
Figure 19. The F-22 balanced and achievable design.
I would like to make one last remark. When I was working for Dick Whitcomb at NASA, there was
hardly a week that went by that some industry person did not come in to see him. It was a time when NASA
was constantly being asked for technical advice, and Dick always gave that advice freely. He was always
there when industry wanted him to help out. This is the kind of cooperation that makes industry want to
work with NASA. As a result of that sharing, we have seen the influence of supercritical technology go to
just about every corner of our industry. I'm very proud to have worked for him, to have been a part of
NASA, and also to be a part of applying that supercritical technology to the F-22 today.
Thank you very much.
Audience: Could you speak to the effect of where the program would have been had it not been for the
dem/vai program?
Blackwell: I am a strong believer in competitive dem/val programs. First, I believe that it is out of a
competitive dem/val that you get the best airplane. Northrop against Lockheed-we produced two fine air-
planes. It was a competition down to the last minute. The dem/val program kept the competitive juices
flowing like you would never believe, causing each company to stretch to the limits.
Second, without a dem/val program, we would not have a refined set of aircraft specifications that we
know are achievable. Further, we would not have identified all the technology risks and brought them to
a low level through design and test. Lastly, we would not have achieved a producible, balanced aircraft
design and demonstrated its performance. In summary, a dem/val program is a must so you can sort out
what you want to build in EMD. In EMD, I want to spend my time not inventing a design but implementing
and building a design. Today's aircraft are too complicated and costly to invent and build at the same time.
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INTRODUCTION OF ED SALTZMAN
Ken Hodge
Last item on the agenda is the Wrap Up and we're tuming to our own Ed Saltzman for that.
Ed is currently a senior aerodynamicist with PRC staff here at Dryden. He's had a noteworthy career
as an aerodynamicist for over 40 years with NACA and NASA; although he retired from Dryden in 1981
he's continued to work here part-time for one of our engineering support service contractors as I previously
mentioned. His career has been spent conducting aerodynamic research as it affects the performance of
vehicles - aircraft and ground vehicles. Some of you may know that in the mid-1970's and early 1980's
Ed worked on truck and van aerodynamics in the era of the first energy crisis.
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SUPERCRITICAL WING WRAP-UP
Edwin Saltzman
Most of us present today are, or have been, associates of the NASA
Dryden Flight Research Facility. Today we honor and dedicate the F-8
Supercritical Wing Research Airplane, a significant transonic research
facility.
How do Dryden and transonic relate? Is there a link? We will go on
to explore whether there is a link, but now we will establish our purpose
in this wrap up, as follows:
To recognize the man, Dr. Hugh L. Dryden, and his namesake,
the NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility, for contributions to
experimental transonic aerodynamics research
• To recognize Dr. Richard T. Whitcomb, the inventor of the supercritical wing concept, and his
dominance in experimental transonic aerodynamics for more than three decades
• To proclaim that transonic research is not to be relegated to history (in spite of its brilliant history),
but to acknowledge that transonic problems still confront us
• To recognize the people who worked on the supercritical wing research airplane that was dedicated
today, and to recognize significant members of the wind-tunnel model research team.
With regard to a relationship between Dryden and transonic, we must first define the term transonic.
Figure 1 shows the range and sources of aerodynamic knowledge as of 1947.1 Notice the gap in the hori-
zontal bar representing theory. The breadth of that gap was, arguably, a good definition of the transonic
region-that is, the speed range in which concurrent supersonic, sonic, and subsonic flow existed over the
wetted surfaces of a configuration.
In 1947, the gap in aerodynamic knowledge from wind tunnels was relatively narrow (between 0.10
and 0.15 of a Mach unit), but this gap occurred at a very crucial region. Work was underway toward the
development of the slotted-throat tunnel that was intended to help close the gap; but that effort would not
bear fruit for another three years.
Three of the data sources shown in figure 1 provided results through the speed of sound. Each of these
sources, however, provided only qualitative data because of limitations in instrument accuracy, control of
variables, or primitive telemetry equipment.
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The range and sources of aerodynamic knowledge as of 1947 (ref. 1).
As can be seen from the top horizontal bar in figure 1, information from flight was limited to about
Mach 0.85. Some of the people most interested in understanding transonic flow concluded that even if the
pending slotted-throat wind tunnel was successful, actual flight experience closer to the speed of sound (or
beyond) was needed.
DRYDEN-THE-PLACE AND TRANSONIC RESEARCH
The Army Air Corps, the Navy, the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA), and oth-
ers believed that a special, carefully instrumented research airplane was needed to obtain quantitative tran-
sonic data and thereby extend the range of knowledge through the speed of sound. The Army Air Corps,
Bell Aircraft Company, and NACA in 1944 began planning the development of the XS-1 rocket-propelled
research aircraft (fig. 2). 2 Approximately three years later, on October 14, 1947, the XS-1 (to be known as
the X-1 no. 1) became the first manned airplane to exceed the speed of sound. 3 This f'u'st supersonic flight
reached M = 1.06, and this same airplane eventually attained M = 1.45. Though most people think of the
X- 1 in terms of supersonic flight, the airplane was actually a transonic research facility, designed and built
to fill in the aerodynamic knowledge gap through the transonic region.
The X-1 was the first bona fide transonic research airplane, and the team that conducted the flight re-
search was the NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit led by Walter C. Williams. 3 This organization has evolved
into the present NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility. (At the time the F-8 Supercritical Wing research
was underway, it was known as the Dryden Flight Research Center). Thus, we see an early link between
transonic flight research and Dryden-the-place.
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TheX-1 airplanes(numbers1and2) in flying through the transonic drag-rise provided valuable wing
pressure distribution data, stability data, and control and loads data. 4 Figure 3 shows the transonic drag-
rise, which was first documented in flight from the X-1 airplanes. This rapid increase in drag is character-
istic of the transonic region for all aircraft that can attain such speeds. The transonic drag-rise may be
thought of as a toll gate. To pass on to higher velocities, a toll must be paid: either an investment for more
thrust or fuel, or an investment in research to achieve less drag.
E606204
Figure 2. The X-1 no. 1 research airplane in powered flight (notice shock diamond pattern in exhaust).
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Figure 3. Variation of X- 1 aircraft drag coefficient with Mach number, C L = 0.4.
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DRYDEN-THE-MAN AND TRANSONIC RESEARCH
Much earlier, during the 1920' s, the young Dr. Hugh L. Dryden and two coworkers obtained ground
facility data that first showed the beginnings of the transonic drag-rise for airfoils. At that time, most air-
planes flew at speeds of 100 mph or less. The absolute speed record was 278.5 mph. 5
Dryden and his coworkers, L.J. Briggs and G.F. Hull, evaluated the lift and drag characteristics of air-
foils ranging in thickness from 10 to 20 percent of chord. They were interested in the effects of compress-
ibility on these airfoils, because the propeller tip speeds on the most powerful aircraft engines were
beginning to experience the effects of local shocks.
Transonic windltunnels were not available in the 1920's, so they borrowed a 5000-horsepower com-
pressor from the General Electric Company. 6.7 The compressor supplied about 2 atmospheres of pressure
to a 30-ft long (by 30-in. diameter) tank. The high-pressure air was discharged from the tank through a
12-in. opening which provided speeds of about 0.95 of sonic speed.
The results of their work are shown in figure 4 in the form of drag coefficient as a function of velocity
ratio (Mach number) for two of the six airfoils they tested. Figure 4 is a reproduction of original data plots
from reference 7. The two airfoils shown were 10- and 14-percent thick, respectively. The two-dimension-
al airfoils were mounted outside of the discharge opening, of course, so the experiment was free of shock
reflected wall effects; and relatively conclusive data were obtained in spite of the primitive nature of the
equipment. At velocity ratios of 0.75 and above (notice that they didn't call this velocity ratio "Mach num-
ber" at that early time in aeronautics history), clearly the transonic drag-rise has started, especially for the
Figure 4.
• 48
.44
• 36
Airfoil drag data showing effects of exceeding critical speed (ref. 7).
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thicker airfoil. Theseresultswerethevery first documentationof therise in transonicdragfor airfoils."
Throughthisexperimentwecanestablishasignificantlink betweenDryden-the-manandveryearlytran-
sonicaerodynamicsresearch.
Two yearsaftertheexperimentwith theGeneralElectriccompressor,L.J.BriggsandH.L. Drydenco-
operatedagainin anotherlandmarktransonicexperiment.This timetheywantedto measurethe detailed
distribution of pressureover thesameairfoil shapesastheyhadworkedwith earlier.Furthermore,they
wantedto obtainvelocitiesinexcessof sonicspeed,sotheyagainneededalargecompressor.Suchacom-
pressorwasmadeavailableto themthroughthecourtesyof theChemicalWarfareService.8
This borrowed compressor was able to supply an airstream of up to 1250 ft/sec through a 2-in. conver-
gent--divergent nozzle (a simple orifice was used at lower speeds). With this equipment (fig. 5 shows a
crude reproduction), they were able to expose airfoils of 1-in. chord to velocities from 0.5, 0.65, 0.8, 0.95,
and 1.08 times the speed of sound. The highest velocity ratio represents the first supersonic aerodynamic
data obtained from a ground test facility in the US-and the year was 1926. An interesting note is that the
first ground facility tests in the US to exceed sonic velocity, V/C = 1.08, were close in Mach number to
the first manned flight to exceed the speed of sound, M = 1.06. In addition, the problem of critical propel-
ler-tip velocities and the novel use of borrowed, primitive equipment, combined with innovation by Briggs
and Dryden, brought forth two landmark transonic research experiments in the 1920' s, a time when most
Americans did not yet own an automobile and Calvin Coolidge was president. Thus the link between Dry-
den-the-man and transonic research was solidified.
Figure 5. General view of apparatus used to obtain first supersonic aerodynamic data from a ground test
facility in the US. Gauges for speed measurement and control valves at the left, airfoil mounting in the
center, and gauge for pressure distribution at the right (reprinted from ref. 8).
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A LOGICAL SPELLER
Even though transonic data were being obtained during the 1920's, there was no such word as yet. Dry-
den was well aware that such a word was needed, and he proceeded to invent the word transsonic. He had
a very logical reason for the way he spelled it. His reasoning was analogous with how one combines the
prefix, trans, with another complete word to form the new word transcontinental or transoceanic. Thus
he combined the prefix trans with sonic to obtain transsonic.
Because Dr. Dryden was held in high regard throughout the aeronautical community, the engineers at
NACA began using his new word. Evidence of this use can be seen* in excerpts from John Stack's Wright
Brothers Lecture, 9 first presented in December 1944 (fig. 6). The first two examples (encircled in fig. 6)
are from the text of Stack's lecture, and the third example is from Hugh Dryden's commentary, which was
published with the written version of the lecture.
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Figure 6. Transonic or transsonic? Excerpt from Eighth Wright Brothers Lecture (ref. 9).
Three years later Dr. Dryden and Professor Theodore von K_irrmin were traveling together by train
between Aberdeen, Maryland and Washington, DC. They had worked together and had numerous interests
in common; consequently they were discussing the need for an official word to describe this critical speed
region in aerodynamics. Dryden explained that he and a few NACA engineers were already using
*In John Becker's The High-Speed Frontier, 6 it is reported that because Dryden and his coworkers were using a borrowed
compressor, they had to use it at the convenience of the General Electric Company. Thus they found themselves conducting
their experiment on Christmas day of 1923 at General Electric's Lynn, Massachusetts facility. The open jet was very noisy, and
as Dryden was to write later, "We walked down the street in Lynn (that evening) discussing the jet and noticed passersby staring
at us strangely and shaking their heads. It was some time before we discovered that we'd been shouting at each other at the top
of our voices, both temporarily deaf as a result of working with our heads only a few inches from the large jet."
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transsonic. Von Karman liked Dryden's word, but he did not approve of the spelling! Von K_irm_in there-
upon proposed his own version-transonic. _o
In spite of Dryden's logic about how to spell the new word, we know that it was von Kfirm_in's version
that has prevailed. Von K_mfin explained it as follows: "Dryden was logical and wanted two s's. I thought
it wasn't necessary to always be logical in aeronautics, so I wrote it with one s. ''l°
In pressing his argument with Dryden, von K_irrn_in even quoted the German poet Goethe, who said,
"Some logic is desirable, but to be always logical is horrible. ''_l Apparently Goethe recognized a nine-
teenth-century nerd when he saw, or heard, one.
THE LINK ESTABLISHED (IN SUMMARY)
So, considering the period from the early 1920's to the late 1940's, a substantial link was established
between Dryden, the man and the place, and transonic aerodynamics research, as noted in the following:
• H.L. Dryden was a key member of the three-member team that generated the first airfoil data
demonstrating the transonic drag-rise.
Dryden was a key member of the two-member team that devised the first convergent--divergent
nozzle ground test facility in the US that provided airfoil pressure distribution data through the
speed of sound and beyond (to M = 1.08).
Dryden invented the word transonic, though his logical mind called for a different spelling.
By the mid-1940's, Dryden, as a leader, supported, encouraged, and advised on behalf of the X-1
transonic research airplane project; and he saw the effort through to fruition soon after he became
the director of research for the NACA.
The ancestral research organization of the present NASA Dryden Flight Research Facility conduct-
ed the world's first quantitative transonic flight research using the X-1 aircraft. At that time, 1946-
1949, the facility was known as the NACA Muroc Flight Test Unit, under the direction of Walter
C. Williams. As will be revealed in the following section of this wrap up, for the next three decades
the flight confirmation of Richard T. Whitcomb's transonic innovations was also achieved at the
Dryden facility.
RICHARD T. WHITCOMB AND TRANSONIC RESEARCH
Now, what about Whitcomb (inventor of the supercritical wing concept) and his relationship to tran-
sonic research? Did the Whitcomb involvement with transonic aerodynamics extend beyond the supercrit-
ical wing?
Hansen's Engineer in Charge 2 indicates that Whitcomb was a member of the team that designed and
developed the first slotted-throat transonic tunnel, thus closing the gap in knowledge from wind tunnels
that was evident in figure 1. Whitcomb was soon after to invent and conceive of the area rule (fig. 7) during
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the early 1950'S. 12A3A4,15 For the F-102A configuration shown in figure 7, the area rule provided a
25-percent reduction in the transonic wave-drag increment.
(a) Prototype airplane (b) Area-ruled airplane.
Figure 7. Application of area rule to F-102 airplane, 1954.
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During the mid-1960's to the early 1970's Whitcomb invented and developed the supercritical wing
concept that culminated in (a) the F-8 Supercritical Wing Research Airplane that was dedicated today, and
(b) the associated flight program. 16,_7,_8,19The subject research airplane, figure 8, demonstrated an overall
configuration, drag-rise Mach number of 0.965 at the cruise lift coefficient and the drag for the wing did
not diverge until M = 0.98 to 0.99. This was, and remains, a remarkable achievement.
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Figure8. TheF-8 SupercriticalWing ResearchAirplane.
In 1976Whitcombpublishedhis initial findings on the winglet concept. 2° Though applicable at sub-
sonic speeds, this invention held promise for faster transport-type aircraft that would exploit the lower por-
tions of the transonic realm. The flight demonstration of the concept on the KC-135 airplane, figure 9,
showed a 6-percent saving in fuel. 21 For the newer generation of civil transports having higher tip loading,
the fuel savings are expected to be even greater.
Each of the inventions or concepts brought forth and developed by Dr. Whitcomb is a landmark tran-
sonic technology achievement by itself. Taken together they have had a monumental impact on current
high-performance transonic aircraft (and supersonic aircraft), and it is fair to acknowledge that these
developments have changed the shape of air vehicles forever.
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Figure 9. The KC-135 Winglet Research Airplane.
ECN 11484
THE RESEARCH CLIMATE
It is reasonable to ask what kind of agency or organization can spawn and nurture such innovative,
profound, and enduring research. Though adequate funding for equipment and personnel is important, this
observer believes that it is more important that the organization tolerate, even encourage, a pattern of rou-
tine challenge toward conventional wisdom. Conventional wisdom is usually granted a position of respect
within our culture. Thus it has its place, but that place is at or near the starting place for technical investi-
gations. A long-standing reliance on conventional wisdom leaves the investigator too close to the starting
place and enhances the status quo.
Therefore, it was encouraging to see a statement from a recent address to the American Institute for
Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) that said, "In the New NASA we'll welcome a diversity of views
and ideas-from both inside and outside the organization. ''22
Perhaps NASA's retired deputy administrator had a similar thought in mind when he wrote, "I think
sometimes NASA could use a little more internal controversy. ''23
It is probably a natural assumption that caution about conventional wisdom is limited to the technical
community-primarily the research portion of the technical community. This is not the case, as can be seen
from the following paraphrased statement from a 20th-century theologian: If you and I agree on every mat-
ter, one of us has ceased thinking.
And perhaps Dr. J.B. Harvey has said it as well as anyone: "... the mismanagement of agreement, not
the inability to manage conflict, is the single most pressing issue of most modem organizations. ''24
It is reasonable to ask whether the spirit conveyed by these four individuals, seemingly expressing con-
cern about reliance upon conventional wisdom, represents the kind of environment that surrounded
Whitcomb and his coworkers during the three decades that he dominated transonic aerodynamics research.
Did Whitcomb's revolutionary ideas thrive because he worked in an environment unencumbered by con-
ventional wisdom?
No, plenty of conventional wisdom was around-enough to challenge each of his historic transonic
innovations:
Although a revolutionary breakthrough for reducing the transonic wave drag was needed, there
were a few in the aerodynamics community who believed and proclaimed that the benefits from
the area rule were primarily fineness-ratio effects.
Conventional wisdom adherents claimed that the benefits from reduced shock strength (provided
by the supercritical airfoil) would likely be overshadowed by high-trim drag inherent in nose-down
pitching moment caused by loading in the cusp region of the airfoil.
• Other believers in conventional wisdom thought that the winglets were simply performing as extra
aspect ratio in disguise.
However, each of these three planks in the platform of conventional wisdom was to be proved false.
Whitcomb and his research team had the innovative spirit and technical ability required to overcome con-
ventional wisdom. The original wind-tunnel research performed at the Langley Research Center, the flight
confirmation work performed at (what is now) the Dryden Flight Research Facility, and the numerous
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commercial and military applications of these three technology innovations have discredited the challenge
** " " toof conventional wisdom. We may think of this three-decade struggle improve the performance and
efficiency of transonic aircraft as a contest where the final score was: Innovative, radical transonic re-
search, 3; Conventional wisdom, 0.
Aeronautics researchers and planners of aeronautics programs should remember this score as their
work addresses future configurations (whether transonic, supersonic, or hypersonic). Yes, all three of these
speed regions represent configurations that must encounter or pass through the transonic "toll gate." As
Dr. Whitcomb's research has shown, the magnitude of the toll can be reduced by innovative experimental
effort.
After the accomplishments of the Whitcomb team had been confirmed in flight and applied on aircraft
throughout the world, the adherents to conventional wisdom acknowledged the benefits of Whitcomb's
transonic research for the previous three decades. But now they are tempted to consider the problems of
transonic aerodynamics to be solved.
However, at least two of the high-performance US aircraft that flew in the recent Gulf War, and the X-
29A forward-swept wing research airplane, display an erosion of transonic aerodynamic design finesse (a
slippage of the very specific aero-design principles conceived by Dr. Whitcomb) relative to the aircraft
built in the 1950's and 1960's. The specific deficiencies of these three aircraft are that wave drag and par-
asite drag are too high. These deficiencies are evidence that conventional wisdom learns reluctantly, if at
all, and (like childhood diseases) it seems to infect each generation.
Therefore, just because this F-8 research aircraft symposium has retired the original supercritical wing
airplane as a research artifact (and just because transonic research, per se, has a history), we should not
assign transonic problems to history. The brilliant transonic research findings of the 1950's through the
1970's did not revoke the laws of physics governing transonic flow for future aircraft.
The supercritical wing research airplane that has been dedicated at this symposium will, of course, rep-
resent and honor the innovative research of the past. However, it must also remind us that if we limit tran-
sonic research to the status of history, the charges at the transonic "toll gate" will be unnecessarily high
for some future transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic configurations. It is appropriate to recall the words
of Hugh L. Dryden, "The most important tool in aeronautical research, even more important than the large
wind tunnel, is the human mind. ''25
RECOGNITION
One of the purposes of this wrap up presentation is to recognize the members of the research team. At
the NASA Langley Research Center the primary members of the research team were Richard T. Whit-
comb, Thomas C. Kelley, Charles D. Harris, Dennis W. Bartlett, James A. Blackwell, Perry W. Hanson,
and Laurence K. Loftin, Jr. (technical/administrative).
Theodore G. Ayers, though not a part of the Langley team assigned to the F-8 configuration, was then
a part of their supercritical wing research for fighter aircraft applications. His subsequent transfer to the
**As was mentioned earlier, there is a legitimate place and function for conventional wisdom. It was proper for conventional
wisdom to challenge these three innovations. Unencumbered by nontechnical factors the worthy innovation or concept will
prevail.
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Dryden facility strengthened the transonic-supercritical capability for flight research. Dryden Flight Re-
search Center personnel involved with the F-8 Supercritical Wing research effort are listed in figure 10.
Larry W. Abbott
William H. Andrews
Charles H. Bailey
Richard D. Banner
Frank Caroddo
John P. Cary
Frank W. Cazier
Clarence E. Cook
V. Michael DeAngelis
Paschal H. Dorr
James A. Duffield
Harold W. Everhart
Francis J. Fedor
Daniel C. Garrabrant
Donald H. Gatlin
Gene A. Kenner
Maurice King
Gary Krier
Wilton P. Lock, Jr.
James F. Maher
Nell W. Matheny
Leon S. McDaniel
Frank C. McDonald
Elsie B. McGowan
Thomas C. McMurtry
John G. McTigue
Richard R. Fischer Lawrence C. Montoya
De E. Beeler, technical/administrative
Weneth D. Painter
Gordon A. Payne
Harvey B. Price
Jon S. Pyle
Walter P. Redman
Edward J. Sabo
Edwin J. Saltzman
George J. Sitterle
Darrell G. Sperry
Louis L. Steers
Harold J. Walker
Lannie D. Webb
AI White
James Wilson
Donald D. Yount
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Figure 10. Members of the F-8 Supercritical Wing Flight Team.
PERSPECTIVE
It is probably quite normal for a worker to wonder how his or her specialty or subspecialty fits into the
fabric of the overall "big picture." We each desire an enlightened evaluation of our contribution, not lim-
ited by the time frame and immediate objectives of the particular project. We seek an assessment that has
reliable perspective.***
Thus, today's innovators in the fields of electricity and electronics might welcome an assessment of
their work, or a perspective commentary (if it were possible), by pioneers in their field such as Tesla, Mar-
coni, or Edison. Likewise, in the field of rocketry, today's worker might desire perspective commentary
from the pioneers of modem rocketry--Goddard and von Braun.
In a narrower sense, the same can be said for those who worked on the development and investigation
of the supercritical wing concept (those mentioned in the Recognition section or listed in fig. 10). Whether
a pilot, planner, supervisor, mechanic, technician, engineer, or some other specialist-an acknowledgment
of having been needed (recognition with perspective) is welcomed. And the pioneer for this group would
be Dr. H.L. Dryden.
***perspective (per-spek'tiv) n ... 3. the relationship or proportion of the parts of a whole, regarded from a particular stand-
point or point in time. 4. A proper evaluation with proportional importance given to the component parts. [From Webster's New
World Dictionary of the American Language].
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Dr. Dryden died in 1965, the same year that the first technical report was written on the supercritical
airfoil concept. Though he would not witness the final outcome, we know that he was enthusiastic in his
support of the innovative transonic research efforts of Dr. Whitcomb.
The team members (participants) who worked on the supercritical wing have a special relationship
with the young Dryden. This participant is confident that the young Dryden, who studied transonic aero-
dynamics with a noisy, borrowed compressor on Christmas day in 1923, would have been excited had he
realized the ultimate reach and significance of his first efforts. Those efforts clearly extend to the later
work represented by the airplane that has been dedicated at this symposium. A reasonable expectation is
that the young Dryden would have considered the work of each team member mentioned herein to be a
logical and worthy extension of the transonic experiments that he began in the early 1920' s.
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SYMPOSIUM WRAP UP
Kenneth J. Szalai
It's been a fun day for me and I'm sure a fun day for you as well. It's great to see friends and team
members alike.
One of the things that stands out here today is the amazing history of the LTV F-8 aircraft as a NASA
research vehicle. The second thing is the eloquence of this lineup of speakers that we had today starting
with Duane McRuer, Dwain Deets, Gary Hartmann, Ted Ayers, Richard Whitcomb, Tom McMurtry,
James Blackwell, and Ed Saltzman. The enthusiasm and the dedication of the people that made these pro-
grams successful is still apparent.
I also would like to thank the people who have really been responsible for making this day happen. It
seems that when you stand up here everything happens automatically, but that' s because of the work of a
number of people. The brilliant minds of Milt Thompson and Nancy Lovato conceived this event, I think
they deserve a hand. There were also many people behind the scenes: Don Bacon, Joe D'Agostino, Ken
Hodge, Dwain Deets, Ed Saltzman, Lou Steers, Jim Phelps, Stephanie Rudy, Karen Richards, Don Nolan,
Dan Viney, Cal Jarvis, Marty Curry, Laurel Mann, Sandy Meske, Cheryl Heathcock, and Monique Sulli-
van. These people have all done a great deal and let's recognize that as well. I'd also like to thank last
night's speaker, Richard Hallion.
Finally, we see the role of flight separating the real from the imagined, and making known the over-
looked and unexpected. We see the role of flight in discovery, technology acceleration, maturation, con-
fidence, and validation. We also see the role of flight in process development and risk reduction. This is
why we think flight research is a discipline all its own.
I recall Duane McRuer's charge to us all-to be prepared for discovery, to keep our eyes open, and our
minds sharp.
Finally, we are honored by the presence of Dr. Whitcomb.
Thank you all for joining in this historic anniversary, God bless you, and drive safely!
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From left: Einar Enevoldson, Gary Krier, Phil Oestricher, Fitz Fulton, Harry Heimpel, Jim Patton, Don
Mallick, and Ron Gerdes.
Ted Ayers: Well, it looks like most people have finished their lunch. I can tell that we have great
acoustics in this building. At this point we'll go ahead and start on our lunch program. I would like to say
that it appears that Tom McMurtry has maneuvered his way out of another presentation/discussion. He de-
parted this morning with the 747 and orbiter to deliver it east and the latest word we have is they're unable
to land because of weather. He may be coming back which would get him here too late to do the other part
of his program.
We have commandeered Gary Krier to sit in for Tom and lead this panel discussion. I promised to
make short biographical information available on these folks, so let me go through that.
First of all, Gary Krier, who I just said will lead the panel, is a NASA employee. He flew the first flight
of the fly-by-wire, also flew the supercritical wing. Einar Enevoldson, sitting next to him is retired NASA;
next to him is Phil Oestricher from General Dynamics; Harry Heimpel from the Air Force; Fitz Fulton is
retired NASA; Don Mallick, retired NASA; Jim Patton, retired NASA, and promised not to talk about the
Mother Center; and Ron Gerdes, retired NASA. We have a tremendous amount of experience represented
up here. All of them flew one or the other of these airplanes at some time in their careers.
I might also say that there are a number of other people who also flew the airplanes who were unable
to be here today. I would like to acknowledge them by name. Tom McMurtry who I've already mentioned-
he was the first pilot to fly the F-8 Supercritical Wing; Bill Dana, John Manke, Ken Mattingly, Rogers
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Smith,who gaveusthenicefly-by in theF-18;EdSchneider,SteveIshmael,Bud Iles,StuBoyd,andLee
Personwereunableto bewith us.
With thatI'd like to turn it overto Garywhowill actasamoderatorfor thispaneldiscussion.
Gary Krier: I think that the mikes are hot. Is Bill Dana here? I saw him outside, I guess he might come
later. If he does come in I'd like him to come up and join us.
I'd like to ask the panel some questions that have been on my mind for a long time. The way I'd like
to work it is to ask a couple of questions and get the responses, then have the individual pilots comment
about anything on the program they want to; then open it up for questions. If what we say here stimulates
a question that you've got to have answered, I'd like to have it, so please stand up and ask the question.
The kick-off is this. When we started out with the side stick, there had been a lot of experimental side
sticks. Some were force sticks, some were limited displacement, some were total displacement. In the F- 16
Program, Phil you finally wound up with a limited displacement stick.
Phil Oestricher: That's correct.
Gary Krier: Can you talk a little bit about how that evolved from when you flew the F-8 and how that
translated?
Phil Oestricher: The primary purpose of my flying the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire airplane was to eval-
uate the side stick that had been installed in it. It was identical to the one that we had for the YF-16 Pro-
gram. I was privileged to come here in October of 1973, a few months before the YF- 16 arrived at Edwards
to preview the side stick that was in an airplane with which I was familiar. I had been flying the F-8 in the
Marine Corps Reserve for about 7 years at that time. This would be a nice way to see just what difference
a side stick made. Of course, the flight control system was entirely different, and I think that was more
educational than the side stick. At that time we had a completely fixed side stick-well, that's not exactly
true, it moved perhaps a tenth of an inch. After all, you do have to stroke the transducers to some extent.
To all intents and purposes it was a rigid, fixed stick.
I personally liked that but as we went through the F-16 Program, there were complaints about people
who'd done a lot of heavy maneuvering with the airplane, that they were fatigued. I think what these peo-
ple were doing was putting in maybe 70, 80, 100 lb of stick force when 32 lb would have done the job,
which was the max for a high-g command. And, just in the heat of the engagement, or whatever they were
doing, they were working way too hard. There was a general feeling that a slight amount of movement in
the stick would give you greater precision control. Again, for me that wasn't true. In general, the customer
liked it and so we were happy to provide what he wanted. The airplane to this day has a small amount of
discernible movement. It's really just enough so that you can feel the stop when you hit it, both laterally
and aft. In the forward sense it's still about the way it was in the beginning.
Gary Krier: Thanks. Any comments from the pilots' panel on side sticks? Harry, how about this?
Harry Heimpel: Sure, I was flying with the F-16 test force at the time we took the side stick from the
fixed to the small amount of movement. There was a lot of controversy about it. I happen to be from the
other school where I got my arm tired a lot so I thought the limited motion was a good idea. The decision
that was made-as we make a lot of the decisions in the Air Force-the commander of the Tactical Air Com-
mand flew the airplane and decreed that we going to have a motion stick. From an engineering aspect that
was very simple. It was just, "How much?"
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Gary Krier: Other comments? A supercritical wing question. Anybody that's seen Jim Patton's work
on spinning the airplane has got to have great respect for this man's work. Have you ever spun an airplane
with supercritical wing? How does it respond?
Jim Patton: I'd like to make a couple of remarks, not about the Mother Center but in another direction.
I think it was tremendous and I applauded every time we worked together with different centers. There's
a lot to be gained and a lot to be avoided in the inherent competition between centers to get the engineers
and the pilots working together. I think that should be exploited to the fullest in every opportunity. I
thought that was just great and as it happened with every case in which I participated, I think it has helped
all of us.
Gary Krier: Great idea.Don?
Don Mallick: Gary, I'd liketo make a comment too.Within the varioustestpilotofficesinNASA
therehas been a procedure thatthere'susuallyone ortwo primary testpilotson aprogram. Ithas tobe that
way because they'revery complex. These people have toreallygetup to speed,but when theopportunity
availsitself,the other pilotsare usuallyallowed to flyone or two qualitativeflightsinthe aircraft.That
was my situationwith the supercriticalwing. Some ofwhat Jim was sayingisthatit'san excellenteduca-
tionalapproach tothings.Itisstillbeing done today.As Ilooked out thereatthatsupercriticalwing today,
and it'sbeen over 20 years,and it'sso beautiful.What Iremember about itissittingin the cockpitand
gettingclosed inand itwas a littlebittighterthan theotherF-8 thatIhad flown-but then alsothatitwas
a sweet smooth thingto flyand clean.Even when you'repullingings itfeltso nice.Iwould have never
had thatopportunity,even atthe time I was chiefpilot,ifwe didn'thave thatpolicythattriedto allow
people to be exposed to it.
Gary Krier: That's a great comment. I think that had it not been for that attitude, I never would have
had the chance to fly some of the airplanes that I got to fly, and we all got to fly the YF-17 with never a
training flight. We did some simulation work and some check-out work with Northrop and then we all
went out and flew s0me test missions. It really worked out well. Ron Gerdes, have you got comments?
Ron Gerdes: My comment has to do with the only flight that I flew on the supercritical wing airplane.
I never quite got it back to the chocks like I was supposed to, like I was briefed. We had a utility hydraulic
failure which was no big deal. I had to go ahead and we landed out on the lake bed and I guess they weren't
quite ready to bring me back in because I landed early. There I was sitting by myself on the lake bed out
here. They said, "Don't shut the engine down, don't try to open the canopy." (You had to blow it offI guess
to open it). So there I sat sort of dumb, not really happy about it, waiting for the crew to show up. After
about 10 minutes I guess they finally met me down there and got me out of that cockpit. That's my most
memorable part of the flight.
Gary Krier: Well, how about hearing from my mentor, the guy who took me in when I was the FNG
and taught me a lot about test flying, Fitz Fulton.
Fitz Fulton: Mighty nice comments there, Gary. I, like Don, only flew the airplane one time, and I
looked back like 20 years to pick out one great spark to say that I really remember exactly what happened.
I don't remember that well except that it was a nice flying airplane. The other thing I remember was that
it was phenomenal, with a low amount of fuel flow, you could get up to an altitude and you pull it back to
cruise and the numbers you looked at on fuel consumption were so much less than most any other fighter
I've flown. It was a very good illustration to the man in the cockpit that, "Hey, this really is doing some
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good!" Of course, that's what has transpired now into transport airplanes; everyone gets increased range
as a result of the supercritical wing.
Ted Ayers: Excuse me Fitz, if I could ask some of the pilots, if you bump or touch the mikes you'll
cut out. So keep your hands off the mikes, please.
Gary Krier: It's called an audio PIO, Fitz. That's a perfect segue into a comment by Einar. Einar's
got some very explicit and some very good technical information on the PIO on the task that he did that
you saw on the film. If Einar would explain that, I think we would all be the better for it because I didn't
have the exact correct story.
Einar Enevoldson: I hope I have this straight. John Manke and I were flying a series of tests in support
of analysis of the shuttle PIO. The test was to fly the augmented, the SAS on F-8, with various time delays
between the pilot's command and the actual response of the flight control computer. To create as much a
sense of urgency, or as we say, to demand the highest bandwidth from the pilot, we gave ourselves the task
of landing on the white line on the runway. The idea was to touch down not before but as close beyond
that as possible. This was about as good as we could do.
I should paraphrase Russ Barber's description of PIO testing which has to do with self-infliction of
pain. It's difficult to do. Visualize putting your thumb down and hitting it with a hammer, because it's very
serious, and until you actually do it, you don't know what the result is going to be. You suspect it's going
to be bad. The only way you can simulate creating a true PIO environment is to have something you're
going to hit if you don't move the controls. To simulate the shuttle PIO, you have to put an alligator pit at
one end of the runway, and solid objects like big redwood trees on the other end. You mustn't hit either of
those ! Within the limitations of the task we shot for the white line and worked as hard as we could. I flew
that case and we'd done about five or six flights each and we were each flying the same cases. We were
up to about 300 msec, 300 to 350 msec, and felt terrible. But neither of us had actually PIO'd the airplane.
It's sort of impossible to fly an airplane artificially. You had to adapt to it as a pilot and do the best you
could given the circumstances of the test. So I flew it and I said, "Boy, it's really awful, John. I think it's
going to PIO."
John said, "Yeah, I'll work it a little bit and see if I can give it my best shot at creating a PIO." But he
didn't actually PIO the case. He landed, nice landing, close to the white line, and then in the course of tak-
ing off, he touched the tail skag and that tripped off the SAS and he was now flying an airplane with
300-msec time delay and poor pitch damping. He immediately ran into a reversion PIO which was beau-
tiful footage. The number of cycles you saw was how long it took him, and I don't know whether he actu-
ally reengaged the SAS or disengaged the time delay, but one of those two events he was able to do and
immediately was back under control. In retrospect, it probably was not the smartest system design to leave
the time delay on and turn off the SAS but we knew that after the fact.
Obviously no one gets very far into fly-by-wire discussions without talking about PIOs and as far as
we can see they remain a vital topic. It seems like every new generation of airplane has some control sys-
tems designer discover a new way to create them. Have to dig them out each time.
Gary Krier: Well said, thank you. How about comments from the audience. Comments and questions.
Yes, Ken.
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Ken Szalai: Although I had my eyes closed during the PIO, I wanted to mention that in the testing
world there were some things that were done and Gary led this activity to make them as safe as possible.
One was the decision to do those tests wing down at high speed as opposed to wing up where it would be
close to stall. To do those gear down, we took the gear doors off the airplane to provide gear-down capa-
bility at high speed. We also had a time delay cut out on the stick. On the first oscillation which was done
in direct, John Manke said "Oh no!" and pushed the time delay off and the next oscillation he said, "This
is not damping very much!" and he selected SAS and the next oscillation finally damped. He was calmly
going through the mode changes to get out of that. It looked like a short time period but actually worked
through it successfully.
Gary Krier: I think it only took him half a life time to make those decisions!
Ken Szalai: Gary doesn't remember but he called on the radio as he turned away from the runway and
said, "John, I didn't have data running, could you run that again?"
Gary Krier: And that's why I'm in Washington! Milt, could I ask you to make a couple of comments
on the programs overall based on what you've seen over the years? I would appreciate it.
Milt Thompson: What specifically Gary? I mean you caught me off-guard here. I wasn't supposed to
talk!
Gary Krier: Well, a couple of things, Milt. What I remember about the airplane and the programs, of
course, were all the flying experiences. In addition to that, there were managerial things. The program was
run as if we all had an equal stake in it. There was no hierarchy, and no differentiation of duty. There were
people who were cross-working all the time. The people who were working the back-up system were talk-
ing with the digital people; they had close coordination. As I mentioned earlier, electricians were doing
things like sanding airplanes. Can we still run a program that way, where the top person can talk to the
bottom person in the way Paul Bikle used to do, and the way that Phil was talking about at General
Dynamics? They are trying to promote that kind of a loop now where somebody in the pilots' office can
talk to senior management.
Miit Thompson: Yes we still have that. We have to continually remind people that they can come and
talk to anybody in the front office. Particularly in my case, you know, that's my whole job to look after
the day-to-day flight activities. We encourage people that have a problem or any kind of concern to come
and let us know about it. We can't do the job on our own. We aren't smart enough to know the details or
the intricacies of every airplane. We have to depend on the people on the projects to be honest about their
problems and highlight the problem to us and then we can delve a little deeper into that problem. The only
way we can maintain a safety record is to have open communications. I think it's still working very well.
Gary Krier: Thank you Milt. Other comments, please?
Audience: In witnessing the fly-by-wire testing that you folks did, brings to mind the B-2 and F-22
Programs that deal with intricate and complex skill work to do on the software prior to involving flight.
They go through a lot of complex testing man-in-the-loop simulators. Can you give us insight as to the
type of simulations that were used in the mid to early 1970's and the fly-by-wire and perhaps how that
benefitted your flight testing; and what improvements you've seen since then in terms of before flight test-
ing that you see as quantum leaps in that kind of technology?
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Gary Krier: Ok,commentsonsimulationof fly-by-wire. I'd like to startwith Phil to makea couple
of commentsaboutwhatwasdonein GeneralDynamicsin theearlydays.
Phil Oestricher: Unfortunately, we attempted to save a lot of money on simulation, especially in the
display area. We checked but there was no doubt that the simulation was dead accurate. The problem was
that the simulation was so primitive that it simply did not bring out the idea that there was roll PIO potential
lurking in the airplane. All of the pilots, the six of us on the program at the time, after the big adventure
you saw on tape, went back to the simulator and the answers each time were, "Well, I don't see anything
there. We know there's a problem, but it just doesn't come through," because the simulation was no good.
In my opinion, what has really happened over the years, is that we got very good on very short lag display
techniques to where the pilot has a reasonable view of what the world is supposed to be doing and thus the
simulation is really useful.
Gary Krier: Fitz, you should have some comments and I'll ask you to extend them from beyond fly-
by-wire and supercritical wing to include some of the remotely augmented vehicle things that you have
done in the Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) Program and the value of simulation there.
Fitz Fulton: Well, obviously this is not fly-by-wire, but fly-by-no-wire, I guess. I'm thinking about
the crash program that we had on the Boeing 720. Of course, we did that on simulation, but the end of that
simulation was the airplane responding to my controls in the ground cockpit. We found it extremely valu-
able to repeat the profile that we were going to crash the airplane on, we repeated many times because of
the safety crew on board the Boeing 720. By having that, you had the confidence that you could go ahead
and fly the airplane, bring it around, and touch it down. In our case, we had a real airplane that was on the
end of the string and it responded to what I did in the ground cockpit. That's not quite simulation, but it
certainly shows the value of practice and doing what you would do in real life. Later on we crashed the
airplane not exactly like everybody had planned, but sometimes when you plan a test you can expect dis-
appointing results and prejudge what the results are going to be.
Gary Krier: Thank you. Harry, have you got some comments to make about the fly-by-wire simula-
tion and AFTI simulations?
Harry Heimpel: I'd like to finish Phil's story. General Dynamics went on after the basic F-16 Program
and AFTI came along as their next effort. As a result of the experience gained from our partnership with
NASA on the F-8 and AFTI Programs, and the experience from the F-8 simulations, General Dynamics
committed probably the greatest industrial capital investment in simulation in a center facility of any of
our major incorporations-I know Phil had a lot to do with it having had first-hand experience with the lack
of that simulation. The first full-dome visual sim that GD did was, of course, for the AFTI which was the
full hardware-in-the-loop in terms of all the computer simulation. I don't know how many hundreds of
thousands of hours we ran that simulator and simulated, and simulated for the months before we flew. The
result was that the airplane flew exactly like the simulator did. I think that in preference of the value of that
activity in the fly-by-wire area all of the contractors have that same experience.
Gary Krier: Thank you. Other comments? Ok, I guess I will conclude the Pilots' Panel. Any last re-
marks from the pilots? Who wants the last words? Fitz?
Fitz Fulton: Well, let me make a comment. I never flew the F-8 Fly-By-Wire, and I retired from
NASA 5 years ago. I had never flown a fly-by-wire airplane until about a month ago when I was invited
to fly the F-18. That was my first opportunity to fly a fly-by-wire airplane and that was a delightful flying
139
airplane. It brought home to me the real improvements and the significant changes in flight controls that
happened throughout the time I was in the flight testing business.Thanks for letting me fly the F-18!
Gary Krier: This is from a guy that' s got bags of time flying at Mach numbers greater than 3. Phil?
Phil Oestricher: I'd like to make a comment of appreciation and a hearty "well done" to the people
who worked on the digital F-8. I had probably 600 or 700 hours on the F-8s when I came here to fly the
airplane. It was a love-hate sort of thing. I loved the performance, I hated the way the airplane handled. It
just was not a good-flying airplane, in my estimation, particularly any time the gear was down and the
wings up, it just didn't fly like it ought to. On my second flight in the F-8, I took off on the side stick, which
was a new thing for me in the F-8, and I don't think I've ever flown a better airplane for take off or landing.
This team did an outstanding job in every aspect of developing that airplane, and I'm talking Phase 1 now,
not the later approach to the job. You did a wonderful job on that and believe me it showed that the F-8
was a great airplane held prisoner by its flight control system. Thanks.
Gary Krier: Going, going, gone!
Ted Ayers: Thank you very much folks. Thanks, Gary, for filling in for Tom here (we'll get even with
him). I'd like to make a few comments on this and to summarize what we heard here. There are three things
that stand out in my mind. One is certainly simulation, simulation, simulation; practice, practice, practice.
As Fitz said, no matter how many times you practice, sometimes things don't go quite right at the end.
However, you hit the target Fitz, that's what we were after. To practice continually, and even after doing
all of that, you still go out to fly and something can and something does somewhere along the way usually
occurs that was unexpected. I believe that we learn from all these events. We've seen recently the YF-22
airplane that was involved in the accident here at Edwards. These things serve to bring us back to reality
that we chug along and everything works fine and all of a sudden something bites us. You can never relax,
you always have to keep in mind that safety is of paramount importance. I believe that Milt in his com-
ments-and by the way Gary, thank you for getting Milt up here, you did something that none of the rest
of us have been able to do in this whole two-day event-Milt in his response to the question about safety
reiterates the need for openness. That is not always an easy thing to do, particularly when you have large
change overs in people. It's important to keep stressing that. I agree with Milt, I think we do have that and
our record speaks for itself in this area, but that doesn't mean that we don't have to be careful tomorrow
either. The other thing that I believe is important, and Jim Patton touched on it, and it's probably something
that isn't done enough, and that is that more people, more pilots in the pilot community flying these air-
planes because that spreads the information around, gets that knowledge up to the community at large. It' s
critical to people understanding the technology that is being developed. We heard in the case of Phil and
Harry Heimpel talking about the benefits of flying an airplane like the F-8 when they went on into pre-
production and production airplanes trying to prepare themselves for any events that happen there. So the
research airplane provides not only the good tool for the researcher, but good information for the pilot
community to go out and fly other airplanes from.
The last thing is the ITF, Ken says that wasn't the last thing, but it's the last thing I can remember now,
Ken. We are sitting for the first time in the Integrated Test Facility which has been too many years in com-
ing. We've spent a lot of resources on this facility. You happen to be sitting in one of six test bays. We
have the capacity to house a lot of airplanes, we can open up the bays on the other side into one large mas-
sive bay for big airplanes. This facility has a center spine running down it with control rooms as you can
see in the windows up there. It has a computer interface capability, hydraulics, which allows us to have a
man-in-the-loop test facility with the airplane right in our simulation. The only thing that's lacking is a
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thruststandto runuptheengineon.Thiswholefacility wasdesignedandbuilt to answersomeof theques-
tionsthatyou folks weretalkingabout,andthatisgettingtheairplanein theloopanddoingthesimulation
testandretest,for doingverificationandvalidationto makesurethatwhenyoudogoout to fly in theair-
planeyoudohavethehighestlevelof safetythatyoucanget.
A needfor this capability is further increased by the airplanes we're flying today like the F-16, the
X-31, X-29, or the F-22 which have very high levels of relaxed or negative stability in them where things
can happen very fast and it's too late to try and correct after the incident happens. This provides us an extra
margin of safety. We're looking forward now to getting all the staff settled in and getting it cranked up and
going. This is the first hosted event and it's good to be in here.
Again, let me thank the pilot panel. I don't have all the information, but there's probably close to
100,000 hours of flight time here at the table. With the people who are not here, but who were mentioned,
there's probably another 100,000 hours of flight time. You are probably looking at the highest level of
flight experience in the country today right here giving you information first hand.
Thank you very much.
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Obverseand reverseof medallionsstruck for F-8 DFBW and SCW first flights' 20th anniversary
celebration
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GuestspeakerDr. RichardP.Hallion
TheF-8AnniversaryCelebrationincludedanafter-dinnerpresentation"The Gulf War:A Survey"bynot-
edaviationhistorianandauthorDr. RichardP.Hallion. Althoughthetextof his talk is not available,the
excellentsupportingslidematerialis reproducedin thissection.In additionto aninformative,quantitative
summaryof theGulf War,therole of high-technologyaerospacesystemsandspace-basedC3inproviding
air superiorityisclearlystated.In thewordsof then-PresidentGeorgeBush,"Gulf LessonOneis thevalue
of air power!"
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THE GULF AIR WAR: A SURVEY
Dr. Richard P. Hallion
Air Force:
750 fighter, bomber, & armed trainers
200 miscellaneous types
160 armed & troop-carrier helicopters
Soviet & European AAMs, ASMs, & PGMs
Army:
Approximately 60 regular dlvlslons
8 Republican Guard divisions
5,700 tanks
5,000 other armored vehicles
5,000 other support vehicles
3,700 artillery pieces (tube & rocket)
Over 800 SCUD & SCUD-derivatives
Air Defense Forces:
16,000 SAMs: 7,000 radar-guided and 9,000 heat seeking
7,000 antiaircraft guns
Figure 1. Iraqi military capabilities.
August 6: King Fahd invites nations to bolster Saudi defenses
August 7: F-15s deploy for Saudi
August 8: F-15s arrive Saudi (15 hrs, 8,000 mi. non stop)
2 CVBGs arrive on station
Troop airlift to Saudl begins
August 21 : SECDEF Cheney proclaims sufficient forces in Saudi
to defend it from Iraq
Figure 2. Gulf air deployment.
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Air Force prepositioned $1 billion worth of supplies in Gulf in 1980's
• Fuel and equipment
• Ammunition and weapons
- Sufficient smart bombs to destroy 3,000 tanks
- 2 million rounds of 30-ram cannon ammunition
- 20,000 cluster bombs
- 45,000+ MK. 82 - 500 Ib bombs
Figure 3. The value of prepositioning.
• In first 5 days, airlift moved:
- 5 fighter squadrons
- An AWACS contingent
- Brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division
• In first 18 weeks, airlift moved:
- Equivalent of 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts
• 200,000 people; 210,000 short tons of cargo
• By middle of Desert Shield, 65 aircraft/day delivered
8,000 troops/day to 16 different airfields
• By middle of Desert Storm, 127 aircraft were landing each
day in Gulf-one every 11 minutes
Figure 4. The value of airlift.
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Figure 5.
Operation MTM/D
World War II "Hump" 0.9
Berlin Airlift 1.7
Operation Nickel Grass 4.4
Operation Desert Shield 17.0
Aircraft
C-46, 47, 54
C-47, 54, 74, 82, 118
C-141A, C-5A
C-141B, C-5A/B
The airlift in historical perspective (millions of ton-miles of cargo flown per day).
• Desert Shield and Desert Storm required 75% of KC-10s and 44% of KC-135s
• Demonstrated the synergy between airlift and tankers
• During Desert Shield, tankers:
- Flew 4,967 sorties totaling 20,000 flight hr
- Refueled 14,588 aircraft, Including 5,495 USN/USMC aircraft
- Off-loaded 68.2 million gal of fuel
• During Desert Storm, tankers:
- Flew 15,434 sorties totaling 60,000 flight hr
- Refueled 45,955 aircraft (20% of which were USN/USMC)
- Off-loaded 110.2 million gal of fuel
Figure 6. Air refueling support.
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• Began upon outbreak of crisis
• Initial concept established by mid-August, 1990
• Emphasized a FOCUSED AND INTENSIVE offensive air campaign-no
gradual escalation
• Three key phases:
- Attacks to inflict STRATEGIC PARALYSIS
- KTO air defense suppression
- Attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait & Republican Guards
• A "seamless" air campaign-no strict borders
Figure 7. Planning the air war.
Inside out warfare
• Military/civil leadership
• Key production
• Infrastructure
• Population
• Fielded military force
Figure 8. Conceptual basis.
148
II.
Disconnect Iraqi command structure (the "head") from the military forces (the "fists" and
"feet") by targeting:
• Internal control organizations (the "brain stem")
• Communications and electrical power (the "central nervous system")
• The transportation network and refined oil capacity (the "circulatory system")
Accomplish this while:
• Minimizing losses of coalition aircraft and aircrews
• Minimizing civilian casualties
• Avoiding destruction of Iraq's cultural, religious, and historic treasures
Figure 9. Goals of the strategic air campaign.
KEY INFRA- FIELDED
LEADERSHIP PRODUCTION STRUCTURE POPULATION FORCE
Hussein regime Electricity, oil Only railroads Psyops Destroy strat
air defense
• Incapacitate • Only internal Added later: • Iraqis Destroy strat
distribution and Bridges offense
Telecommunications storage- not • Foreign
and C3 production, workers ° Bombers
export
capability
• Civil - Nuclear • Soldiers in • Missiles
biological Kuwait
chemical
facilities
• Military - Military Added later:
research Republican
production/ guards
and storage
Extract from original Air Campaign
concept briefing to Gen Schwarzkopf
Figure 10. Focus: what we would target.
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Strategic targets 350+
84
127
178 178
218
238
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan
Phases: Strategic
Timeline:
Planning focus:
Added Republican Guard and Army In Kuwalt
Sequenced execution of phases 1, 2, and 3
I st, 2nd, 3rd, 24-hr attack plans and refinement
Figure 11. Evolution of the air campaign.
y Simultaneous
execution
), ] Dynamic
Phase IV: Ground offensive
._'_ground ,_,*,;_'e
Phase II1: Air attack Iraqis in Kuwait
Phase II1: Air attack Republican Guards
Phase I1: KTO air supremacy
Phase I: Strategic air campaign
I I 1 I
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Days
• Assumed 13% cloud cover (actual weather - 39% cloud cover - worst in 14 years)
• Assumed phases executed sequentially (air phases executed almultaneously)
Figure 12. "Original" theater campaign.*
I
18
I
32
*As briefed to SECDEF 20 Dec 1990.
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DIVISION
PRODUCT
FOCUS
Example
Activity
on 1 Feb
GAT (Guidance,
Apportionment,
Targeting)
I lraq/Strategic Cell JKTO cell I
• Master attack plan
• Guidance letter
• Target planning worksheets
• Change sheets
NEXT DAY
ATO (Air Tasking
Order
ATO (CAFMS)
- Detail (callsigns,
squaks, SPINs, etc.)
- Airspace deconfliction
- Tanker tracks
• ATO transmission
TOMORROW
ACE/OPS (Airborne
Command Element/
Current Ops*)
• Execution management
- Coordination
- Immediate taskings
- Changes
TODAY
•Current Ops separate
Directorate
PLANNING (3 FEB) PROCESSING (2 FEB)
Three "wars" being worked each 24 hours
Figure 13. Organization: directorate for campaign plans.
EXECUTION (1 FEB)
Percent
Country Ftr/Atk Tanker Airlift Other Total of force
United States 1,323 285 175 207 1,990 76.1
Saudi Arabia 276 15 38 10 339 12.9
Grt. Britaln 57 9 3 4 73 2.8
France 44 3 12 7 66 2.5
Kuwait 40 3 - - - 43 1.6
Canada 26 ...... 2 28 1.1
Bahrain 24 ......... 24 .9
Qatar 20 ...... 20 .8
UAE 20 ......... 20 .8
Italy 8 ......... 8 .3
New Zealand ...... 3 - - - 3 1
TOTALS* 1,838 312 234 230 2,614 99.9
Figure 14.
•Total does not equal 100% due to rounding
Coalition air strength on eve of war.
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II.
IIh
The war opened with three strikes:
1) Task force Normandy (AH-64 Apache + HH-53 Pave Low)
• Iraqi radar vans on western Iraqi-Saudi border
2) F-117 Stealth fighters
• Hardened air defense sites and strategic targets
3) TLAM cruise missiles
• "Soft" targets
Conventional attackers followed
Operational intensity:
• 400 strikers in first 4 hr
• 668 strikers total in first night
530 USAF(79%)
90 USN/USMC(13%)
24 RAF(4%)
12 RSAF(2%)
12 FAF(2%)
Figure 15. The air war: the first night.
The F-117:
• Was the only coalition weapon capable of hitting hardened targets in extremely
high-threat areas.
• Constituted less than 2.5% of coalition strike aircraft, but hit 31% of strategic
Iraqi targets attacked on first day
• Flew only 2 % of Gulf War strike sorties, but flew against 40% of all Iraqi strategic
targets
• Had high leverage
- At same time 8 conventional strike airplanes escorted by 30 electronic warfare,
Wild Weasel, and air defense suppressors were attacking 1 airfield, 21 F-117s
were attacking 37 even more heavily protected targets by themselves
Figure 16. The air war: the impact of stealth.
152
• Total U.S. munitions (smart and dumb) expended:
- USAF expended 60,624 tons (72%)
- USN/USMC expended 23,576tons (28%)
• Total smart munitions expended:
- USAF expended 6,660tons (90%)
• 30% of AF total dropped by F-117
- USN/USMC expended 740 tons (10%)
• Total dumb munitions expended:
- USAF expended 53,964 tons (70%)
• 47% of AF total dropped by B-52
- USN/USMC expended 22,836 tons (30%)
Figure 17. The air war: U.S. weapon utilization.
84,200 tons
7,400 tons
76,800 tons
Approximately 19,800 precision munitions were expended in the war
Percentage breakdown by type was:
Paveway LGB (G BU-10/12/16/24/27/28) 46.7%
Mavericks (AGM-65B/D/G) 27.8%
Hellfires 13.7%
HARMS 9.1%
Tomahawks 1.5%
Misc. (Walleye, GBU-15, Skipper, SLAM) 1.1%
Figure 18. The air war: smart weapon utilization.
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Length, Tonnage/
War Tonna_oQ months month
WWI 137.5 8 17.19
WWII 2,150,000 45 47,777.78
Korea 454,000 37 12,270.27
Vietnam/SEA 6,162,000 140 44,014.29
Gulf War 60,624 1.5 40,416.00
Gulf war tonnage is only 11% of that dropped on Japan (537,000 tons), and less than
4% of that dropped on Nazi Germany (1,613,000 tons).
Figure 19. The air war: level of intensity & effort (USAS/USAAF/USAF bomb tonnage statistics).
• Precision weapons offset mass, reducing sortie requirements
• Precision weapons offer unprecedented accuracy; bomb CEPs have declined from
3,300 ft in WWll to less than 10 ft now
• Precision weapons offer virtually "one weapon-one kill" expectations against any
pinpoint target-particularly tanks
• Precision strikes can achieve nuclear-equivalent effects with conventional munitions
• Precision weapons minimize collateral damage and civilian casualties
• The synergy of airlift, stealth, and PGMs has created a new level of military air power
effectiveness
Figure 20. The air war: the impact of precision.
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1. Strikes in Baghdad area drove Hussein regime underground in disorientation,
confusion, and ignorance
• Leadership had to rely on CNN to know what was happening
2. Strikes across the country shut down the Iraqi electrical power grid
• TLAMS and 200 sorties of manned aircraft returned Iraq to the pre-Edison era
3. Strikes targeting fuel and lubricants sapped the lifeblood of the Iraqi military machine
• 1,200 tons of bombs dropped in 500 sorties accomplished more than 185,841 tons
of bombs dropped in 50,000 sorties in WW-2 against Nazi oil facilities
4. Strikes across Iraq and Kuwait achieved clear cut interdiction
° 41 of 54 bridges dropped, and 32 pontoon bridges destroyed
5. Strikes destroyed the Iraqi Air Force aloft and in its shelters
° IQAF attempts to "ride out" air campaign failed; "shelter busting" caused IQAF to
"flush" to Iran
Figure 21. What the air war accomplished.
• USAF lost 14 aircraft
• Prewar estimates had forecast a total of 50 to 80 coalition losses
• Losses low because of planning, training, targeting, and tactics
• Prewar estimates ranged from .5% (.005 losses/sortie) to possibly 3% (.030
losses/sortie). Some pessimists suggested 10% (.10 losses/sortie)
• Actual loss rate was .047% (.00047 losses/sortie)
• The Gulf War in the context of USAS/USAAF/USAF losses in previous wars:
War Combat sorties Losses Losses/sortie Percent
World War I 28,000 289 .010 1.0
World War II 1,746,568 18,369 .010 1.0
Korea 341,269 605 .0017 .17
Vietnam 1,992,000 1,606 .00081 .081
Gulf War 29,393 14 .00047 .047
Figure 22. The air war: USAF losses.
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• Modern, high-technology aerospace systems had sustained mission capability rates of
approximately 90%
- Appears to be new "baseline" standard
- Not just a "surge" phenomena
- True for entire coalition
- True for aircraft, missiles, helicopters, and electronics
- Countered "simpler, cheaper" argument of 1980's defense reformers
• Peacetime and wartime mission capability percentage data for Air Force chosen because of
availability; other services & allies similar:
Aircraft Peacetime Gulf War
A-10 90.4 95.5
C-5 69.0 78.0
C-130 78.0 84.0
C-141 80.0 86.0
F-4G 83.7 88.7
F-15ClD 85.1 93.7
F-15 E 80.4 95.5
F-16 90.2 95.4
F-117 81.6 85.8
KC-10 95.0 95.0
KC-135 86.0 89.0
Figure 23. The air war: reliability & maintainability issues.
• Destroying Iraqi armor and artillery established as a key priority by CENTCOM
Commander General Schwarzkopf
• Four weapon combinations proved particularly deadly:
1. F-111 + Pave Tack FLIR Turret + GBU-12 500 Ib LGB
(up to 150 armor kills per night)
2. F-15E + LANTIRN targeting & navigation pods + GBU-12
(2 F-15Es destroyed 16 tanks for
expenditure of 16 GBU-12s)
3. A-10 + AGM-65D Maverick imaging infrared (IIR) missile
(Maverick gave "one missile-one kill" results against T-72)
4. AH-64 + FLIR/LLLTV/Helmet-mounted sight + Hellfire missile
(one Apache unit scored 102
hits for expenditure of 107 missiles, a hit rate of 95%)
• Bottom line: aircraft & helicopters are now the MOST EFFECTIVE antitank weapon
Figure 24. The air war: the anti-armor/artillery campaign.
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Air attack did not "prepare" the battlefield, it DESTROYED it
Gulf War reaffirmed that air attack has s powerful psychological impact upon troop
morale
- 35,000+ attack sorties targeted Iraqi army
- 5,600 of these targeted the Republican Guard
- Between 20% and 40% of Iraqi troops deserted prior to G-Day
Full range of coalition aircraft struck at Iraqi Army, day and night
- From day one, B-52s attacked every three hours
• Were most feared attacker
- The 249 F-16s in Gulf flew 13,500 sorties, more than any other strike airplane
• Used as "killer scouts" and "killer bees"
Quotable quotes:
Q: "Why did you surrender?" A: "It was the AIRPLANESI"
"None of my troops would get near a tank at night because they Just kept
blowing up."
Figure 25. The air war and the Iraqi army in Kuwait.
C-130 theater airlift was critical to the success of the "Hall Mary" maneuver
- Flew 1,200 missions, with 10-minute separation between planes
- Delivered 14,000 people
- Delivered 9,000 tons of equipment
- Flew fuel & general cargo for the army's XVIII corps into logistics base
Char,e, on the Trans-Arablan pipeline & (tapllne) road
When G-Day commenced, coalition air attack obvlatad any need for bitter and
prolonged ground combat
Could not be characterized as "sirland battle" as defined in FM 100-5
On night of G + 2, JSTARS detected Iraqi III corps bugging out, setting the stage
for the "highway of death" air strikes on Feb 26-27
Figure 26. The air war and the ground operation.
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E-3B AWACS (Airborne Warning And Control System)
- Proved critical to success of air campaign
• Identified threats
• Prevented "Blue on Blue" fire
• Managed air traffic control for Gulf War--up to 3,000 sorties per day
E-8A JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System)
- An "AWACS" for the ground war
• Identified threats, including armor & SCUD tels
• Provided "reel-time" targeting to strike aircraft
• Responsible for success at Khafji & "highway to death"
TDF (Tactical Digital Facsimile)
- "Today's telephone to the modern battlefield commander"
• Operated at temperature up to 125 °F & blowing sand
• In opening weeks was only secure means of updating key information short
of having a flying courier service
Space-based systems
- Gulf War the first "space-supported war"
• NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS)
• Defense Meteorological Support Program (DMSP)
• Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS)
Figure 27. The air war: C 3 issues.
Intelligence and bomb damage assessment
• The single most controversial issue in entire air campaign
• Accuracy critical to determination of when to launch G-Day
• Estimates varied widely on levels of destruction
• CENTAF forced to rely on strike video as most reliable Indicator of true
destruction
SCUD detection and destruction
• Anti-SCUD air campaign involved 2,493 sorties against two major "SCUD
boxes"
• Combination of air action and ground-based special operating forces proved
very productive
• Air campaign reduced SCUD launches from 5/day at beginning of war to
1/day to end of war
• Air campaign degraded SCUD accuracy by forcing launches "on the run"
• BUT "shoot and scoot" SCUDs posed difficult challenge, and were never
completely neutralized
Figure 28. The air war: areas of concern.
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Number launched V-21,190
Dally average 6
Number/percentage reaching target 517/43%
Number engaged by defenses (n/a)
Number intercepted (n/a)
Casualtlee-wounded 6,500
Casualitles-killed 2,700
Combined killed/injured per missile 18
Wounded per missile 13
Killed per missile 5
Ratio of wounded to killed 3:1
Damaged/deetroyed buildings/homes 123,000
Damaged/destroyed buildings/homes per missile 238
Figure 29. Comparison of SCUD with V-2 Anti-London Campaign.
91
2
48/53%
47
45
450
42
11
10
1
10:1
10,750
224
Friendly fire
• Air-to-ground friendly fire Incidents claimed 15 Americans killed and 11 wounded
• Not exclusively an "air" problem
- Ground vs. ground Incidents were over twice as numerous (2.14:1) resulting in
24 deaths and 58 woundlngs
• Will demand Intensive work on ID technologies
Combat search and rescue (CSAR)
• Too few aircraft available to meet both CSAR & SOF needs
• Seven CSAR missions launched
- 3 were successful
- Only 3 of 64 downed aircrew picked up (4.7%)
• Clear need for fast, responsive, & survivable CSAR systems
Figure 30. The air war: areas of concern (cont).
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"The United States relies on the Air Force and the Air Force has never been the decisive factor in the history
of ware"
- Sadclam Hussein, Aug. 1990
"Gulf lesson one is the value of air power"
- President George Bush, May 29, 1991
"The air campaign was decisive"
- Secretary of Defense Dick Cheesy, Apr. 14, 1991
"Air power is the decisive arm so far, and I expect It will be the decisive arm Into the end of the campaign,
even if ground forces and amphibious forces are added to the equation...if anything, I expect air power to
be even more decisive in the clays and weeks ahead"
-JCS Chairman (3an. Colin Powell, Feb. 21, 1991
"The day we executed the air campaign, I said "we gotchal"
- (3an. Norman Schwsrzkopf, July 3, 1991
"The Gulf War marked the apotheosis of twentieth century sir power"
- Air Vice Marshal R.A. "Tony" Mason, RAF (Rat)
"The Iraqi military machine folded under the pressure of allied smart bombs and air power"
- Harry Smith, CBS News, Aug. 2, 1991
Figure 31. The air war: selected quotes.
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AA
A/C
ACE/OPS
AFFTC
AFTI
AIA
AIAA
AR
ASEB
ATO
AWACS
CADRE
CFD
CID
CSAR
CTF
DEM/VAL
DFBW
DFRF
DMSP
DOD
DSCS
E&D
ELAC
EMD
EMI
FAA
FDIR
FMEA
FNG
NOMENCLATURE
associate administrator
aircraft
airborne command element/current ops
Air Force Flight Test Center, Edwards, CA
Advanced Fighter Technology Integration
Aerospace Industries Association
American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
analytical redundancy
Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board
air tasking order
airborne warning and control system
Cooperative Advanced Digital Research Experiment
computational fluid dynamics
controlled impact demonstration
combat search and rescue
combined test force
demonstration/evaluation
digital fly-by-wire
Dryden Flight Research Facility, Edwards, CA
defense meteorological support program
Department of Defense
defense satellite communications system
evaluation & demonstration
elevator & aileron computers
engineering and manufacturing development
electromagnetic interference
Federal Aviation Administration
frequency domain identification routines
failure modes and effects analysis
fresh new guy/greenhom
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gGAT
GD
GE
GNAC
GPS
HIRF
HTTB
DR
IMU
ITF
JAA
JOVIAL
JSTARS
LTV
M
MTBF
NACA
NASA
NCO
OAST
OART
PI
PIO
PRC
R&D
RAE
REBUS
RM
RPV
SAS
SCA
SCW
acceleration of gravity
guidance, apportionment, targeting
General Dynamics (corporation)
General Electric (company)
guidance, navigation, and control
global positioning system
high-intensity radio frequency (radiation)
high-technology test bed
imaging infrared
inertial measurement unit
Integrated Test Facility
Joint Airworthiness Authority
USAF version of computer algorithmic language ALGOL 58
joint surveillance target attack radar system
Ling Temco Vought Corporation, Grand Prairie, TX
Mach number
mean time between failures
National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
non-commissioned officer
Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology
Office of Advanced Research and Technology
principal investigator
pilot-induced oscillation
Planning Research Corporation
Research & Development
Royal Aircraft Establishment
resident backup software
redundancy management
remotely piloted vehicle
stability augmentation system
Shuttle Carrier Aircraft
Supercritical Wing
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SEC
SITE
T,t
TACT
TDF
TO
TQM
USAF
V&V
VTOL
spoiler and elevator computer
Simulated Integrated Test Environment
time
Transonic Aircraft Technology Program
tactical digital facsimile
technical order
Total Quality Management
United States Air Force
verification & validation
vertical takeoff and landing
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